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Opening a World; From Categorial Intuition to Art
William Koch
ABSTRACT
My purpose, broadly construed, is a simple one; to interpret Heidegger’s “The
Origin of the Work of Art” in the light of his early work on the nature of phenomenology
and philosophy. My method will therefore be to present certain key elements of
Heidegger’s early understanding of phenomenology and philosophy, and then to trace
these elements, and certain challenges which arise from them, into their development in
Being and Time. Following this I will enquire into how these considerations should guide
our interpretations of “The Origin of the Work of Art” and evaluate how “The Origin of
the Work of Art” presents a different perspective, and perhaps a new answer, to earlier
concerns.
My thesis is that, within “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger develops a
more radical understanding of the insight which first allowed him to reply to the neoKantian attacks on phenomenology and which led him to break away from Husserlian
phenomenology. This insight/innovation is the transformation of categorial intuition into
pre-ontological understanding, as discussed in the work of commentators such as
Theodore Kisiel. From the insights of intentionality and categorial intuition follows the
explicit necessity of human finitude as later understood as Dasein’s thrown-being-in-theworld. This finitude leads to what I call the riddle of Gelassenheit, meaning how, faced
ii

with the inevitability of comportment and the concealing nature of all limited disclosure,
we can yet comport ourselves in such a way as to allow things to be what they are. One
answer to this riddle is provided in the comportment specifically towards the undisclosed
which is later to become Gelassenheit proper, but which also appears in the techne of the
artist which points to the origin of our pre-ontological understanding (i.e. world) in the
fundamental event of disclosure/concealment that occurs in art.

iii

Introduction: The Opening Up of a World
“The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets
this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground. But men
and animals, plants and things, are never present and familiar as unchangeable objects,
only to represent incidentally also a fitting environment for the temple, which one fine
day is added to what is already there. We shall get closer to what is, rather, if we think of
all this in reverse order, assuming of course that we have, to begin with, an eye for how
differently everything then faces us… The temple, in its standing there, first gives to
things their look and to men their outlook on themselves.” Heidegger1
My goal in this work is simply to come to understand “The Origin of the Work of
Art” in light of the path of Heidegger’s thought which led to it. This path will reveal that
within “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger develops a more radical understanding
of the insights which first allowed him to reply to Paul Natorp’s neo-Kantian attacks on
phenomenology as he attempts to go beyond, or perhaps simply to better understand,
certain limitations of Being and Time. Essential to this interpretation of “The Origin of
the Work of Art” is an understanding of what it means to say that the work of art sets up,
or opens up, a world. Despite the apparent modesty of my goal, it will be seen to run
counter to at least two possible interpretations of “The Origin of the Work of Art”
presented by prominent Heidegger scholars. My contention is that, in misinterpreting the
radical nature of what it is to set up a world, Julian Young and Hubert Dreyfus have
disengaged Heidegger’s work on art from the path of his thought which came before it. In
so doing, they have also failed to fully appreciate the manner in which “The Origin of the
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Work of Art” is an innovative attempt to answer fundamental questions from Heidegger’s
early work that were unanswered, and arguably unanswerable, in Being and Time.
The deeper questioning, or perhaps the deepening of earlier questions, we find in
“The Origin of the Work of Art” concerns the nature of world change, which also
contains a re-inspection and renovation of the form-matter duality which had already
concerned him as early as his habilitation and remained a concern throughout his early
phenomenological years, and can thus be seen as an attempt to understand the origin of
world. We can characterize world as a cultural framework of meaning, or a fundamental
interpretive scaffold, which Dreyfus compares to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm and
which Julian Young discusses, following Heidegger, as a transcendental horizon of
disclosure. All of these characterizations remain merely suggestive, and will be explained
and expanded in our tracing of this key concept from Husserl’s concept of categorial
intuition into Heidegger’s own conception of pre-ontological understanding which forms
the foundation of Being and Time. Our way along this path will be guided by Heidegger’s
enquiring as to the origin of the categorial elements of our experience and his alteration
of Husserl’s answer to this question, in the face of Natorp’s critique. In Heidegger’s early
work up to and including Being and Time Heidegger’s conception of world, like
Dilthey’s conception of life from which it is partially drawn, is that behind which we can
not go. As Charles Guignon puts it: “Although we can discover grounds and
explanations within our regional projects, there is no way to reach a ground ‘outside’ of
the way we project the meaning of Being in our everyday lives. Being-in-the-world, like
Dilthey’s ‘life’, is ‘that behind which we cannot go’ to bring it ‘before the judgment seat
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of reason.’”2 Nevertheless I claim that the radical nature of “The Origin of the Work of
Art” rests precisely in Heidegger’s attempt to get back behind the pre-conceptual lived
understanding which he had previously taken as bedrock.3 It will be seen that this pattern
of looking back behind supposed foundations for their origin mirrors the very
development which led to Heidegger’s concepts of world and the pre-ontological
understanding. In the development of his formulation of the concept of world Heidegger
will be seen to be going back behind the sensory intuition which Edmund Husserl, in The
Logical Investigations, takes as foundational for our experience of categorial intuition.
Heidegger does this by locating categorial intuition in the engaged activities and speech
of life and by revealing the hermeneutic elements of sensation itself. Later in his career,
through discussing the way in which a work of art sets up a world, Heidegger can be seen
to be extending the path he had earlier tread in enquiring as to the origin of the very
projects, involvements and ways of “talking over” things which had themselves become
foundational for Heidegger’s earlier work. It is precisely this point which is missed by
Young and Dreyfus, partially because they seek to interpret “The Origin of the Work of
Art” in terms of Being and Time rather than noting the work’s driving impetus to go
beyond what had come before, and partially because they work too hard at making the
views of Heidegger amenable to various other contemporary views.
In discussing Heidegger’s emphasis upon observations concerning the way in
which art first makes things what they are, as demonstrated in the quotation which opens
this introduction, and Heidegger’s identification of art as a beginning, origin, and primal
2

Guignon, Charles Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge p. 176 henceforth cited as [Guig. 1983]
In the course of demonstrating this point I will have to take into account and address Guignon’s object
that “To treat the shared background of meaning that is grasped in our pre-ontological understand of the
world as something that could be grounded would be to treat the horizon that makes the discovery of
entities possible as if it were just one entity among others.” Ibid. p. 177
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leap, Julian Young observes that it is these elements which have “…led to ‘The Origin’s
being read as affirming the, as I shall call it, ‘Promethean’ view that art creates world.”4
According to Young, then, we can interpret the opening of a world in one of two ways.
Either great art creates a world, meaning it brings into being a new cultural framework of
meaning, or it simply brings to our attention the world which we always already inhabit,
but which generally exists in the background of all our comings and goings. As we have
seen, the first view Young labels the Promethean view. The second view might be
compared to the role that anxiety plays in Being and Time. It is a breakdown which
reveals the structures of both Dasein and the world which we usually do not notice
because they are too near to us. This second view we might label the revelatory
interpretation. Young interprets art as revelatory but not Promethean, the creation of a
world he places on the shoulders of a shared language and the cultural conversation from
which such a language grows: “If, it might be asked, the artwork does not create its
world, what does? Heidegger’s answer to this question is clear: not the artwork but rather
‘language’ creates world.”5 In this focus upon art as revelatory but not Promethean we
can avoid what Young takes to be the dangerous, and potentially fascist, image of a great
world-creating artist.
I believe that Young has set up a false dichotomy, and that the ambiguity about
whether the work of art reveals or creates a world is an important and informative
ambiguity. Great art, according to my view, is both Promethean and revelatory. It is my
claim that this understanding of the artwork is necessary in order to understand both how
“The Origin of the Work of Art” is continuous with Heidegger’s earlier work and how, in
4

Young, Julian Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art p. 29 henceforth cited as [Young]
Ibid. p. 34
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that very continuity, it tries to proceed beyond his earlier work in questioning the
historicality of world and the event of world change. This interpretation of art works well
with a Hegelian reading of art insofar as expressive art is both creation and clarification
or revelation. It both brings about something which previously was not in existence and it
expands and clarifies what was previously inchoate. From the Heideggerian perspective,
Young’s interpretation of language is perfectly right, but when one considers how closely
and often Heidegger equated language to poetry the clear lines between Promethean
creation and simple revelation become murky again. Young appreciates this, but wants to
argue that in equating poetry with language we need not summon forth the image of some
original poet creating a language, which again is what he takes the Promethean view to
necessity.6 Here is at least part of Young’s mistake. Nowhere, in speaking of the
happening of truth in art, need we be concerned with the creation of the image of some
Promethean artist or originating poet. It is precisely this mistaken focus on either the
work or the creator, these echoes of the subject/object distinction, which Heidegger goes
to such great pains to avoid in discussing art as a happening of truth and not some
intending of a genius. Art can be understood as the worlding of a world, an event in
which both art work and artist themselves first come to be. This worlding of a world can
play both the role of creating new frameworks and horizons of meaning and of revealing
previous such frameworks. Of course in some sense, such as presented in expressivist
views, an explicit manifestation of what was previously background is also always a
change, a development and creative event. Therefore the very distinction between
revelation and creation seems far from as clear as Young would have it. Further, as
6
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already stated, without an appreciation for the Promethean aspects of art we will fail to
notice the importance of “The Origin of the Work of Art” as a new answer to old
questions, and an attempt to get beyond the framework of one’s current world which was
previously taken as bedrock.
Julian Young is direct about his concern that the Promethean interpretation of art
lends itself to an interpretation of Heidegger’s work which sees it as “…a thinly disguised
plea for the overcoming of European nihilism through a coming into being of a brave
new world to be established by the Hitler-created artwork, by, in a word, (a refined
version of) the Nuremburg rally.”7 As already mentioned, I locate his mistake at least
partially in missing the fact that the Promethean power of art does not necessitate a
Promethean artist, and in missing the larger goals of Heidegger’s project. In connection
with this, however, it will be seen that the concept of a withdrawing sheltering earth
which, as Heidegger presents it, necessarily accompanies the setting up of a world brings
into “The Origin of the Work of Art” the issues of Gelassenheit and openness to the
mystery, or the reservoir of the undisclosed, both of which further invalidate any
possibility of a totalitarian art work giving rise to a monolithic world. As Charles
Guignon observes: “A work that dictates how one must live is not art; it is propaganda or
didacticism. What is distinctive about an authentic work of art is that it leaves its own
significance open-ended, and therefore demands a response from its audience as to what
it means.”8 Beyond this limit on the potentiality for art to be a monolithic world
construction or propaganda, Heidegger’s concern with openness to the mystery, indeed
7

Ibid. p. 29
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[Guig. 2000]
8
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the very role which the releasement of Gelassenheit is supposed to play in his work,
suggests the possibility and centrality of the self-disclosure of the new and unknown
which is counter to the strictly revelatory role that Young would keep art limited to.
In connection with his argument concerning the rejection of the Promethean view,
Julian Young points to the work of Jacques Taminiaux, specifically his paper “The Origin
of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’”, as demonstrating that Heidegger did toy with the
Promethean view in early drafts of his work before he “…saw the error of his flirtation
and returned, decisively, to the insights of Being and Time.”9 In confusing the concepts of
Promethean art with that of a Promethean artist, Young mistakenly locates a rejection of
the idea that the art work creates a world in Taminiaux’s assertion that the artist does not
create a world. As Taminiaux states:
“The word decision, to be sure, is still used. But the decision now belongs to
Being, no longer to Dasein…. As for the creator, what he sets-into-work is still a
striving, the struggle of world and earth, but he himself is no longer a struggler.
Creating, Heidegger says, is “receiving and borrowing within the relation to
Unconcealment” (OWA, 62). Indeed, such verbs contain nothing Promethean.”10
Perhaps Young has been confused by Taminiaux’s use of the term Promethean, but
Taminiaux here is interested in rejecting the Promethean artist which does not at all go
along with a rejection of Young’s Promethean view that “art creates world.” Taminiaux
demonstrates the shift from a decisionism in the earlier drafts of “The Origin of the Work
of Art” to an openness to the concealed in the final draft, which will be seen to coincide
with my own interpretation that art, and not artists, can indeed be seen to create worlds

9

Ibid. p. 30
Taminiaux, Jacques “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’” from Poetics, Speculation, and
Judgment p. 168-169 henceforth cited as [Tam.]
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while also suggesting that Young’s motivating concerns, and interpretation of Taminiaux,
are fundamentally misdirected.
Even as I disagree with Young’s interpretation of Taminiaux as rejection the
Promethean view as defined by Young, so too do I disagree with his assertion that Hubert
Dreyfus argues in favor of such a view. Rather, in his focus on art’s role in gathering and
unifying, Dreyfus places too little an emphasis on art’s creation of the new in order for
his view to be considered Promethean. Dreyfus, in using Kuhn’s idea of the role of
paradigms in science as an interpretive framework for his analysis of Heidegger’s
concept of world in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, equates world with a cultural
paradigm and describes the role of art in setting up a world as a gathering together of
previously scattered practices into a unified whole: “The cultural paradigm collects the
scattered practices of a group, unifies them into coherent possibilities for action, and
holds them up to the people who can then act and relate to each other in terms of that
exemplar.”11 As with Julian Young, whose identification of art as revelatory is not wrong
but rather merely not sufficient, there is something right about Dreyfus’ discussion of art
as a cultural paradigm which gathers and unifies already existent practices while still
there remains something missing in this view when it comes to the radical sense in which
the setting up of a world by an art work first actually makes a people a people, and first
gives rise to new practices and possibilities. As a partial answer to the question of how an
artwork gives rise to a world Dreyfus’ work is admirable, but as a demonstration of all
that such a setting up can, and for Heidegger’s project hopefully does, mean Dreyfus’
work is too conservative. Young and Dreyfus alike do well to recognize that there is no
11

Dreyfus, Hubert “Heidegger on the Connection Between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics” in The
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (ed. Guignon) p. 354 henceforth cited as [Drey. 1993]
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time actually prior to world, even as there is no Dasein which is not Being-in-the-World,
but they fail to see that Heidegger’s focus on an artwork as potentially a new beginning
demands that the setting up of a world also be potentially more than a revealing or
gathering, but rather also an eruption or primal leap into being of a radically new world
which nonetheless does not spring from a worldless void.
It should be clear from the preliminary discussion thus far that a proper
understanding of what Heidegger is trying to do in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, and
the relation of this work to Heidegger’s earlier path of thought, is precisely what is at
stake in the debate concerning the meaning of setting up a world which Young has
himself set up. Beyond this, however, there is a wider view of the matter we can take.
Heidegger’s understanding of world grows out of his early reflections upon the nature of
philosophy and phenomenology which were themselves prompted by his attempts to
answer Neo-Kantian critiques of phenomenology, while also being heavily influenced by
such Neo-Kantian thinkers as Emil Lask and Heidegger’s own Neo-Kantian education at
the hands of Rickert, and which served as well to orient him upon a unique path away
from that of his teacher Edmund Husserl. This path, which leads philosophy through
phenomenology and Lebensphilosophie in contrast and tension with Neo-Kantianism and
positivism, arrives eventually at art. Beyond its implications for the interpretation of
Heidegger, and the unique perspective it provides us on art, reflection upon this path has
much to teach us concerning the fundamental connection between art and philosophy
which belies the secondary status philosophy of art is generally granted in comparison to
epistemology or metaphysics in the world of academic philosophy. Indeed, the path of
Heidegger’s thought demonstrates that an intense and prolonged meditation upon the
9

fundamental questions of epistemology and metaphysics, leading through their ultimate
origin in ontology, brings us ultimately to reflect upon the relation of humanity to art and
the relation of both to world and truth.
I would like to end this introduction with a note on my methodology. It may seem
strange that two thirds of a work dedicated to the interpretation of “The Origin of the
Work of Art” should be taken up by an interpretation of Heidegger’s work which came
before it, such as Towards the Definition of Philosophy, Phenomenological
Interpretations of Aristotle, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, History of the
Concept of Time; Prolegomena and Being and Time. One reason for this has already been
mentioned, specifically that it is not adequate to interpret a work through what it says but
rather also with a view for why it says what it says. We must understand what the work is
attempting to do, and we can only understand this if we know the questions that the work
is attempting to answer and why those questions are important as steps on a larger path.
In the epilogue to “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger hazards just such a selfinterpretation of his own work: “The foregoing reflections are concerned with the riddle
of art, the riddle that art itself is. They are far from claiming to solve the riddle. The task
is to see the riddle.”12 It is my claim that this riddle is the precise point upon which Julian
Young, Hubert Dreyfus, and I partially disagree, namely the nature and origin of world
change through art and the importance of the way in which art, at the same time,
demonstrates the limits of any world by letting the earth be an earth. It is these points
which Heidegger himself, in offering a still later self interpretation in the further
addendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art” highlights as an essential ambiguity which
12

Hof. p. 77
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had been of continual concern since Being and Time: “In the heading ‘the setting-intowork of truth,’ in which it remains undecided but decidable who does the setting or in
what way it occurs, there is concealed the relation of Being and human being, a relation
which is unsuitably conceived even in this version – a distressing difficulty, which has
been clear to me since Being and Time…”13 All this suggests that, in order to see the
riddle that art is, we first need to see the way in which this riddle has arisen from Being
and Time through the incomplete answer to Heidegger’s continual question concerning
the nature of world which that work offers. As I have mentioned, I believe Young and
Dreyfus have missed part of the riddle by too heavily basing their interpretation on Being
and Time with too little a concern for the ways in which the answers provided by that
work lead beyond themselves and demonstrated their own incompleteness. However,
understanding why this is so requires an understanding of the riddles which Being and
Time was meant to address. In attempting this unraveling of the hermeneutic position of
“The Origin of the Work of Art” I follow the path laid down before me by such works as
Guignon’s “Philosophy and Authenticity: Heidegger’s Search for a Ground for
Philosophizing” and his analysis of the connection between Being and Time and the
influence of Dilthey as presented in Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, as well
as Theodore Kisiel’s detailed tracing of Heidegger’s early concerns with, and
reformulations of, Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition as found in such works as The
Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time and Heidegger’s Way of Thought. It is my hope
that we can further our understanding of Heidegger’s study of the riddle of art by

13

Ibid. p. 86
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applying what has come to light concerning the early Heidegger, a move which does not
seem to have been yet adequately attempted.

12

Chapter One: Phenomenology
“I seek not to instruct but only to lead, to point out and describe what I see. I
claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights, principally before
myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lived in all its
seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence.” Edmund Husserl14
The central focus of our interpretation of Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of
Art” will be upon his presentation of great art as an event of truth setting itself to work as
the strife between world and earth. In preparation for a full interpretation of this
conception of art we must map the development of Heidegger’s understanding of the
central concepts out of which this presentation of art is formed. We must therefore trace
Heidegger’s concept of truth as primordial disclosure, or clearing, and his concept of the
world from their Husserlian roots in intentionality and categorial intuition, through the
influence Dilthey exerted upon them, to their appearance in “The Origin of the Work of
Art”. While the concept of earth appears as such for the first time within “The Origin of
the Work of Art”, it too has an origin we can trace which grows from Heidegger’s
appreciation of the hermeneutic limitations of all disclosure and the inevitability of
prejudice or perspective. The earth begins to appear in references to the reservoir of the
undisclosed, untruth, or mystery which is fundamental and foundational for all limited
disclosure. The formation which truth, earth and world take on in “The Origin of the
Work of Art” involves a fourth and final key concept, namely Gelassenheit, letting-be or
releasement. The problem of Gelassenheit, the question of how one can let things be what
14
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they are which had already been an issue in earlier works, arises within “The Origin of
the Work of Art” specifically from the tension between world and earth, between the
limiting and directing structures and horizons that define necessarily partial disclosure
and the ambition to be open to the undisclosed in such a way as to let it be and appear as
what it is. This very tension, the difficult relation between world and earth, will be seen
as well to be a later return to Heidegger’s earlier reflections on the form-matter duplicity
which was at the foundation of his addressing of the problem of the categories in his
habilitation.
What I intend to show is that the problem, or perhaps challenge, of Gelassenheit
grows from Husserl’s phenomenological motto “To the things themselves!” and
Heidegger’s appreciation of hermeneutic human finitude. In Being and Time, Heidegger
defines phenomenology as the science which seeks to “…let that which shows itself be
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself…”15 and in “The
Origin of the Work of Art” we are told that “The work lets the earth be an earth.”16
Gelassenheit is therefore both the goal and method of phenomenology, and in letting the
undisclosed be precisely as the undisclosed, the work of art is an achievement of what
phenomenology seeks to accomplish. This chapter will be concerned to trace the early
formation of the aforementioned key concepts in Heidegger’s work and their progression
towards the writing of Being and Time with a specific eye for the difficulties that arise
from them, leading eventually to pre-ontological understanding and world as they appear
in Being and Time which will be the central focus of Chapter Two. Further difficulties

15
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arising from Being and Time will lead us to our discussion of Heidegger’s post Being and
Time work including, ultimately, “The Origin of the Work of Art”.
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Section One: Phenomenology and the Neo-Kantian Challenge
“We stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure
thingness, or we somehow leap into another world, more precisely, we manage for the
first time to make the leap into the world as such.” Heidegger17
The young Heidegger, the Heidegger of the 1919 war emergency seminars for
example, presents us with a complex but fertile web of influences and ambitions.
Educated in a Neo-Kantian atmosphere under the Neo-Kantian Rickert yet having taken
on the mantel of the new phenomenological movement as the star student of Edmund
Husserl, heavily influenced by the Neo-Kantian/Pragmatist hybrid Emil Lask, the
historicist Wilhelm Dilthey, and the religious proto-existentialist Soron Kierkegaard
while infatuated with the medieval worldview of the German mystic Meister Eckhart,
Heidegger was to prove to be both more and other than all his various influences,
teachers, causes and enemies. It is perhaps his position in the center of this rich web of
complex struggles and contradictions which allowed him to see so clearly to the core
flaws and virtues of both Neo-Kantianism and Husserlian Phenomenology.
At the risk of over-simplification, let us briefly attempt to characterize the
environment out of which Heidegger’s philosophy first began to develop. This will begin
to highlight the very questions which would years later, though then understood perhaps
in a different light, drive Heidegger’s reflections on the riddle that art itself is. One might
locate Phenomenology’s birth in the Husserlian war cry “To the things themselves!”,
which itself immediately raises certain questions, especially within a philosophical
17
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culture dominated by Kantian epistemological concerns vying for dominance with
positivistic philosophy of science. In the face of the work of Kant, the motto is clearly
provocative. For Kant it is precisely to the things themselves that we can not get, insofar
as any experience is already limited to what is made accessible by the a priori forms of
intuition, space and time, and structured by the spontaneous organizing activity of the
understanding according to its own categories. With the Neo-Kantian attempt to get rid of
intuition in general and shift philosophical focus away from cognitive receptivity and
towards active conceptualization, leading to Heidegger’s observation that in the work of
Paul Natorp we have a radical absolutization of mediation and theoretical activity the
likes of which hasn’t been seen since Hegel18, the idea of any thing-in-itself or irrational,
as in not worked over by rationality, facticity at all begins to look more and more
suspect.19 Within this philosophical environment, then, the natural question concerns
what sort of access we have to the things themselves and, beyond this, what the nature of
these very things in question are and how knowledge achieved through access to them is
to be transmitted or presented to others.
Of course, from a non-philosophical perspective there seems to be no more
straightforward and commonsensical statement than that one should concern oneself
precisely with the matters, or things, themselves which are of interest or concern. In a
way the divide between these two responses to the motto can already guide our eye to
what could be meant by the phrase. Insofar as Kant’s hypothetical thing-in-itself is never
18
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on the insuperable irrationality of the ‘matter’ given to thought.” (Kisiel, Theodore “Why Students of
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an object of experience there is also a sense in which it is never really an object of
concern. If the very matters themselves to which we seek to “go” are matters of direct
importance to human life or the scientific undertaking then noumenal entities hidden
behind a veil of concepts are of little interest, or at the very least become of interest only
at the end of an investigation as a hypothetical product. What is of interest, perhaps, is the
actual nature and structure of the experiences we do have. We can bracket, we can
perform the phenomenological epoche, and thus leave out of consideration the nature of
any given thing as it may be beyond our experiential encounter and consciousness of it
and proceed to investigate what it is we actually do know and have experience of.
If the matters at hand might precisely be experience itself and the structures of
consciousness then we should turn our gaze to them as they are in themselves. This sets
the stage for the phenomenological battle with psychologism and the Neo-Kantians. As
Heidegger states:
“The science of experience is a descriptive one. Every descriptive science ‘has its
justification in itself’. The experiences of perception, of memory, of
representation, of judgment, of I, you and us (types of experiences of persons) can
thus be described. Experiences are not explained psychologically, nor referred
back to physiological processes and psychic dispositions. No hypothesis are made
about them, but we simply bring out what lies in the experiences themselves…”20
Part of the motivation for such an undertaking, for the phenomenological turn to epoche
and description in contrast to either a positivistic or Kantian reductionism to hidden
underlying transcendental, psychological, or physiological mechanisms, is a concern to
avoid the assumptions that both Kantianism and physico-psychological explanations must
already make concerning the nature of experience and everything with which experience
20
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and consciousness provide us. Before reducing representation to the categorial activities
of the understanding, for example, one should perhaps look at the matters themselves
with which such activity claims to be concerned, such as consciousness and
representation themselves, which of course are already going to be providing us with the
very data and direction we then use in reducing them to some other explanatory basis.
There is a very real sense in which, in the case of the psychologists and Neo-Kantians
alike, we have not fully come to know what it is we are even seeking to reduce or
explain. With the subject so poorly formulated any attempt to explain it, or explain it
away, is of course going to be presumptuous and groundless.
The important point to focus on in this swift sketch of the philosophical situation
with which Heidegger’s early lecture courses were engaged is that, while there may be
any number of ways to raise veils between experience and the worldly object of which it
is the experience, we still assume that we can reflect and describe what occurs within our
experience while whatever underground mechanisms that order or direct experience are
rolling merrily along. Perhaps “reality” is inaccessible, but life as we live and experience
it seems not to be, and it may be that a proper description of this living experience can
dissolve the very assumptions which lead to the concept of the Cartesian theater or
phenomenal/noumenal divide.
In his 1919 lecture course “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of
Worldview”21 Heidegger discusses an important response to the very sorts of claims
made by phenomenology I have just sketched on the part of the Neo-Kantian Paul
Natorp. The response is to ask if perhaps conceptualization itself is distortive and
21
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destructive to the primordial substance of life and reality. The objection rests precisely on
the fact that reflection is a theoretical de-vivifying of life experiences since “…in
reflection they are no longer lived but looked at.”22 The very activity of reflection alters
the make up of the thing observed, in reflection upon lived experience we isolate and
delineate bits of experience from other bits of experience. Heidegger quotes Natorp in
observing that reflection is necessarily analytical.23 Reflection creates a false atomism of
experiences with each being taken from the natural flow which is the actual characteristic
of life experiences as lived: “We set the experiences out before us out of immediate
experience; we intrude so to speak into the flowing stream of experiences and pull one or
more of them out, we ‘still the stream’ as Natorp says.”24 This stilling of the stream is
already an alteration of the matters themselves as they are when lived, as are all
theoretical comportments. In this way the motto “to the things themselves” already
represents an impossibility if the path to these things is going to be one of de-vivifying
reflection, an objectifying looking.
This is only the first level of Natorp’s critique of phenomenology. Beyond the
failure of the reflective method to capture experience as it is in itself, the claim of
phenomenology to be purely descriptive only makes things worse. Description brings the
critique to the level of language which is going to rely upon concepts and thus
generalities: “For description also already proceeds via concepts: it is a circumscription
of something into generalities, it is ‘subsumption’ (Natorp); it already presupposes a
certain kind of concept-formation and therefore ‘abstraction’ (Natorp) and theory, i.e.
22
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‘mediation’.”25 Thus, even were the phenomenological method of reflection to arrive at
experience as it is, the moment such reflection moved into the realm of speech, writing
and ultimately description it will have once more turned the matter at hand into a
collection of abstractions, constructions and generalizations. The stream of life, stilled in
reflection, is fully objectified and dismembered in description.
The ultimate thrust of this entire line of critique is not to solve the problems
raised. Rather, according to Heidegger, Natorp turns to affirming the inescapability of the
theoretical and rejects as fantasy the phenomenological dream of any immediate
experience or description. As Heidegger presents Natorp’s view: “If one wishes to make
experience into an object of science, it is impossible to avoid theoretization. This means,
however, that there is no immediate apprehension of experience… Accordingly, Natorp
says that there can be only a mediated apprehension of experiences.”26 Therefore, for
Natorp, the only possibilities for a science of experience is for it to be an analytic
undertaking involving the rational reconstruction of lower level experiences which are
really just basic abstractions and attempts at theoretizations requiring further logical
improvement and clarification. The only way out of mediation and the ‘stilling of the
stream’ is precisely through it; “Science provides experience of its objects by way of
objectification.”27 As already mentioned, Heidegger connects this counter method of
rational reconstruction proposed by Natorp with the apotheosis of mediation found in
Hegel, stating that Natorp’s system is “The most radical absolutization of the theoretical
and logical, an absolutization that has not been proclaimed since Hegel. (Unmistakable
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connections with Hegel: everything unmediated is mediated.)”28 Earlier in the same
course Heidegger had made a similar observation, stating that “…the very idea of a
system that would essentially absolutize the theoretical, is illusory. So, in one of the most
difficult confrontations, we stand on the front against Hegel.”29 Hegel himself, within his
lectures on fine arts, had proposed an answer very similar to Natorp’s when facing
something very much like Natorp’s objection. Hegel, having asserted that art itself
requires and leads to a transformation into philosophy, himself raises the question how it
could find this fulfillment and completion in being transformed into philosophy if the
thinking of art, meaning the interpretation or translation of art into philosophical
concepts, precisely destroys that sensuous beauty which is the heart of art: “For the
beauty of art does in fact appear in a form which is expressly opposed to thought and
which thought is compelled to destroy in order to pursue its own characteristic activity.”30
Hegel ties this idea, that to grasp the beauty of art in thought is to somehow destroy it, to
the claim that the real itself is ungraspable in conceptual thought:
“This idea hangs together with the view that the real in general, the life of nature
and spirit, is marred and killed by comprehension; that instead of being brought
nearer to us by conceptual thinking, it is all the more removed from us, with the
result that, by using thinking as a means of grasping what the live phenomenon is,
man defeats his own purpose.”31
Hegel’s answer is to assert that thought is the essence of spirit, and that the expression is,
in a sense, an improvement upon the thing expressed. When spirit translates nature into
art, and later art into thought, the inner essence of each of the sublated elements is finally
brought to fulfillment. Each later stage of the dialectic is more real than the former, and
28
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so the outcome of the rational reconstruction, be it performed by Natorp or Hegel, is
closer to the absolutely real and unconditioned.
As we have seen, there are two key elements of Natorp’s attack with which
Heidegger must concern himself. First, there is the problem of reflection being a devivifying theoretical mode of comportment. Second, there is the claim that language itself
is abstraction, conceptualization, and thus alteration of experience as lived such that there
can be no pure description. Heidegger, then, is faced with the problem of access to, or
observation of, life and the problem of language’s grasp of life. The answer to both of
these questions rests in the realization that the divide these attacks assume between
humanity and reality, thought and existence, language and life, is a false divide. The
answer, inspired from the work of Dilthey, is that reflection and interpretation is an
activity of life itself which is undertaken through language.32 Life interprets itself and
speaks, and these activities are intimately connected, indeed are continuous, with the
nature of existence. As Heidegger expresses it in his 1923-1924 lecture course
Introduction to Phenomenological Research: “In these two respects we saw at once that
the world’s being has the character of showing itself and that life’s being entails a basic
possibility of speaking about existence in such a way that being is pointed out by means
of speech. The world’s being and life’s being have a quite specific connection with one
another, thanks to speaking’s being.”33 Phenomenology, then, can be set on solid ground
in the face of Natorp’s claim concerning the impossibility of escaping from analysis,
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abstraction, and mediation if we can base our descriptive science on the way in which the
world has the character of showing itself through life’s thought and speech.
Phenomenology must be understood, then, as an activity of life itself: “It is the
primordial intention of genuine life, the primordial bearing of life-experience and life as
such, the absolute sympathy with life that is identical with life-experience.”34 In order for
phenomenology to be identified with life we must be assured of not forcing concepts or
methods unsuited to the matters of concern onto those matters. As Heidegger puts it in
Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: “The addressing and
interpreting of factical life actualized by factical life itself allow the ways of seeing and
speaking here to be given to them in advance from objects in the world.”35 The goal, then,
is the same as that present in Dilthey’s principle of immanence where by we seek “to
understand life from life itself” through concepts which are “the spontaneous
articulations of the structural coherences and temporal continuities of life itself.”36 This
understanding of philosophy as born from the self-articulating and interpreting nature of
existence such that, in its truest form, it can be seen to be continuous with the flow of life
and not a stilling or de-vivifying Heidegger equates to the ancient Greek interpretation of
existence which “…remains within existence, and this interpretation is this existence
becoming explicit through the explication.”37 In order to explicate the way in which
philosophy grows from life, however, Heidegger will have to locate the origin of
philosophical questioning in life rather than in a theoretical position from which official
philosophical questions as objectively of concern are traditionally addressed and
34
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investigated. As Heidegger asserts: “The question is lived, is experienced.”38 The need to
explain how a question is lived and the origin of a question in life points us to
Heidegger’s turn to hermeneutics which he will use in transforming intentionality into the
structures of care and human temporality, issues which will be taken up more fully later
in this chapter.
We must, then, first recognize that concepts, or the categories, are not an
imposition upon experience by the understanding of the human mind. This point had
already been of central importance in Heidegger’s habilitation “The Theory of Categories
and Meaning in Duns Scotus” where it is address in terms of the form/matter dichotomy
as the “principle of the material determination of every form”39 where each concept or
category is determined by its content. This is not, however, to say that there cannot be a
misapplication of concepts or a distortive stance towards any given matter. If philosophy
is born of a natural movement of self-interpretation inherent in life which is born into
language, the very power of language can become a danger to the disclosive movement
of life. The critique leveled by Natorp against objectifying language is quite right insofar
as language can indeed become reified and philosophy can degenerate to nothing more
than a matter of “possession of words” which Heidegger identifies as the state of most of
the philosophy of his time: “They [traditional philosophical concepts] signify the great
danger that one philosophizes today in words rather than about things.”40 Language and
philosophy both, when not understood in a way which uncovers their origin in the
movement of life itself, tend toward deception and illusion: “Insofar as language is taken
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up in a traditional and not in a primordial sense, it is precisely what conceals things…”41
It is from this danger, then, that the focus upon the things themselves must bring along a
directive to the effect that one avoid all concepts and methods, traditional or innovative,
not dictated by the matters themselves.42 This image of empty concepts set adrift from
their material determination echoes a certain class of intentional acts found within the
work of Husserl, namely acts of empty intending in which the meaning of the act is
unfulfilled by intuition. In this sense, what we consider commonsensical philosophical
concepts may indeed have grown from the ground of some valid material determination
but, in being used in a purely empty form of intending in their transmission in tradition
their original intuitive fulfillment is no longer activated which allows their form and
application to change and drift. In recognizing the growth of concepts from the soil of life
we have given ourselves a new problematic. We can be assured of the faithfulness of
phenomenology to the flowing life of existence only if we can be certain that the
concepts we use are derived from the matters of concern, or can be reconnected to their
origin, and this in turn raises the problem of our mode of access to living concepts or
categories. If we accept the principle of the material determination of form, we may be
assured that every concept was originally dictated by its content but this does not
alleviate the danger that its content has long since been lost in the human tendency
towards the repetition of formulas and functions the point of which have long been lost.
How do we distinguish the authentic speech of life from the reified speech of traditional
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philosophy or theory? How do the things themselves dictate their proper concepts to us?
Heidegger presents the guiding insight thus:
“The categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata as such,
“lattices”; on the contrary, they are alive in life itself in an original way: alive in
order to “form” life on themselves. They have their own modes of access, which
are not foreign to life itself, as if they pounced down upon life from the outside,
but instead are precisely the preeminent way in which life comes to itself.”43
However, it should be clear that this insight leaves unresolved what are the
“modes of access” that the categories themselves as forms of life have. The answer to this
question rests in an applying of Husserl’s insights concerning categorial intuition to
Dilthey’s fundamental program of the derivation of concepts of life from life itself.
Natorp’s critique had two levels, first the claim of objectification at the level of
reflection and then the further abstraction contained in language. We have already
asserted that Heidegger locates the critique’s flaw in the assumption of artificial divisions
between reflection and life, or humanity and reality. It is important to note that this
general method of finding deeper unities where others assume dualisms progresses even
further than the location of speech in life and concepts in existence itself. In fact,
Heidegger wishes to locate the two levels of Natorp’s critique within the same activity of
life. In other words, life speaks and in speaking it sees and directs its sight: “Whether or
not it is vocalized, it is always in some way speaking. Language speaks not only in the
course of the perceiving, but even guides it; we see through language.”44 What has
occurred here is in fact a move to a hermeneutic understanding of vision, whereby each
seeing is a ‘seeing as’ and perception itself ends up being saturated with the categorial. It
is an important point that this relation works both ways. Every seeing goes hand in hand
43
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with the possibility of its expression and all speaking directs vision. Now, the NeoKantians would be happy enough to accept the hermeneutic assertion that every seeing is
a ‘seeing as’, indeed a philosophical movement centered on the active conceptualizing
activities of the mind to the point of an absolutization of mediation would have to be
comfortable with such a claim, but the further claim that the categorial elements found in
vision and speech derive from base facticity itself, namely from life, flies in the face of
Neo-Kantian conceptualizing mediation. Through this insight we have moved to the heart
of Heidegger’s answer to Natorp which goes beyond the basic insights drawn from
Dilthey, namely his conception of understanding as hermeneutic intuition:
“The empowering experiencing of living experience that takes itself along is the
understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition, the originary
phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the recepts and precepts from
which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out.
Universality of word meanings primarily indicates something originary:
worldliness of experienced experiencing.”45
In order, then, to fully understand what it means to locate both language and
conceptualization in the movement of life itself, to discover a philosophy born of
existence, we must turn to Husserl’s categorial intuition and the path Heidegger followed
from it to pre-ontological understanding and hermeneutics. Then, perhaps, we can hope
to understand the leap whereby we find ourselves not in a reifying language depicting
objects over against experiencing subjects, but rather within the world itself.
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Section Two: Categorial Intuition and Understanding
“We have gone into the aridity of the desert, hoping, instead of always knowing things, to
intuit understandingly and to understand intuitively…” Heidegger46
Within his lecture course History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena
delivered at Marburg in 1925, Heidegger discusses in depth what he considers the three
major discoveries of phenomenology and their importance. These discoveries, namely
intentionality, categorial intuition, and the proper original sense of the apiori, are then
transformed in various ways which form the basis of a rough version of what will later
become Being and Time. We note a telling foreshadowing of the uses to which Heidegger
will put Husserl’s work when, prior to his presentation of the discoveries, Heidegger
comments that Dilthey was the first to recognize the importance of the Logical
Investigations, the early work of Husserl in which these insights are presented. It was
upon these insights which Dilthey, already an old man, sought to complete the goal
towards which he had been driving throughout the course of his work; “Dilthey here
found an initial fulfillment of what he had sought for decades and formulated as a crucial
program in the Academy essay of 1894: a fundamental science of life itself.”47 It is
precisely this recognition of the promise of Husserl’s discoveries which Heidegger goes
on to articulate and develop in the transformation of categorial intuition into a preontological understanding and hermeneutic intuition from which the categories proper to
the study of any given matter might be uncovered. In the course of this transformation
46
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Heidegger will have to reverse the founded/founding relation of categorial intuition and
sensory intuition, which will bring him to the very foundation of the hermeneutic insights
concerning the finitude and oriented nature of human disclosure which is expressed in the
transformation of intentionality into the structure of care. This path will bring us fully to
the concept of the world, discovered in our Being-in-the-world which has the character of
care. What we originally called the challenge of Gelassenheit, or how we can let anything
be experienced as what it is as it is, will finally come into focus in our engagement with
the concept of world which is co-determinate with, both determining and created by, all
our ways of taking, interacting with, and talking over things, ourselves, and our concerns.
This will bring us through Chapter Two where it will begin to become clearer what it
means to claim, as I do, that it is precisely beyond this point, beyond world as an answer
to the question of why we take things the way we do and how they should be taken in
themselves, which “The Origin of the Work of Art” seeks to go. “The Origin of the Work
of Art” can not accomplish, or even wish to accomplish this, however, if we adopt with
Young and Dreyfus the view that the worlds set up by artworks always have their origin
outside of the event of art in the scattered practices or unarticulated world of a cultural
people. In order to better understand this path we will need to turn to Husserl, and the
presentation of categorial intuition within his Logical Investigations.
The issue of categorial intuition is raised, for Husserl, within the framework of
meaning fulfillment and perceptual assertions or observations. Husserl states that:
“Knowledge always has the character of a fulfillment and an identification: this may be
observed in every case where we confirm a general judgment through subsequent
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intuition, as in every other case of knowledge.”48 The meaning of a perceptual assertion is
fulfilled insofar as an intuition is provided in which the meaning content of the sentence
can be identified with the content of the intuition. As Heidegger presents the issue;
“Identifying fulfillment is what we call evidence. Evidence is a specific intentional act,
that of identifying the presumed and the intuited; the presumed is itself illuminated in the
matter.”49 In this light the question is raised if even basic sentences allow for complete
and adequate fulfillment, if even the most common sentences are such as allow for
evidence. As Husserl puts the question in section forty of the sixth logical investigation:
“Are there parts and forms of perception corresponding to all parts and forms of
meaning?”50 The example Husserl uses to demonstrate the difficulty of the issue is an
apparently straightforward perceptual statement such as “This paper is white.” We do
indeed have a sensuous intuition corresponding to whiteness. However, the statement
also contains logical connectives, such as the copula “is”, which require fulfillment as
well. Do we perceive the being of the paper? Or, taking the statement in a different sense,
do we perceive the being white of the paper? As Husserl states: “I can see color, but not
being-colored. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear a sound , but not
that something is sounding.”51 In even the most basic sentence there exists a surplus of
meaning that is unfulfilled by merely sensuous intuition: “The intention of the word
‘white’ only partially coincides with the color-aspect of the apparent object; a surplus of
meaning remains over, a form which finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it.
White paper is paper which is white.”52 As Husserl points out, only the meanings which
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refer to quality alone receive direct sensuous fulfillment in perception, all formal
characteristics such as are expressed by formal words such as “the”, “some”, “not”,
“which”, “is” and many others representing structural formal elements apparently receive
no direct perceptual fulfillment.53 If, as asserted, all knowledge has the character of
fulfillment and identification, how are we to reassure ourselves of our knowledge of even
so simply a statement as “This paper is white”?
The answer rests in distinguishing founding acts of sensuous intuition from
founded categorial acts. The founded acts to which I refer are connective, relational, or
formative acts in general which arise from an original sensuous intuition and make
explicit what was implicit within the sensuous whole. Categorial intuition may, then, be
formally defined as a perceptually founded act wherein formal aspects of meaning
intentions find their fulfillment. The line of reasoning we have lain out thus far is fairly
direct, sentences contain more than sensuously fulfillable content insofar as there is a
meaning surplus found in the categorial elements of even basic perceptual assertions, thus
there must be non-sensuous fulfillment at our disposal if even basic sentences are going
to be able to be transformed into knowledge through evidentiary acts. This line of thought
has been understood by many, in one form or another, including such thinkers as John
Locke. The twist is Husserl’s answer to the demand for non-sensuous fulfillment. Where
someone like Locke posits the origin of the meanings of formal aspects of assertions in
reflection upon mental acts performed on sensuous data, Husserl asserts that reflection
upon mental acts would never provide us with knowledge of the meanings of categorial
properties. While this method may be useful when actually seeking the meaning of
53
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mental acts, such as judgments where by we can perhaps reflect upon a moment of
mental judgment and thus receive some fulfilling intuition of what a judgment is, the
meaning of something like Being or “is-ness” can not be thus found in some mental act:
“The thought of a Judgment fulfills itself in the inner intuition of an actual judgment, but
the thought of an ‘is’ does not fulfill itself in this manner. Being is not a judgment nor a
constituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a judgment.”54
We can, then, arrive at the fulfillment of categorial elements of assertions through neither
sensuous intuition nor reflection upon mental acts. What these categorial elements
actually correspond to, Husserl asserts, are “states of affairs” of which we can gained
intuitions based upon sensuous intuitions. We can now polish further our definition of
categorial intuition. Categorial intuition is an intuition, founded upon sensuous intuition,
granting knowledge of a state of affairs. As Husserl states:
“Not in reflection upon judgments, nor even upon fulfillments of judgments, but
in the fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the true source of the concepts
State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these acts as objects,
but in the objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us
to realize the concepts in question.”55
In narrowing in on a clearer understanding of Husserl’s categorial intuition, we must now
ask more clearly and directly what exactly we mean by categorial intuition as a founded
act of perception.
Categorial intuition is founded insofar as it requires a perceptual intuition from
which it can arise, we can not imagine a direct intuition of “is” without something which
actually is given to us as existing through sensuous intuition. Another way to consider
this point is to note that categorial elements, insofar as they are relational or connective
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etc., seem to require predicates or objects which are being related.56 In this sense, then,
we can delineate two levels of perception or intuition:
“Sensuous or real objects can in fact be characterized as objects of the lowest
level of possible intuition, categorial or ideal objects as objects of higher levels…
the object is also an immediately given object in the sense that, as this object
perceived with this definite objective content, it is not constituted in relational,
connective, or otherwise articulated acts, acts founded on other acts which bring
other objects to perception. Sensuous objects are present in perception at a single
act-level: they do not need to be constituted in many-rayed fashion in acts of
higher level, whose objects are set up for them by way of other objects, already
constituted in other acts.”57
Categorial intuition, then, requires the base of sensuous intuition given at a single actlevel, upon which objects with categorial aspects then arise. In such founded intuition,
then, “…something appears as actual and self-given, which was not given, and could not
have been given, as what it now appears to be, in these foundational acts alone. On the
other hand, the new objects are based on the older ones, they are related to what appears
in the basic acts.”58 The State of Affairs we intuit through categorial intuition arises from
simply given sensuous intuition, and yet is a newly constituted object. From some direct
experience of whiteness we discern the whiteness of a piece of paper, a piece of paper
which is further intuited as there before us existing. It is important to stress the
implications of this new object, we are not engaged in a simple combinatory activity
involving atomistic data of sensory perception and we are not inferring conclusions from
sensory data, we are directly seeing categorial aspects of objects. Husserl insists that “…
56
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we are here dealing with a sphere of objects, which can only show themselves ‘in person’
in such founded acts.”59 Another way in which this can be considered is in terms of part
to whole relations. Straightforward sense perception always only gives a homogenous
unity, a unity which has not been arrived at through the unification of various atomistic
perceptual data but which is there all at once without the need for any unifying act.60
However, founded upon this straightforward sensory perception, we can have another
intuition of elements related to each other within such a unity, similarly we can for the
first time have an intuition of the unity as a unity;
“Only when we use the perceptual series to found a novel act, only when we
articulate our individual percepts, and relate their objects to each other, does the
unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts – the unity of fusion
through their coinciding intentions – provide a point d’appui for a consciousness
of identity.”61
The recognition, then, of any sensuously given element as an element of a larger part, or
as a unity made up of parts, is always a relational founded categorial act.62 In the
movement from the directly given perceptual whole to an intuition of its categorial
relational elements we have moved, Husserl asserts, from the sphere of sensibility to that
of understanding. As this language should suggest, however, in characterizing categorial
intuition as understanding we have completed a revolution from Kant’s original
understanding of these sets of terms.
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Within Kant the sensibility/understanding divide can be explicated in terms of the
passivity with which the mind receives intuition and the active spontaneity with which it
organizes intuition according to the categories of the understanding. With the
presentation of categorial intuition, however, we have dissolved the divide between the
passively receptive and spontaneously active. If the categories are no longer imposed, but
rather experienced in perception and intuition, then the wall between the mind and the
thing-in-itself has fallen. When we reflect upon Heidegger’s early interest in the principle
of the material determination of form which he discusses in its connection to the theory
of categories in Duns Scotus, which we mentioned earlier, we can see how exciting the
claim that intuition, properly understood, can give direct perception of categorial forms
was for Heidegger. Furthermore, recalling the need to locate the origin of philosophical
concepts in life itself we had earlier discussed in Heidegger’s taking up of Dilthey’s
project in answer to Natorp, we can now begin to see ourselves clear to the way in which
the categories and concepts proper to any given subject matter can be arrived at. The
matter in question does indeed provide its own categories, precisely through categorial
intuition. There remains, however, one element of Husserl’s presentation we still must
explicate and upon which Heidegger’s fruitful use of hermeneutic insights rests, and that
is the manner in which States of Affairs are given in categorial intuition.
Categorial intuition, as founded intuition arising from a base of straightforward
sensuous intuition, can be described as an act of explicating and articulating new objects
out of the sensuously intuited. New objects are categorially intuited, but this intuition can
be understood as articulation. This multileveled analysis of intuition, which brings
understanding out of the mind and into the realm of what can be perceived by way of
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intuition, gives rise to the observation that a sensible object can be intuited by us in a
variety of ways: “It can, first of all, of course, be apprehended in ‘straightforward’
fashion… The same object can, however, be grasped by us in explicating fashion: acts of
articulation can put its parts ‘into relief,’ relational acts bring the relieved parts into
relation, whether to one another or to the whole.”63 Husserl goes on to observe that,
insofar as categorial intuition can occur in a variety of manners, or can to a certain degree
be allowed not to occur at all, several different objects can arise from the same
straightforwardly given sensuous intuitional base. The manner in which different
categorial intuitions arise will be determined by the perspective or standpoint from which
we intuit, thus highlighting the possibility of various possible States of Affairs to be
intuited from any given perceptual base due to the interpretive position of the viewer:
“According, therefore, to our ‘interpretative standpoint,’ or to the ‘sense of our
passage’ from part to whole or contrariwise – which are both novel
phenomenological characters making their contribution to the total intentional
matter of the relating act – there will be two possibilities, marked off in a priori
fashion, in which the ‘same relation’ can achieve actual givenness.”64
While Husserl’s example here focuses on the option between arriving at an intuition of
the relation of a part to the whole or a whole to its part, either of which will grant a
different actual phenomenological relation, he also provides examples where the
alternatives provided by the variety of interpretive standpoints is more pronounced. In a
State of Affairs involving a plurality of members of a given whole, one’s orientation
towards one specific member of the whole rather than another will give rise to the
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intuition of a relationship which would be different had one picked out a different
member as primary:
“Only when one member is picked out as principal member, and is dwelt on while
the other members are still kept in mind, does a determination of members by
members make its appearance, a determination which varies with the kind of
unity that is present and plainly also with the particular members set in relief. In
such cases also the choice of a principal member, or of a direction of relational
apprehension, leads to phenomenologically distinct forms of relationship,
correlatively characterized, which forms are not genuinely present in the
unarticulated percept of the connection as a straightforward phenomenon, but
which are in it only as ideal possibilities, the possibilities, that is, of fulfilling
relevant founded acts.”65
What Husserl has, then, asserted is that the manner in which we approach any given
straightforward sensuous intuition, which includes our interpretive position in relation to
it, determines the categorial elements which can arise from the given sensuous base. Here
we have at least a slight appreciation for the determinative power of the hermeneutic (and
might we hazard to say historical?) position of any potential categorial intuitor. We can
begin to see in this a further reason why this presentation of categorial intuition would
have struck the young Heidegger as so exciting, and also why categorial intuition was
able to play such a fundamental role in Heidegger’s hermeneutic reforming of
phenomenology. Indeed, once the founding/founded relationship between sensuous
intuition and categorial intuition is reversed in Heidegger, with the determinative power
of interpretive position for intuiting categorial elements and States of Affairs maintained,
we have almost all of the necessary elements for Heidegger’s hermeneutic understanding
of philosophy. Further, this way in which categorial intuition discloses States of Affairs
which are already implicit in straightforward sensuous intuition will be echoed, in
importantly altered forms, in Heidegger’s talk of the concept of a Situation in both his
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1919 summer semester lecture course and in his discussion of the manner in which
authenticity discloses a Situation in which one always already was in Being and Time.
Now let us move on to discuss more directly what the young Heidegger was able to make
of categorial intuition.
Within his discussion of categorial intuition in History of the Concept of Time;
Prolegomena, large sections of which are taken almost verbatim from Husserl’s Logical
Investigations, Heidegger makes an observation which, while it can pass almost
unnoticed, fundamentally turns Husserl’s conception on its head: “What is primary and
original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first
talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the
reverse, we see what one says about the matter.”66 In the previous section of this work we
have already discussed the way in which Heidegger, in Introduction to
Phenomenological Research, states that the being of the world and the being of life have
a very specific connection and relation through the being of speaking. Language is the
activity whereby existence, or being in the world, is disclosed to itself. It is important to
note here that language is, first of all, fundamentally public, social and enmeshed in a
cultural life world. Language is understood as a shared public activity of ostension
whereby elements of the world are explicated, articulated, uncovered and disclosed. In
this way speech is already an undertaking, a cultural activity of relating to the world that
is wrapped up in our collective projects which have already disclosed specific ways in
which the world might be and which are always already underway towards further
articulation. As Heidegger observes in shifting the focus of an interpretation of categorial
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intuition: “This inherently determinate character of the world and its potential
apprehension and comprehension through expressness, through already having been
spoken and talked over, is basically what must now be brought out in the question of the
structure of categorial intuition.”67 For these reasons Theodore Kisiel sees in Heidegger’s
take over of categorial intuition a move from identifying categories primarily as
delineators of ontological regions towards instead identifying them as projects and
projections which then delineate ontological regions when taken in a theoretical manner:
“Heidegger will view these categories not only as contexts or regions of being but
also, more temporally, as projects that already anticipate and guide our
understanding of objects that appear in their respective regions… Categories are
first of all incipient presuppositions of an operative context that carry us forward
in the movement of interpreting that context. Categories are at work before they
are seen, and we attempt to see them to put them to work all the more
effectively…”68
If, in fact, we see what one says about matters then we have located categorial
determinations in language and we have further located language within the context of
cultural projects. In doing so we have de-theorized categorial intuition by locating it back
into the flow of life and in doing so we have reversed the founding/founded relation
between sensory and categorial intuition: “But if intuition in general can thus be taken
back to a more fundamental operative context, then sense intuition is itself a founded
mode of knowledge.”69 An observant reader will, however, noticed something unusual
that has occurred here. Our talk of categorial intuition now seems out of place, for of
course we are no longer discussing anything of an intuitive nature at all. Rather, the work
which categorial intuition did for Husserl is now done, for Heidegger, by our shared

67

Ibid.
Kis. 2003 p. 96
69
Ibid.
68

40

involvement in a way of life made up of practices, commitments, and projects. What
Husserl locates in consciousness Heidegger is able to locate in our being involved in the
world with others. In this way, as Kisiel points out, the supposedly cognitive which was
formerly assumed to be foundational is in fact founded upon active engagements in the
world: “If non-cognitive comportment underlies our more cognitive behaviour, if our
more cognitive stances are drawn from our non-cognitive comportment, then this
expository movement is a mode of knowing more basic than intuition.”70 At this point we
will pause to ask a troubling question. If the founding/founded relation has been reversed,
and the categorial has been located in speech and projects, are we not simply left with
some form of social constructivism wherein our experience of the world is culturally
determined and this determination either constructs experience or constrains and directs it
in such a way that we are thrown back into the divided world of Kant, once more forever
removed from the world as it is? Our answer to this question will rest in Heidegger’s
discussion of the new understanding phenomenology allows us of the original sense of
the apriori.
While the categorial intuition of Husserl has been turned on its head, it is
important that we not forget certain key aspects we brought out in its discussion. When
considering the hermeneutic aspects of Husserl’s understanding and of the manner in
which one’s point of view effects the categorial intuition which discloses a given state of
affairs, it was important to note that the effect of various view points on the availability
of given categorial intuition in no way suggested the subjectivity of said intuitions. In the
same way that a sensuous intuition might alter as I move my perspective and yet not thus
70

Ibid.

41

suggest that the intuition originates from me, so too the relativity of categorial intuition to
hermeneutic interpretive position does not suggest the origin of the categorial in my
inferential or judging faculties. We can, then, round out this chain of points by extending
the discussion to Heidegger’s location of the categorial in speech and the shared
assumptions and foundations of our collective activities. Heidegger states that the
structure of categorial intuition must now be altered to match the insight that the
“determinate character of the world and its potential apprehension and comprehension”
arises through its already having been talked over.71 This “having been spoken and talked
over” need not be radically different in terms with respect to constructivism or
subjectivism from a table having been seen from a certain perspective. Neither suggests
that the table or its characteristics are constructs of subjectivity or veils before the form of
the thing in itself. The world is disclosed precisely in the “having been spoken and talked
over”, in our projects and activities the world appears for us, but this is not to say that the
determinative power of hermeneutic position should be turned into a concern about our
being limited to “mere appearance”.
Following his discussion of categorial intuition in History of the Concept of Time;
Prolegomena Heidegger attempts to return to the original, or primordial, meaning of the
apriori. This presentation, he states, will be shorter than that dedicated to either
intentionality or categorial intuition because it is the one which still requires the most
work insofar as it is only limitedly clarified by phenomenology and still enwrapped in
traditional lines of investigation. In fact, to fully clarify the nature of the apriori
Heidegger points us to the end of the entire path of his inquiry, which will be the
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appropriate exposition of the nature of time. However, even in the short discussion
Heidegger presents, we already see the manner in which his new understanding of
categorial intuition is attempting to avoid any of the old epistemic problems and
concerns, such as our earlier concern that we have landed ourselves in a form of social
constructivism. Phenomenology has shown, Heidegger claims, that “…the apriori is not
limited to the subjectivity, indeed that in the first instance it has primarily nothing at all to
do with subjectivity.”72 This is so because Husserl’s presentation of categorial intuition
has shown that, “There are sensory ideas, ideas whose structure comes from the subject
matter’s content (color, materiality, spatiality), a structure which is already there in every
real individuation and so is apriori in relation to the here and now of a particular
coloration of a thing. All of geometry as such is proof of the existence of a material
apriori.”73 The material a priori, and its disclosure through categorial intuition, can then
be found, as it were, out in the world itself. Heidegger’s talk of sensory ideas, and a
material apriori, are meant to point towards a deeper unity prior to the a posteriori
division of sensation from understanding or mind from world:
“In the ideal as in the real, once we accept this separation, there is in reference to
its objectivity something ideal which can be brought out, something in the being
of the ideal and in the being of the real which is apriori, structurally earlier. This
already suggests that the apriori phenomenologically understood is not a title for
comportment but a title for being. The apriori is not only nothing immanent,
belonging primarily to the sphere of the subject, it is also nothing transcendent,
specifically bound up with reality.”74
As we had earlier suggested, but can now state baldly, categorial intuition as understood
by Husserl and applied to the question of the apriori demonstrates through the presence of
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the categorial in intuition a primordial unity between understanding and intuition. In
detheorizing this conception, and locating the categorial in the speech and activity of life,
we then find the entire complex intuition/understanding structure, and indeed the subject/
object structure it presupposes, founded upon a lived unity of life and world through
which what is, is disclosed. It is along these lines, then, that we can understand
Heidegger’s answer to that other important Neo-Kantion, Rickert, later in the same work
where he discusses the three primary discoveries of phenomenology. In response to
Rickert’s claim that phenomenology fails to be a true philosophy of the immediate, along
similar lines to those critiques already attributed to Natorp, Heidegger states: “In
opposition to this, it must first be stated generally that phenomenology does not wish to
be either a philosophy of intuition or a philosophy of the immediate. It does not want to
be a philosophy at all in this sense, but wants the subject matters themselves.”75 This
makes perfect sense insofar as intuition and conception of the immediate, both, are
already derivative of our lived engagement in the world. Phenomenology, then, seeks to
study what Husserl understood as the a priori structures of intentionality which underlies
all intuition or understanding, or what Heidegger will come to understand as the
background understanding of being-in-the-world and Dasein’s care structure.
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Section 3: Intentionality, Care, and Gelassenheit
“It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that
what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a
phenomenon regarded merely from the outside.” Heidegger 76
Within History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena Heidegger discusses
intentionality first of the three discoveries he attributes to Husserl. Why, then, have we
come to discuss it last? The answer is that, in a sense, we have been discussing it all
along and now, duly prepared, we can bring all our early concerns into focus through the
subject of intentionality and its correction and completion as care. All the problems with
which we have been concerned thus far, Natorp’s charge concerning the distorting nature
of phenomenology and the impossibility of the unmediated, Heidegger’s discussion of the
birth of authentic philosophy from the self articulating speech of life, Husserl’s insights
concerning categorial intuition and finally Heidegger’s relocating of this insight into
lived projects, have all dealt more or less directly with what Kisiel characterizes as the
primal relationship (or Urverhaltnis) of categorial form and matter. This same primal
relation will be rethought and revolutionized in the strife of world and earth in “The
Origin of the Work of Art” and will serve as the scaffold through which what is at stake
in my objection to the understanding of world found in Young and Dreyfus will become
clear. This primal relation of form and matter, certainly nothing new within the history of
philosophy especially since the work of Kant, was in a sense renovated in the work of
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phenomenology in the concept of intentionality.77 Intentionality itself, however, was due
to be revolutionized in Heidegger’s anti-theoretical returning of it to life in the form of
Dasein’s care structure.
Before we move directly into the subject of intentionality we should note a few
further points concerning the connection of the form/matter relationship and our overall
project. We have mentioned Heidegger’s assertion of the principle of the material
determination of every form, and the manner in which categorial intuition and its
renovation as lived understanding provide the very mechanism whereby a subject matter
determines the way in which it is conceptualized, addressed, or dealt with. What was at
stake in Natorp’s claim concerning the impossibility of the unmediated is precisely the
possibility of any starting point from which the material determination of form can get off
the ground. The absolutization of mediation, in either Neo-Kantian or Hegelian
philosophy, is ultimately the denigration, if not complete abolition, of a determining
ground. If the rational is the real then any determining ground is always going to be seen
as simply the incomplete or inchoate fodder for negation from whence the rational can
ultimately arise. As mentioned earlier in relation to Natorp, each higher level of
expression and articulation is, in a sense, more real and complete than the earlier level
from which it took its start. If we do not accept this prioritizing of mediation we are left
with an insurmountable facticity, a determining material which gives rise to our forms
77

“This original domain is structured by the Urverhaltnis (primal relationship) of categorial form and
matter, which for Heidegger (as we shall see) reflects a truncated noematic version of the
phenomenological Urverhaltnis of intentionality. The categorial form reflects or indicates a certain
Bewandtnis (relevance, bearing) of the matter, the ‘circumstances’ or ‘appliant implications’ of the matter
itself, just as in Being and Time the tool is defined by Bewandtnis (appliance) in and through the referential
structures of the environing world. Finally, the priority of this original realm is such that even the cognition
of it always contains a precognitive lived element, such that it is simply ‘lived through’ and not itself
known.” Kis. 2003 p. 103

46

and our activities, conceptualizing or otherwise, but which is not itself rationally formed.
As Kisiel characterizes it: “These more surcharged manifestations of ‘irrationality’ or
‘brute facticity’ thus mark the entry into history of the unexplainably new, unprecedented
and creative.”78 It may, or may not, be surprising to note that this is precisely the debate
in which I am engaged with Dreyfus and Young. Is the world which is set up by art a new
enframing or gathering of elements which were already there in the world, thus providing
a further mediation of the already mediated, or do we have in the work of art the
possibility of an irruption and “the entry into history of the unexplainably new,
unprecedented and creative”? As I hope now to show, it is indeed our very dependence
upon facticity which places us within the hermeneutic situation that is characterized in
Heidegger’s discussion of the care structure which ultimately is Being-in-the-World. It is
for this reason alone that Gelassenheit can have any meaning and also why it should be a
challenge. It is precisely towards the entry of the new to which we must be open, and
which Young and Dreyfus run the risk of denying.
As has already been stated, the phenomenology of Husserl has its own way of
clarifying and solving the problems involved in the dualism of conceptual form and
matter. You will recall that categorial intuition, in dissolving the boundary of Kant’s
passive faculty of intuition and the active faculty of conceptual categorizing and ordering,
was already a radical answer to Kant’s formulation of the matter/form dualism in terms of
the blindness of intuition without concepts and the emptiness of concepts without
intuitions.79 Beside this innovation, Husserl’s conception of the intentionality of
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consciousness also seeks to lift us out of the morass of the old epistemology centered
critical philosophy by reformulating the very problems which gave rise to that
philosophy, or perhaps that it helped give rise to, from the more primordial point of
intentionality as the being of consciousness. It should be no surprise to us, then, that
Heidegger’s early interest, attested to in his habilitation, in the form matter relation
appears in conjunction with his growing recognition of the promise of phenomenology’s
intentional revolution. We shall have to look to how it is that intentionality reformulates
the subject/object and matter/form dualisms, each of which reflect each other on separate
levels, and how Heidegger himself transforms the insight of intentionality.
An observant reader of the work which has led up to this moment will have noted
repeated changes in formulation of the central issues in question. Originally with our
discussion of Natorp our question, or rather what we presented as Heidegger’s question,
had been how phenomenology can be understood as not distorting the “things” which it
sought to describe. In other words, first we were dealing with a relation between “things”
and a philosophical mode of conceptualization and discourse. In response to this we
discussed Heidegger’s location of philosophy in life and the connection between
language, experience, and expression. At this second level the relation in question
seemed primarily to be that of life and thought, and then the relation between thought and
language. Following this we shifted our focus to the observation of how conceptual
elements which apparently serve to order our experience of “things” are given to us with
the same sensual intuition with which we experience the things themselves, the key
stipulation being that a founded act of categorial intuition rests on the founding act of
sensual intuition. At this third level we were dealing with the relation of concepts to
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sensory intuition within an experiencing consciousness. Heidegger’s relocating of
categorial intuition within the engaged activities of life returned us once more, however,
to the second level of living-existence, actual language use and expression, and involved
activity in the world. Finally we began to discuss the issue of the material determination
of form and we arrived at a fourth formulation of the issue with which we are grappling,
one which rests on an abstract level such that it can be retro-fitted to each of the
formulations already under discussion. I would like to point out that this moving from
one level of discussion to another (i.e. philosophy and things; life, thought, and language;
concepts and sensations; form and matter) is justified insofar as each of these problematic
relations, generally appearing in a dualistic form, shares the same structure as the others
and is transformed from one level to another in Heidegger’s returning of theoretical
philosophy to life. As we shall see, the relation of subject and object, concept and
sensation, mind and world, all can be reformulated in terms of intentionality. As
Heidegger asserts: “We must learn to see the data as such and to see that relations
between comportments, between lived experiences, are themselves not complexions of
things but in turn are of an intentional character. We must come to see that all the
relations of life are intrinsically defined by this structure.”80 Beyond this, intentionality
itself can be further removed from the arid realm of the theoretical gaze through the
locating it in the Care structure of Dasein. My method of presentation thus far is justified,
then, in at least two senses. First, it follows the very method of relocating theoretical
problems in the soil of life which Heidegger uses, the path of which is ultimately our
focus. Second, it provides discussions of the same underlying subject from several
80
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different levels and perspectives. We must do more to make our case, however. How are
the problematic relations of subject to object, concept to sensation, and mind to world, to
say nothing of philosophy to “thing” which includes each of these, changed by
intentionality and how is intentionality changed into Care?
Intentionality, most directly stated, is the assertion of the directedness and
aboutness of all conscious experience. As Heidegger states it: “Intentio literally means
directing-itself-toward. Every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself
toward something.”81 Rather than simply an observation concerning some characteristic
or property of the mind, Husserl locates this directed-about-ness in the very essence or
ontological nature of consciousness itself.82 Even beyond this, as our most recent
quotation suggests, Heidegger wishes to locate intentionality as the fundamental structure
of all lived experience and not “a coordination relative to other realities, something added
to the experiences taken as psychic states.”83 Understanding the primordial ontological
nature of intentionality will be fundamental for our understanding of how it represents a
transformation of the old problem of the relation of subject to object. Our preparation for
discussing the subject can be guided by criticisms leveled against intentionality. In NeoKantian criticisms leveled by Heinrich Rickert, and discussed by Heidegger in History of
the Concept of Time; Prolegomena, intentionality is identified with a dogma ridden
tradition derived through Brentano from Scholastic philosophy.84 We must, then, pause
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here to consider first what intentionality is mistakenly taken to be by Neo-Kantians and
then the important role it actually plays in the work of Husserl and Heidegger.
The dogmatic form of intentionality, used by the Neo-Kantians as an example of
the failed attempt to use intentionality as an answer to the problem of mind’s relation to
world, rests on the assumption that the outwardly directed nature of the mental and its
aboutness somehow assure us of any dependable relation to the physical world as it is
outside of us and independent of our minds. Intentionality taken, then, as a relation
between mind and world appears as a dogmatic assumption of the very answer to the
epistemic problem it claims to then demonstrate. This mistaken view of the role of
intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger rests on the description of intentionality as a
relation between mind and world, and not rather as the primordial structure of experience,
whether experience is taken in a psychical sense or Heidegger’s sense as lived
involvement. As Heidegger puts it: “What makes us blind to intentionality is the
presumption that what we have here is a theory of the relation between physical and
psychic, whereas what is really exhibited is simply a structure of the psychic itself.”85
Nonetheless, intentionality taken as a structure of the psychic with no reference to
physical externality at all still represents an answer, or renovation, of the mind/world
subject/object epistemic challenge. To see how this is we will have to consider Husserl
more fully.
In the context of categorial intuition we have already discussed the subject of
sensuous intuition and the state of affairs we end up actually perceiving. The experience
of states of affairs contains, beyond pure sensuous intuition, the categorial elements that
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alone allow the occurrence of what we recognize as experience of objects. Without these
categorial elements we would have simple sensuous bombardment. In order not to
confuse different senses of the term, we might now wish to change our terminology to
reflect the difference between Husserl’s position and that of classic empiricists such as
Berkley or Locke. What we might call sensory or sensuous intuition in orthodox
empiricism, identified as seemingly caused from some external source due to its
incorrigibility and the passivity with which the mind experiences it, can be placed in
contrast with what we might term hyletic data for Husserl. One reason for making this
distinction rests in the fact that, granted the existence of categorial intuition,
incorrigibility and the passivity of a receptive mind are no longer unique defining factors
of the sensory as compared to the conceptual or categorical. There must, then, be
different internal criteria of distinction between the hyletic and other forms of data, for
Husserl. As Levinas clearly explains it in his book The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s
Phenomenology:
“To oppose the hyletic data to the sensations of the sensualists, we must still
emphasize that the character which gives unity to these contents which are
grouped under the concept of hyle is not the purely extrinsic character of being
provided by the senses. This was sufficient for empiricism. But for us this unity
proceeds from an internal character which permits us to extend the notion of hyle
beyond sense-data to the sphere of affectivity and of will…We can distinguish in
consciousness an animating act which gives to the hyletic phenomena a
transcendent meaning: they signify something from the external world, they
represent it, desire it, love it, etc. This act is an element which has a mode of
existing identical to that of hyletic data, i.e. it is conscious and constituted in
immanent time; it knows itself in the implicit manner which is characteristic of
Erlebnisse. Yet it gives meaning to the flow of consciousness. It intends
something other than itself; it transcends itself.”86
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The point to stress is that the meaning giving act which provides a transcendent meaning
to hyletic data does not itself rest in some relation between the mind and world, rather as
Levinas asserts, this act has the same mode as the reception of hyletic data itself.
Consciousness transcends itself in a manner free of any need for us to look to the physical
to define this transcendence, the transcendence occurs internally. Intentionality as the
very nature of consciousness points to the nature of consciousness as self-transcending.
Levinas clarifies this position by stating:
“But Husserl also attacks a theory which would see in intentionality a new
element, a bridge between the world and consciousness… intentionality is not the
way in which a subject tries to make contact with an object that exists beside it.
Intentionality is what makes up the very subjectivity of subjects. The very reality
of subjects consists in their transcending themselves. The problem of the relation
between subject and object was justified by a substantialist ontology which
conceived existence on the model of things resting in themselves. Then, any
relation to something alien was extremely mysterious. As we have shown,
Husserl, by overcoming the substantialist concept of existence, was able to
demonstrate that a subject is not something that first exists and then relates to
objects. The relation between subjects and objects constitutes the genuinely
primary phenomenon in which we can find what are called ‘subject’ and
‘object’.”87
It is not, then, that some thing or substance known as “mind” is, or perhaps is not, in
some complex relation to some thing or substance called “physical world”. Rather, the
very nature of subjectivity is to be engaged in self-transcendence because both subject
and object arise primordially within intentionality and thus within relation to each other.
Intentionality, then, is primary and previous to any mind or world and it is from
intentionality that any concept of mind and world, subject and object, arise. It is precisely
this point Heidegger makes when he asserts that “…there is a connection between
presuming and presumed, or noesis and noema…”88 or when he identifies “…
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intentionality as a reciprocal belonging-together of intention and intentum.”89 Outside of
skeptical epistemology and epistemic philosophy there is no zero point from which a
mind substance is faced with the input of sensory data which it somehow must infer or
judge to be a correct or incorrect representation of some external physical substance.
Rather, both artificial theoretic concepts of mind and physical matter or thing-in-itself
derive from the two poles of the original primordial intentional being of consciousness.
The intended is given in the intention.
Just as in the case of subjects and objects, intentionality also works as the origin
of form and matter. Heidegger states that “…every intention has within it a tendency
toward fulfillment and its specifically proper way of possible fulfillment…”90 this also
means that every form, taken as a mode of relating to something intentionally, has
internal to it a connection to its appropriate matter. However, our previous discussion of
language’s ability to persist as tradition alone in connection with the possibility of empty
intending free of the corrective of material attestation suggests that form alone can not be
taken as determinative of matter. It is form, as the bearer of a tendency toward
fulfillment, which depends upon its proper matter for completion. In this sense we can
uphold the principle of the material determination of form as a corrective to empty
expression or intending, but this does not imply a real ability to separate intentio and
intentum such that one might become absolutely prior to the other. To imagine the
possibility of a real separation between form and matter is to ignore the primordiality of
intentionality and the very idea of hermeneutic intuition, which we have come to identify
as pre-ontological understanding, Heidegger’s bold 1919 statement of which first set us
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along out path: “The empowering experiencing of living experience that takes itself along
is the understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition, the originary
phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the recepts and precepts from which all
theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out.”91 We must
always remember that it is precisely this vision of the hermeneutic intuition which caused
Heidegger to assert at the very close of his first 1919 seminar that “Life is historical; no
dissection into essential elements, but connection and context. Problem of material giving
is not genuine, but comes only from theory.”92 This may rightly give rise to the
impression that our subject matter has become blurred. We state that intentionality is
primordial, but within this primordial relation the material side is to be understood as
having priority over form. At least part of the cause of confusion here has been due to our
focus on extrapolating the Husserlian structure of the insights which Heidegger will make
his own. It is now important for us to test this general form of the primal relation with the
matter itself that is to fill it out, namely Heidegger’s understanding of facticity. This
requires us to turn to Heidegger’s transformation of intentionality into care structure.
The move from intentionality to care is, first of all, a move from the epoche
purified realm of consciousness to the realm of world enmeshed activity. As Heidegger
notes, the very basic activities of interest to intentional analysis, such as the most basic
experiences of perception, are to be understood in terms of the purposeful world
engagements from which they arise:
“Natural perception as I live in it in moving about my world is for the most part
not a detached observation and scrutiny of things, but is rather absorbed in dealing
with the matters at hand concretely and practically. It is not self-contained; I do
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not perceive in order to perceive but in order to orient myself, to pave the way in
dealing with something.”93
The same observation was central to the de-theorizing of categorial intuition whereby the
categorial elements of experience were taken out of a purely intuitive context and shown,
rather, to arise from shared understandings drawn from activities in the world. Things are
already implicitly presented to us as organized into ontological regions, complete with
conceptual structures, in our everyday activities and dealings with them. Reality comes to
us, as it were, having already been thoroughly talked, and worked, over. This is not to say
that we are always already biased, as it were, but rather to say that only through active
involvement does ‘what is’ come to expression at all. The thing to note in the now
familiar movement we have just made is that, in moving from consciousness to
enworlded engagement, we have revealed the primal relationship characterized in
intentionality to be a temporal, and indeed historical, one. We are always already living
in the understanding of a meaningful world provided us through language and shared
practices, which is precisely what turns categorial intuition into a pre-ontological
understanding. As Heidegger observes:
“But what is meant by intentionality – the bare and isolated directing-itselftowards – must still be set back into the unified basic structure of being-ahead-ofitself-in-already-being-involved-in. This alone is the authentic phenomenon which
corresponds to what inauthentically and only in an isolated direction is meant by
intentionality. I refer to this here only in passing in order to mark the place from
which a fundamental critique of phenomenological inquiry finds its start.”94
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As this quote suggests, the unified basic structure which all lived comportment share and
through which they themselves are connected, is the structure of always already being
engaged in practices, articulations and involvements which similarly are always already
directing us towards various anticipated outcomes and actions. We are, then, always a
step ahead and behind of ourselves, stretched out through time as meaningful directed
movements. This is, at least partially, what is meant by being-ahead-of-itself-in-alreadybeing-involved-in. A key element of Heidegger’s discontent with the original Husserlian
sense of intentionality rests in its apparent prioritizing of theoretical comportment as the
model of all intentional comportments. He states:
“1. with respect to intentionality insofar as this is always construed (less explicitly
than implicitly) as specific theoretical behavior. Characteristically, intentionality
is translated for the most part as meaning, intending something; one speaks of
willing, loving, hating, and so forth as meaning something. Through this fixing of
usage, a definite prefiguration of perspective creeps into every intentional
analysis…for every intentional context of a complicated sort, theoretically
meaning something forms the foundation, that each judgment, each instance of
wanting, each instance of loving is founded upon a presenting that provides in
advance what can be wanted, what is detestable and lovable.”95
Intentionality conceptualizes all human comportment in terms of assertion and meaning
relations. An intentional relation contains an implicit meaning, or anticipation, which can
be fulfilled through various evidentiary acts, imploded through lack of fulfillment, or
emptily intended. In this way intentionality, taken as the primal relation which all living
comportments contain, locates all human activity and emotion within the realm of
epistemology. Everything, all action and feeling, ends up being analyzed on the level of
meaning and fulfillment. Meaning, however, seems to be in most cases more a medium
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through which we move and which is both set up and assumed through all of our
activities than anything from which we are separated as the asserting subject is from his
assertion. The disengaged image summoned up by the prioritizing of the theoretical
suggests that, while of course all consciousness is intentional, nonetheless we can
separate ourselves from any given intentional act or complex of them. This alone helps to
explain why Husserl assumes an epoche is possible and Heidegger finds the idea
impossible. For Heidegger meaning comes from our involvement in the world, ultimately
meaning is this world, and so any attempt to bracket the world will either be destined to
fail or will leave one in an absolute void. Recall, for example, Heidegger’s valorizing of
what he took the Greek interpretation of existence to be: “The Greek interpretation of
existence remains within existence, and this interpretation is this existence becoming
explicit through the explication.”96 There can, however, be no explication that is
independent of the existence which is achieving explication in the process and from
which the process arises. Intentionality understood in an epistemic form based upon the
model of assertion, then, destroys the promise that intentionality originally had by
reintroducing the very subject/object dichotomy it had offered to dissolve by giving the
impression that asserter and assertion, or subject and intention, can be divided to say
nothing of the divide between the asserted meaning and object meant.
Much of this critique of Husserl deals more with a feeling and with a misplaced
stress or, as Heidegger admits, with an implication, and not with Husserl’s official
position. As Levinas has helped us to just recently show, there is much in Husserl that
seems to precisely avoid the problems Heidegger sees. If subject and object arise from
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the primordial relation of intentionality, such that their nature is to be fundamentally
related, there can’t be the sort of epistemic divide based on the model of assertion which
Heidegger fears. However, if this is so the outcome of the various phenomenological
epoches seems endangered. It is possible that Husserl intended for the epoche to
demonstrate, at the end of the day, that the world has never actually been bracketed at all
because, in setting aside the question of the existence of subject independent “things” we
have discovered that the question was mistaken to begin with. It was an illusion, and not
the world, we bracketed.97 If this is so, however, it seems that Heidegger as well is correct
and it is as world-engaged and both temporal and historical that comportment must be
considered independent of the empty rhetorical or, perhaps more kindly stated,
methodological gesture of the epoche.
In order to bring into focus the shift that has occurred in the move from
intentionality to care we must characterize one of the key subjects of central concern to
us which it touches upon. We can approach the subject by asking how Husserl’s
intentionality and Heidegger’s care differ in their conception of the “matter” side of the
matter-form dichotomy. Within Husserlian intentionality the matter is the various forms
of fulfillment each intention allows. One could also reverse the order of the relation and
think in terms of hyletic data as matter, for example, and the categorial acts which
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provide the hyletic with a meaning and context as the form. Either way the conception of
matter found in Husserlian intentionality, despite the very form/matter dichotomy’s
deeper grounding in intentionality, remains very much within the traditional structures
and metaphors which had dominated epistemic philosophy for so long before Husserl.
Within Heidegger’s formulation of care, however, the primacy of matter is rediscovered
in our always already finding ourselves within a meaningful world and engaged in
ongoing projects. This is one formulation of facticity within Heidegger, our sheer havingalready-been-involved-in. This shifts the talk of ‘matter’ from some focus upon sensual
intuition or hyletic data, to the transmissions obtain from history and tradition implicitly
embodied in our possession of a language and cultural practices. We are, then, always
already oriented and directed to ‘what is’ and ‘how it is’ through our involvement in a
living world. This is facticity, the ‘matter’ which must have primacy over form insofar as
it will always already direct our ways of taking things. This innovation will go hand in
hand with the discovery of new problems for the activity of philosophy which will be
answered through Heidegger’s method of historical de-struction of traditional concepts.
Before we move on to make more specific the new problems which have grown
from Heidegger’s answer to old conceptions of matter and form, we must first pause to
note what a strange reversal and interweaving of concepts has occurred here, and perhaps
to clarify this tangle. You will remember that categorial intuition was the reception of the
categorial forms which organize experience from the base of founding sensuous
intuitions. Heidegger relocated form giving categorial intuition in worldly activity and
language while also reversing the relation between sensations and concepts so that, as he
put it, we don’t so much say what we see as we see what people say. Here, surely, we
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seem to have denied the principle of the material determination of form insofar as it is
language, and the conceptualization embodied in language, which determines to some
degree sensations. Now we find that facticity, i.e. matter, rests in the way in which we are
already delivered over onto certain articulating activities and interpretations of ‘what is’.
First it seemed that form determined matter, and now it seems that our always already
implicitly having certain forms precisely is matter. There is only one way that this bizarre
tangle, this apparent confusion of terms, can be straightened out and that is to return to
one of the earliest points we made concerning Heidegger’s early work. In answer to
Natorp, Heidegger had asserted that phenomenology is not distortive and language is not
an abstracting medium because the ‘object’ of phenomenology is existence, which is self
articulating and self interpreting precisely through the being of language. Phenomenology
can thus be born from the movement of life itself as a manifestation of its primordial self
articulating being. The important turn to notice here is that, faithfully following Dilthey,
life simply is the most fundamental ‘matter’, and life is to be identified with self
articulating and interpreting such that language too is ‘matter’. We are thus led into the
unusual circumstance where we can assert that our implicit inheritance of categorial
forms is facticity. What an analysis of this very facticity will give rise to, in Being and
Time for example, are the structures of care and worldhood which have apparently been
present throughout the course of the historical sending. The very fact of our always
already being delivered over to our historical context, for example, is a formal structure
of Dasein’s being which only becomes clear in the analysis of our embededness in a
world. These structures are only known through a phenomenological investigation of the
everydayness which is the onward movement of historical life.
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Within Introduction to Phenomenological Research Heidegger provides us with
five key characteristics of care.98 First, care is disclosive. It brings into the realm of
existence what it is concerned with. The concept of bringing into the realm of existence
should not be taken to mean that care creates its object ex nihilo, rather we should recall
the original sense of the word ex-istence as a standing-forth. Care causes its object to
stand forth into appearing, thus it discloses its object. As Heidegger asserts: “Care is
nothing subjective and does not feign what it takes care of; care allows it rather to come
to its genuine being.”99 Secondly, care involves one in an ongoing explicating of what it
has disclosed to begin with. Thirdly, care manifests in specific forms of holding onto and
maintaining what has been disclosed and the way in which it has been disclosed and
articulated. Fourthly, care commits one to holding to the disclosed and articulated object
of care such that it leads to the extrapolation of normative principles from the disclosed
domain which further seek to legislate over other cares and future disclosures. Fifthly,
and most importantly for the issue currently at hand, care manifests in a loosing of itself
in its own unconditional setting up, articulating, maintaining and interpreting of its own
object. What these characteristics reveal is that every care is both a way of seeing while
also being, in some sense, blinding. Heidegger therefore asserts that “…each care qua
care neglects something.”100 This makes perfect sense when we recall language’s role of
both embodying pre-ontological understanding and, as such, disclosing a world while
language also runs the risk of becoming, as it were, an empty intending or empty care
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where the voicing of tradition continues independent of any experience of the realties
which it had once disclosed. As Heidegger states:
“As a result, care, residing in this manner, from the outset becomes devoid of
need in the sense that it does not interrogate at all what it works with (the entire
fundamentum of ancient ontology) as to its suitability and its origin; it does not
inquire at all into the suitability of what this care again and again sets as its task.
That means, however, that the tradition is not itself seen as tradition at all. If what
a tradition befalls and how it does so are kept in view, then the tradition is
explicit. Insofar as that is not the case and the traditional is taken over in such a
way that the entire work of founding is taken over, it is apparent that the tradition
has been lost sight of.”101
Facticity, the way in which we always already find ourselves engaged in a tradition, can
either provide us with the authentic material determination from which the articulation of
life can proceed or can be taken over in an inauthentic empty way such that the
possibility of all future disclosure is foreclosed. By authentic material determination I
mean an engagement with the matters themselves of concern or a vital tradition which is
still in contact with these matters through a connection to the wellsprings of that tradition.
In this way facticity or tradition can provide us with a connection with those things with
which it claims to concern itself. Alternatively, the traditional can be taken over or taken
up simply as empty phrases, statements and terminologies repeated about as if
meaningful without a connection to the real experiences or wellsprings from which they
originated. This is precisely the issue that was of concern to the young Heidegger when
he frequently criticized the philosophy of his day for degenerating into empty talk.
This is a problem I have already mentioned in passing in various forms, it is the
problem of how Gelassenheit or “…the possibility of letting the entity be encountered in
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its character of being…”102 is possible in the face of falling, or existence’s fundamental
tendency to loose itself within its own self-satisfied and pre-directed care structure. It is
precisely because we are always already directed towards beings in a certain way,
because we are always already engaged in a certain manner of disclosive interpretation,
that any disclosure at all is possible and also that the simple act of letting something be
experienced out of its own being can be the fundamental goal, method and problem of
phenomenology. Once we understand the historical nature of facticity, however, the
answer which will guide Heidegger throughout the course of Being and Time begins to
become clear. The primordial material determination of our future categorial forms,
namely the tradition we are provided with in our facticity, is also precisely what can
deceive us into empty talk. The answer, then, is to re-achieve the fundamental
determination through a destructuring, or destruction, of the empty elements of the
tradition which blind us. As Heidegger states: “In order to get at the matters themselves,
they must be freed up and the very process of freeing them up is not one of a momentary
exuberance, but of fundamental research. The seeing must be educated and this is a task
so difficult that it is hard for it to be overemphasized since we are, like no other time,
saturated by history and are even aware of the manifoldness of history.”103 Historical
destruction, directed towards the freeing up of things from the sedimented layers of
traditional conceptualizations, is not itself Gelassenheit but rather the preparatory stage
necessary in order for any releasement, or letting be, to allow things to provide their own
articulation through the individual’s active, but now open, engagement with it.
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You will recall my earlier discussion of facticity as both determining and
irrational, insofar as it has not previously been worked over through human categorizing
rationality. Our question now should be in what sense the pre-ontological understanding
which we always already have through being engaged in traditional activities and
language is irrational in the sense that facticity is supposed to be irrational. Talk of
irrationality here must, of course, seem strange especially since Heidegger purposefully
avoided the use of the term ‘rational’. Our engaged involvement in a meaningful life
world is the foundation for all meaning, in what sense then can it be labeled irrational?
However, Being-in-the-world and the implicitly pre-ontological understanding it contains
is not something we are taught. It is never made entirely explicit and never justified. It is
always a partially inchoate and partially articulate sense of what is and how it is to which
we are delivered over and from which all our other articulates and activities grow. As
such, the founding determining matter of pre-ontological understanding is not itself
rational in something like the Neo-Kantian sense. Heidegger, in Being and Time to which
we soon turn, calls it a ground which is also an abyss (abgrund): “…a ‘ground’ becomes
accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.”104 In this
sense, then, as that grounding beyond which no further grounding is possible preontological understanding is indeed irrational facticity, by Neo-Kantian standards, which
is never able to be brought into full articulation.
It is important to note one last point, a sort of swaying between temporal
orientation that has occurred in our discussion. It is clear that human facticity, understood
as our always already having a pre-ontological understanding and active involvements
104
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due to our membership in an ongoing active life world, has a rather specific past oriented
nature. Our facticity is, in a sense, our existence as finite elements of history, our always
already being caught up in the story. The larger argument with which I am engaged
concerning the interpretation of “The Origin of the Work of Art” hinges, however, on the
idea made explicit earlier by Kisiel that facticity can be understood as the possibility of
the unprecedented new irrupting into the historical movement. This is a future oriented
perspective. Historical destruction, similarly, seeks to free up the purity of the original
transmission from history yet it also allows us to finally be open to the new articulation of
a thing provided by the thing itself. It seems clear that there is a tension involved here
between the manner in which our temporal historical being alone allows anything to
show up for us and the manner in which Gelassenheit can be understood as an openness
to future possibilities. It is my sense that this tension takes on different forms within the
work of Heidegger, and the question of where to lay the stress gives rise to the same
tension dividing my interpretation from that of Young and Dreyfus. As I have already
mentioned in my introduction, I identify Young as drawing too heavily on Being and
Time in order to interpret The Origin of the Work of Art, a work which I take to be an
attempt to get beyond some of Being and Time’s limitations as well as a return and
completion of much of Heidegger’s pre-Being and Time work. In order to understand
Young’s mistake, and “The Origin of the Work of Art”’s innovation, we shall have to
turn now to looking at the role of world and history, as well as future orientation and past
orientation, in Being and Time.

66

Chapter Two: Being and Time and Beyond
“Though, as I shall shortly show, fundamental positions worked out in Being and
Time demand the rejection of Prometheanism… My view is that, almost certainly as a
response to the spirit and rhetoric of Nazism, Heidegger flirted with Prometheanism
from about 1933 to 1936, half-forgetting fundamental commitments established in Being
and Time (1927). By the time of the final draft of ‘The Origin’, however… he had, I
believe, seen the error of his flirtation and returned, decisively, to the insights of Being
and Time.” Julian Young105
Julian Young’s story concerning the way in which “The Origin of the Work of
Art” is a return from dangerous Nazi Prometheanism to the solid insights of Being and
Time rests, at least partially, upon his claim that “…the Promethean reading of ‘The
Origin’ is untenable…” because “…it is inconsistent with fundamental positions
Heidegger had already worked out in Being and Time.”106 The larger historical story we
are tracing from Heidegger’s early thought to his central work on art has brought us now
to Heidegger’s opus of 1927. It may be useful to have recourse to Young’s claims
concerning the relation between the work of 1927 and the work on art of the mid-1930s
in order to focus our analysis of Being and Time. First, it is clear that Young’s position on
this relation rests upon two claims. The first, already mentioned, is that Being and Time
and a Promethean reading of “The Origin of the Work of Art” are incompatible. The
second is that the transition which occurs in Heidegger’s work in the 1930s, as traced
powerfully by Jacques Taminiaux in his “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’”,
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is a transition back to Being and Time. I believe we shall be able to briefly demonstrate
that Being and Time and a Promethean reading are certainly not incompatible while also
conceding that many elements of Being and Time can be read to favor the interpretation
provided by Young and Dreyfus. We shall therefore attempt to trace why my
interlocutors think the way they do, and nonetheless in the course of this analysis
pinpoint why a reading of Being and Time does not necessitate such a view. Further we
shall attempt to show why the second claim is simply wrong, a point which will rest at
least partially on Being and Time’s relation to Heidegger’s earlier work and the key
problematic element or failure he later identified in Being and Time. In the course of
demonstrating this we shall also continue to trace the transformation of Heidegger’s early
insights within Being and Time and beyond.
The insight of Being and Time which Julian Young bases the impossibility of
Prometheanism upon is throwness, the fact that we always already find ourselves in a
world.107 Young is perfectly correct in his assertion that being human actually means
finding oneself already in the world, and as already discussed he is right in his claim that
art can importantly work as a thematizing of a previously obscure world. He is wrong,
however, in presupposing that the role of art as thematizing forecloses the possibility of
world creating art. His thought here, not an entirely wrong one, seems to rest upon the
insight that the way in which we are delivered over to our world leaves no space external
to the world which we might occupy to experience the world as an object which can have
beginning or end, or which might be created. But surely the position I have been building
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can appreciate this position. Have I not previously stressed the importance of the insight
that facticity is the way in which we are delivered over to the practices, language and
history that is our world? Must I reject the Promethean view because up until now I too
have rejected the possibility of a world independent stance? I do not think so, and I think
the reason not will begin to appear as we note a certain difference in how I have used the
term world and how Young does.
Young characterizes as language supporting his view of art as thematizing all of
Heidegger’s talk of clarifying, making express, making manifest, making visible and, in
short, all forms of disclosure. As Young states:
“The artwork’s ‘opening up’ of world is, then, not Promethean creation but rather,
‘thematizing’, ‘making expressly visible’. This kind of language is repeated
throughout the writings of late 1936. The artwork ‘clears’ what normally ‘veils
and withdraws itself’, it ‘make[s] manifest’ the normally obscured, ‘articulates’
the normally implicit.”108
I suspect that Young has lost many valuable distinctions in his, perhaps unintentional,
equating of all disclosure with the activity of thematizing implicit elements of the existent
world. It seems, in this, that Young is falling a little too easily into rather common
assumptions concerning what world is. Along the lines Young sets up it seems that we
can make no sense of world change or the possibility of alternative worlds. If all
disclosure is thematizing of those things already implicit in a world then there can only
be one world from which all that “withdraws” itself can be drawn. In short, it seems hard
to understand how we might ever find the term world in the plural and yet it is clear that
Heidegger does use it so, especially in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Both Young and
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I have previously asserted the nature of the world as a framework of meaning. As Young
puts it:
“In sum, then, ‘world’ is the background, and usually unnoticed understanding
which determines for the members of an historical culture what, for them,
fundamentally, there is. It constitutes, as it were, the entry conditions, the ground
plan, the ‘being of beings’, which something must satisfy in order to show up as
being in the world in question.”109
Not only does Young assume here a plurality of worlds, but he asserts that it is the
unnoticed background understanding, the ground plan, which allows things to show up
how they are and which something must “satisfy” in order to show up at all. The use of
the term “satisfy” points to the restrictive nature of world. Something must fit the world
or else it can’t appear within it, but this very way of talking assumes that there are other
ways in which a thing can show up. But this means that what “veils and withdraws itself”
is not, necessarily, any element of the world but might rather also be that which rests
outside the dominate frame of meaning. This becomes more and more important with the
appearance of earth in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. The role of earth is prefigured in
the nature of truth as disclosure, and the foundational role that untruth takes on in this
conception or truth. Ultimately world can be understood along the lines of disclosure, and
the ultimate clearing in which things appear just is the world. But this means that the
most primordial hidden, veiled, and undisclosed is not an implicit element of world
understood as the most primordial form of disclosure. This need not mean that we ever
occupy a position independent of world, but it does suggest that the undisclosed, what
Heidegger calls “the mystery” in both the “Memorial Address” and “The Essence of
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Truth” and which is importantly connected to the withdrawing self-concealing earth,
unveils itself in the opening up of a world at least sometimes through art.
It is in the course of discussing world, disclosure and their relation to the
undisclosed that we shall come to see more clearly why Dreyfus thinks that the work of
setting up a world must be done through a gathering or unifying of previously scattered
or marginal cultural practices. At the heart of our disagreement with Dreyfus we shall
find a disagreement over what Heidegger means when he refers to a withdrawing selfconcealing earth in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Ultimately we shall find that
Dreyfus interprets the earth’s withdrawing nature as the tendency of the world itself, or
rather the fundamental purposes and practices of which it is made up, to withdraw and
avoid explication while nonetheless providing the framework of meaning upon which the
disclosure of anything else rests. While there is something right in this position, it also
fails to grasp some important elements of the nature of disclosure which only become
more radicalized following Being and Time. We, in contrast, shall interpret earth along
the lines of the undisclosed upon which the clearing of any disclosure rests. When we
consider that the clearing is world, we begin to see why the undisclosed can not also be
the world itself as itself. Rather it is central to the very sense of Heidegger’s hermeneutic
concept of truth and disclosure that any given clearing, and any given world, is finite and
that the undisclosed, untruth, or earth are precisely what is unrevealed by any given
world. As we clarify and explicate these various terms and their inter-relations we shall
find once more the fundamental question we began with. How might the “things
themselves” dictate to us the terms of their own conceptualization or, avoiding
mentalistic terms and the assumptions they embody as the Heidegger of Being and Time
71

and beyond would wish, how might they determine our own relation to them and
practices concerning them? In other words, how do we maintain the principle of the
material determination of form? Indeed, is this principle at work in Being and Time at
all?
As this introductory discussion should make clear, in order to differentiate my
position from Young’s and from Dreyfus’, we are desperately in need of a clarification of
world and disclosure as they appear in Being and Time. These elements we can then
connect to our work concerning Heidegger’s early work in order to see the way in which
Being and Time answers, and fails to answer, some of his central concerns which will
later appear in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. This will prepare us to discuss Young’s
second claim, namely that the path from Being and Time to “The Origin of the Work of
Art” is a path which leads through a period of flirtation with Prometheanism to a return to
the insights of Being and Time.
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Section 1: Three Worlds, Worldhood and Sign
“Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously
discovered, though not thematically.” 110
The project of Being and Time can only get off of the ground because of the
central insight we have already discussed, namely the transformation of categorial
intuition into pre-ontological understanding. As we have discussed, Heidegger found
Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition so exciting because it provided a way in which
the matters of concern for philosophy could provide their own categorial organizing
principles. The challenge, posed by Natorp, of how phenomenology might proceed
without distorting through its very reflective activity and descriptive language the matters
it treated was answered through the use of a de-theorized categorial intuition. This
rooting of categorial intuition in the flow of life itself transforms it into pre-ontological
understanding, that sense of things which we always already have through our concernful
involvements with them. Any matter we might choose to discuss or investigate is
available as a matter of concern only because it has already been encountered in human
practices and ‘talked over’ through social speech. This goes as well for the most
primordial matter of concern, namely Being. As Heidegger states: “Inquiry, as a kind of
seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must
already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our
110
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activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit
question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its
conception.”111 As this quotation suggests, it is not just that our involvements have
already provided us with some grasp and orientation towards Being, but further as was
already foreshadowed in Heidegger’s answer to Natorp, the very activity of explicating
and clarifying this implicit sense is actually just an intensification of an already inherent
activity of the matter in question. As Heidegger later states: “But in that case the question
of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which
belongs to Dasein itself – the pre-ontological understanding of Being.” 112 As already
made clear, Natorp’s objections must assume first that the inquiring philosopher and the
object of inquiry are separate and second that the language and concepts used for the
inquiry are foreign to the object of inquiry. Heidegger, however, has already described
how language arises from existence, and thus is not foreign to it, and how philosophical
phenomenological explication is a manifestation of an inherent tendency of existence
itself which is also the matter into which one enquiries. We are, then, well prepared for
the move which turns the question of Being into an analytic of Dasein.
The general method of Being and Time, then, is going to be to show that we
already have a sense of the matter under discussion and then to proceed to clarify and
correct this sense through phenomenological investigation. In other words, the various
sections of Being and Time begin with formal indications of the matters which are then
followed by phenomenological attestations which fill out and complete the formal
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indications.113 What we now come to see is that Being and Time is composed of a subtle
and complex interplay between form and matter which is precisely what we would expect
from our earlier discussions of hermeneutic intuition as pre-ontological understanding
and the lived explication of this understanding. But what has priority here? We must
remember Heidegger’s adoption of the principle of the material determination of form
which asserts, in contrast to the absolutization of mediation and the theoretical we find in
Natorp, that mediating formal aspects must arise from the matters themselves which they
form and be answerable to those matters. This, indeed, had earlier seemed like the very
heart of phenomenology itself. We might have reason to suspect that this principle is not
maintained in Being and Time, especially when we repeatedly find that an opening move
of a given portion of enquiry is an appeal to a formal indication, and that the outcome is
often the discovery of essential formal structures. What role does matter play here?
The answer lies, of course, in pre-ontological understanding. Where do our formal
indications come from? They come from the way in which the matters themselves have
already been opened up to us through out involvement with them. It is only insofar as we
understand this that we can accept there being any starting point for the project at all, and
for each lesser movement within the project. The guidance we gain from formal
indication is derived from our lived engaged activities, and these activities are not
113
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impositions upon reality but rather arise from it. We might say either that reality
expresses itself through our activities or that it guides the expressions of it which arise
through out activities. Either way the point remains the same, the foundation for Being
and Time is not the imposition of forms but rather the expressions of life. These
expressions can be formalized, and once this has been done they can guide our enquiry,
but they are always also later subjected to the demand for attestation. Again form must
submit to matter. This movement is nicely demonstrated through the nature of anxiety in
Being and Time which will later be discussed as a prime example of our grasping of
formal elements, or essential structures, arising through the most radical confrontation
with matter.
Pre-ontological understanding, both the foundation and beginning of Being and
Time, is itself founded in the fact that Dasein is Being-in-the-world. In other words, we
find ourselves always already engaged in a framework of meanings consisting of
practices, ways of speaking, goals and in general all that goes into making up our
concernful engagements. It is through these engagements that we know both ourselves
and anything else, which is why Heidegger can assert that:
“From what we have been saying, it follows that Being-in is not a ‘property’
which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and without which it
could be just as well as it could with it…Taking up relationships towards the
world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-World, is as it is. This
state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand
outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can ‘meet up with’ Dasein
only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world.”114
We have already pointed to the way in which a difference over how we are to understand
world and its relation to various other concepts, such as earth and disclosure, form a key
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locus of our disagreement with Young and Dreyfus. Let us make clear, then, how it is
that world appears in Being and Time.
Chapter Three of Division One of Being and Time begins with an explication of
three different meanings for the word “world”, and a shift of focus to the concept of
worldhood. The first and second meanings presented for “world” are what we might
consider the commonsense understanding of the word. The first meaning is that world is
the totality of actual existing entities which can be simply present to one. The second
meaning understands world as the being of the totality of entities, in other words as the
ontological categorial elements of everything which exists. This second sense, in turn,
can be limited to characterize various ontological regions, understanding ontological
regions in the sense discussed by Husserl and the Neo-Kantians both to signify domains
such as the world of mathematics, empirical experience, consciousness, or values.115 It is
this sense of world with which much of Heidegger’s early work concerning concept
formation and the categories was first concerned. However, in his rejection of the
theoretical and his turn away from the theoretical excesses of both Husserl and the NeoKantians he had to return these abstract ontological regions to the soil of life which gives
rise to his third sense of world, which is the sense he uses for the word throughout Being
and Time.
Where the second categorial sense of world concerns itself with examples such as
“the ‘world’ of a mathematician”116 the third sense uses examples such as “the public we115
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world” or “one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment”117. The move here should be
familiar, even as Heidegger did when he returned theoretical philosophical language and
concept formation to the activities and practices of life itself, he now returns technical
ontological regions to the lived worlds of concern. This move makes the third sense of
world ontic-existentiell, in other words this term applies to various particular existing
life-worlds. It is this third sense which Heidegger states will be the meaning of the word
world throughout Being and Time unless otherwise noted.118
Following his explanation of the three senses of “world” Heidegger goes on to
discuss a fourth sense to be consider. This fourth sense is that of “worldhood” which he
identifies as an ontologico-existential concept. As ontologico-existential it is located not
in particular existing ontic characteristics of worlds, particular structural characteristics of
actual worlds are identified as simply modes of worldhood, but rather in the formal
characteristics of any world in general. We can see, then, that there can be a plurality of
worlds, where world is understood in the third sense as a lived life world, but those
structures which are necessarily present in any given such world and which are shared by
all worlds make up worldhood. It may be profitable for us to pause and ask ourselves
what the difference is between the second sense of world and worldhood proper. Both
concepts are labeled ontological by Heidegger, meaning both deal with ontological
characteristics which can then be discovered in actual existing particulars. I have already
suggested that the move from the second to the third sense of world was a characteristic
movement whereby Heidegger reoriented a theoretical distortion by relocating it within
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the lived experience from which it takes its origin. This would seem to go hand in hand
with our discussion in the previous chapter about the way in which Heidegger
reconceptualizes ontological regions as arising out of, or being disclosed by, actual lived
practices and engaged activities. Thus the activity of the mathematician opens up the
ontological world of mathematics, with the apparently ontic here receiving the priority.
This is all good and well, but what sense are we then to make of the movement to
worldhood? First of all, the second sense of world is obviously concerned with the
ontological characteristics of a particular world, and not worlds in general. But secondly,
and I think more importantly, the movement from the third sense of world to worldhood
represents Heidegger’s general strategy of reclaiming the a priori or ontological level
following a debunking of empty metaphysical conceits through a returning to life as
lived. What is going on might, then, be characterized in this way. First we mention, only
to dismiss, ready made traditional ontological assumptions such as the existence of a
unique realm of mathematical entities, and we move instead to the level at which lived
activities and commitments may or may not open up such a world. At that level we
encounter the actual life-worlds which the previous theoretical (neo-Kantian and
Husserlian) modes of addressing worlds or ontological regions had covered over. From
this base, renewed through a movement not unlike Heidegger’s historical de-structuring,
we then arrive at new insights about the necessary ontological structures of any given
world.
It is apparently, then, to the structure of any and all possible worlds that
Heidegger addresses his attention for the rest of Chapter Three of Division One. We
might pause at this moment, however, and inquiry how we are going to arrive at
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knowledge of the necessary ontological structures of world. The first part of the answer
to this question will rely upon pre-ontological understanding through the assertion that
we always already have a non-thematized knowledge of both our world and the nature of
worldhood in general. This will lead to a phenomenological analysis of how our world is
actually experienced from which will be derived certain basic structures of worldhood.
Following this, later in Being and Time, it will be inquired how we can be certain of the
characteristics we have derived from our experiences. Is there not a moment when we
fully experience the form of worldhood itself deprived of any distorting content of a
particular life world? The answer to this question will be found in the phenomenological
attestation that anxiety provides to the formal indications derived from our everyday lived
experience in, say, a workshop. Our challenge will be to clarify how what is going on in
Being and Time sticks to Heidegger’s earlier commitments to the material determination
of form. Before we get to this, however, we shall have to discuss what Heidegger actually
ends up asserting are the structures of worldhood, and in so doing discuss what we take to
be the foundation of Dreyfus’ understanding of setting up a world in “The Origin of the
Work of Art”.
Heidegger bases his analysis of our experience of world upon the concept
represented by the German word Zeug which can be translated as “equipment” or “gear”.
What Heidegger has in mind, however, is not just a discussion of that limited class of
objects we experience which can be generally labeled equipment, although he does
indeed take something like a hammer as very useful as an example. Rather, equipmental
being is taken to be the fundamental being of everything we encounter in concernful
Being-In-The-World: “We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern
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‘equipment’.”119 Why and how this is the case, why everything experienced through care
should be considered in the light of equipmental being, we shall have to seek to clarify.
One of the first enlightening observations which Heidegger brings to mind when turning
his attention to equipment is that there can never really be a single equipment or gear, as
the word in both English and German suggests insofar as the word always seems to
represent a collective. Any given entity experienced as equipment is always experienced
within a larger context including other items of equipment and various goals or projects:
“Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment
there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is…
Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of its belonging
to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture,
windows, doors, room.”120 In this way, when we consider any particular experience of
equipmentality an arrangement of equipment arises in which each element mutually
depends upon and refers to the others.
The equipmental arrangement or context can be described in terms of various
intentional relations which, it is later demonstrated, each have the intentional
characteristics explicated in care. It is useful, here, to recall Heidegger’s assertion from
History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena that relations between intentional relations
themselves have the form of intentional relations. It is precisely this which is
demonstrated in the structure of worldhood which arises from the analysis of equipmental
being. Every piece of equipment is the equipment it is due to a relationship Heidegger
characterizes with the phrase in-order-to. The in-order-to of a piece of equipment is that
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for which the equipment is suited, that which provides it its usefulness or serviceability.
A hammer is a hammer insofar as it exists in-order-to strike various other things and
generally provide a force to drive them into something such as wood. It is good for
something. This relation, as an assignment of something to something else, thus marks
the very nature of equipmentality as one of reference beyond itself and existence in a
larger interconnected context.
The in-order-to relation is, in turn, found to exist itself in a large intentional
relationship. A given piece of equipment can only appear as good for some specific use in
terms of the goal which makes that use necessary or useful. Every in-order-to is
motivated, then, by the work which it aids in producing. This work, the goal of the
activities made possible through the usefulness of the equipment, is that towards-which
the useful activity is aimed. A hammer, then, is useful in-order-to hammer things which
itself is only meaningful in the light of that completed work, say a cabinet, towards-which
our activities aim. It is important to note, then, that the work, a concept that will be very
important in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, carries along with it the entire equipmental
context, and thus the world, in which it is made: “The work bears with it that referential
totality within which the equipment is encountered.”121 Work and hammer alike, then,
bring with them and make possible the meaningful totality that is the equipmental context
that is world: “The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but
as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however,
the world announces itself.”122 Continuing the pattern that should now be clear the work
and this further towards-which relation themselves end up being in an intentional
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relation: “The work to be produced, as the ‘towards-which’ of such things as the hammer,
the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment.”123
Each intentional relationship fits into a large one, and so each level of equipmentality
points beyond itself to another. Where, however, is this structure to find its end?
The end to this pattern is found precisely at that level where purposes and
practices can reflect upon themselves, namely at the level of Being-in-the-world itself, or
Dasein:
“But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a ‘towards-which’
in which there is no further involvement: this ‘towards-which’ is not an entity
with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is
rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state
of being, worldhood itself belongs…The primary ‘towards-which’ is a ‘for-thesake-of-which’. But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the Being of Dasein,
for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue.”124
The import of this final move to the for-the-sake-of-which is that it shifts the dependence
of one intentional relationship or intentionally motivated practice onto a self-referential
intentional being whose intentional directedness is precisely dependent upon its own
taking a stand concerning itself. In other words, every specific tool and both the possible
works which provide it its usefulness and the wider arrangement of equipment are only
meaningful in terms of that practice and work which has itself as its own issue and for its
own goal. Here we should hear clear echoes of an Aristotelian understanding of
phronesis. As Taminiaux describes the deficiency of other forms of practices such as
techne and the specific characteristics of phronesis: “But it [techne] is a deficient
excellence, since its end is a product, or ergon, outside the agent... Phronesis, practical
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judgment, is the highest deliberative virtue insofar as neither its principle, its arche, nor
its end, its telos, fall outside the agent himself.”125 The move to Dasein as grounding the
equipmentality of equipment is a similar move, a move away from works external to the
agent and to a stand that the agent must make upon its own being which is undecided and
‘an issue’ for it. The for-the-sake-of-which represents, then, the level at which our
various practices ground out in the basic roles which we can live and fill. These are roles
which are offered us by our history and cultural traditions, roles into which we can be
born and drift or roles which we can understandingly face up to and choose for ourselves
from the possibilities offered us. The totality of the equipmental context, then, depends
upon the foundational roles and practices which characterize Dasein itself at the most
basic level. One is a philosopher, carpenter, father, radical individualist, or citizen and
only in light of these ground commitments does the workshop, lectern, school house or
pen get its meaning.
We should pause here to stress some important elements of what we have said so
far. We must first remember that while we have been discussing examples of what is
actually considered equipment in our day to day world, Heidegger insists that
equipmental being is the being of all things experienced through care. It is not just a
hammer or a given work whose completion we are driving towards that appears as it does
because of our base commitments and practices, rather the entire totality that is our world
arises from, and is constituted of, these practices and commitments. We must recall here,
then, everything that we have said about the movement from categorial intuition to preontological understanding. Our ways of being are ways of disclosing the world. As we
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have already said, care discloses the world in a specific way. This disclosive force of
care, in the context of Heidegger’s discussion of equipmentality, is discussed in terms of
“letting something be involved”, a phrase with echoes of Gelassenheit which we would
do well to note. How, then, do we understand involvement and letting something be
involved in this context?
We had stated in the past that the world can be understood as a framework of
interpretation which structures our experience, or opens up the space which allows for
our experience. The details of the structure of that framework have now been fleshed out
in terms of the intentional relationships of the in-order-to, towards-which, and for-thesake-of-which. What it means, then, to say that all entities encountered in care have the
being of equipmentality is that they all are meaningfully experienced only insofar as they
fit into the structure so far set forth. Of course, a careful reading of what we have already
said will suggest that the term “structure” is more than a little misleading. While what we
are discussing may indeed be a structure, it is a structure of commitments and projects
which carry themselves forward and stretch back within a temporal unfolding. To say that
something is disclosed by a world is to say it plays a role in this temporal unfolding of
projects. In order to be meaningfully experienced something must be involved in the
practices and commitments which are a world: “When an entity within-the-world has
already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its ‘involvement’. With any
such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement
is ontologically definite for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontic assertion
about it.”126 This quotation suggests the danger engendered in the very terms we are
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driven to use in this context. There is not first some thing which is then involved in the
structure of world. Rather, only as involved in the structure of projects which is the world
does anything show up at all. Something’s being involved, then, is also the disclosure of
that entity. Dasein, as the entity that cares, the entity which takes a stand concerning its
own being and in doing so involves itself in projects and commitments or finds itself
always already involved in them through its history, is what allows for anything to show
up as meaningful. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is then a letting-be-involved which
allows a thing to show up as it is: “Ontically, ‘letting something be involved’ signifies
that within our factical concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is
already and in order that it be such. The way we take this ontical sense of ‘letting be’ is,
in principle, ontological.”127 Letting be involved can, then, take on both an ontic sense
insofar as my project of writing this work has in this actual context let this entity be
experienced as the computer on which I write, and it can be understood ontologically
insofar as involvement, or equipmentality, is the Being of what is experienced as
meaningful through care.
We might, then, distinguish different modalities of Gelassenheit we have
encountered so far. We have discussed the issue of de-structuring which takes apart
reified traditional ways of talking and thinking things over which have come to conceal,
rather than disclose, the things with which they are concerned. De-structuring, then,
serves the role of clearing away the empty talk which, though it may once have arisen
from the matters themselves, no longer arises from an authentic experience of the matters
of concern. This de-structuring can also be considered a certain type of freeing up of the
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matters of concern from restrictive previous interpretations. We now have an alternative
modality of Gelassenheit which is a freeing in a different sense. Heidegger asks: “Our
analysis hitherto has shown that what we encounter within-the-world has, in its very
Being, been freed for our concernful circumspection, for taking account. What does this
previous freeing amount to, and how is this to be understood as an ontologically
distinctive feature of the world?”128 The answer is that this freeing occurs through
something always having been assigned or referred already to certain uses, goals and
projects. This is precisely the freeing up to which Heidegger referred when, in his early
work, he asserted that we do not say what we see but rather see what one says and, we
might add, what one does. This, then, is a freeing through being involved, a letting be
through engagement. In this sense, then, Gelassenheit is not a removal of concealing
masks but rather a positing of revealing roles.
There is one final element of worldhood which we must note before we move on.
This last element is the role played by a certain type of setting-up. Our focus upon this
issue is directed by an anticipation of the important role that setting-up plays in “The
Origin of the Work of Art”. Anyone reading Being and Time with an eye towards the
later work on art should be struck by the appearance of this central element in the precise
part of Being and Time which concerns itself with the structure of worldhood. Setting-up
is discussed by Heidegger in this context in connection with the way in which the
structure of worldhood is one of referring various entities one to another, and all to
various goals and projects. This referring, and indeed those things freed up through our
letting them be involved, are aspects of experience which, when everything is going
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smooth, generally recede into the background. When tools are working well they become
just another element of the flow of our projects, we don’t notice them: “But the Being of
what is most closely ready-to-hand within-the-world possesses the character of holdingitself-in and not emerging…”129 This holding-itself-in ends when the tool breaks or
something goes wrong in the meaningful context of the world. Suddenly we see the
workshop, or the world, rather than simply working with and in it. This moment of
breakdown serves as a foreshadowing of the later role of anxiety which ultimately
discloses the structure of worldhood, but there is another way in which an equipmental
context or world can be disclosed as a totality: “Accordingly our circumspective dealings
in the environment require some equipment ready-to-hand which in its character as
equipment takes over the ‘work’ of letting something ready-to-hand become
conspicuous.” This special equipment Heidegger will discuss as the sign which is
established or set up for the purpose of revealing:
“But even when signs are thus conspicuous, one does not let them be present-athand at random; they get ‘set-up’ in a definitive way with a view towards easy
accessibility…In this mode, signs ‘get established’ in a sense which is even more
primordial. In indicating, a ready-to-hand equipment totality, and even the
environment in general, can be provided with an availability which is
circumspectively oriented; and not only this: establishing a sign can, above all,
reveal.”130
The setting up of a sign, then, serves to bring into circumspective conspicuousness the
world itself. Recalling our earlier distinguishing of two ways to interpret the setting up of
a world in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, the promethean and revelatory, we might
now assert that Heidegger discusses the setting up of a sign here in Being and Time very
much along the lines of Julian Young’s revelatory interpretation. Further, the very
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discussion of a sign as a type of equipment set up for this specific reason leads fairly
easily to reflections upon the role played by a work of art. When we read the following
statement by Heidegger with his later work on art in mind we begin to suspect the forms
his thoughts concerning the setting up of a world took at this time:
“Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered;
more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that
our concernful dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a
Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather
an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our
circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand
announces itself.”131
It is hard to read this passage and not see prefigured Heidegger’s critique of aesthetics or
his assertion that a painting is not simply a depicting. We can almost hear his unusual
analysis of Van Gogh’s shoes forming here.
At this point the reader might be confused. Why am I making an argument for the
revelatory interpretation of art? The answers lies in the fact that, first, I don’t believe the
revelatory interpretation to be wrong but rather just to be insufficient and, second, I am
attempting to trace why Young and Dreyfus think the way they do in preparation for
pointing out what they have missed. Most of this presentation should be fairly old ground
for anyone familiar with Being and Time. Now, having made at least a few suggestions
about Young’s connection to this section of Being and Time, I must turn to the work of
demonstrating how these points give rise to the interpretation presented by Dreyfus.
Our discussion of the role played by a sign in revealing the totality of an
equipmental context, or world, echoes Heidegger’s later statement in “The Origin of the
Work of Art” that: “…there must always be some being in the open, something that is, in
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which the openness takes its stand and attains its constancy…”132 and it is precisely this
quotation that Dreyfus presents as Heidegger’s general sense of the role of art before
moving into his discussion of cultural paradigms. As we mentioned in our introduction,
Dreyfus understands cultural paradigms as a gathering and uniting of previously scattered
or inchoate cultural practices. This gathering makes explicit to a people an exemplar
around which they can be united and against which they can judge and understand
themselves. What has been at stake in my interpretations thus far is an understanding of
art as a way in which categorial intuitions, or rather Heidegger’s categorial disclosive
practices which are what a world is composed of, come to be. Dreyfus’ gathering,
however, allows for no radically new world to arise in art. What arises is always a new
unity of previously present elements or, in Young, a new disclosure of previously
inchoate background practices. With the understanding of worldhood from Being and
Time now present to us it is clear why Dreyfus thinks the way he does. In fact, it would
be possible to construct Dreyfus’ entire understanding of art from just the material in
Being and Time. This leads us to ask, did Heidegger not change at all from Being and
Time to “The Origin of the Work of Art”?
How could we construct Dreyfus’ understanding from Being and Time? First, we
understand world as a texture of practices, commitments, goals and referrals of entities to
these elements. At the base level is the for-the-sake-of-which, which consists in the
various roles that Dasein can occupy. Now, it is clear from this that the unifying of
scattered practices into a new possible role, into a new conception of what one can be and
what possibilities are open to one, indeed gives rise to a new world from old elements.
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When George Washington was faced with political leadership following the revolution he
had to carefully gather together various previously scattered roles into the new role of
president, while rejecting against opposition the assertion of the old role, or old elements,
of royalty. This gave rise to a very particular framework of understanding for both
American politics and America’s people. Similarly, much of the history of art is
dominated by the slow movement away from the role of the skilled craftsman and
towards the construction of the new role of the “artist”. This role, however, was found in
the uniting of strange elements of several other cultural roles including that of the priest
and prophet along with leftovers of the expert and craftsman.
We can see, then, how the worldhood presented in Being and Time, with social
roles and practices for its foundation, would suggest that the way in which a work of art
sets up a world must be through social practices and roles. When we further consider the
work performed by the sign when, in its being set-up, it brings to circumspection the
world we seem to have all the necessary elements to explain Dreyfus’ view. While there
is no sense of this in the passages dealing with the sign in Being and Time we can see the
step from a sign which reveals what is, as in Julian Young, to a sign which brings into
focus specific practices previously unnoticed and so gives rise through this shift in focus
to a new world. However, our question should be, why should the shift from a sign which
reveals what was already there to one which rearranges what was there to set up a new
structure not take the full step to a sign which sets up new practices which were not
previously there? If we think back to where we began, Heidegger was originally
concerned with how we can conceptualize matters with concepts that suit those matters,
rather than importing or imposing inappropriate forms upon them. The answer came first
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through categorial intuition, which was taken as the first inkling of a way in which
matters might dictate their own forms. This became pre-ontological understanding when
it was recognized that it is our activities and ways of talking over the world which
disclose reality to us. But, as our talk of facticity suggested, we are not master of our
activities, as the original connection between categorial intuition and pre-ontological
understanding should well suggest. We find things already disclosed to us in our being
thrown into a history and culture. However, it is not just that things have always already
been spoken of and practices are always already underway. It is rather that our practices,
as forms of disclosing and being with the matters they concern, arise from those matters
themselves. Practices can become hollow, speech can become reified, but when they
were still vital they were born of life or existence itself, born of the matters they concern,
and not simply applied. In other words, perhaps it is not just practices which are already
floating about that we have to deal with, rather perhaps what is can disclose itself in new
practices. Indeed, this seems to be precisely what Heidegger was looking for to begin
with in his earliest work, this is what we would expect from the principle of material
determination of form.
I think there is an extent in which this point is lost sight of in Being and Time. At
the very least large sections of Being and Time, like the section dealing with signs we
have discussed, can be interpreted just in terms of human practices already in existence
determining how things show up. Indeed, one might even develop a tension between the
various senses of Gelassenheit we have discussed. There seem to be several ways to let
things be. De-structuring perhaps frees things up, as I suggested earlier, so that they can
then give rise to new forms in which they can be disclosed. Letting-be-involved, on the
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other hand, discloses through a freeing up which is a providing of form. By involving
things in our practices we do indeed free them up to be experienced, but we may also be
concealing them in inappropriate determinations. The echoes of this earlier concern of
Heidegger’s, indeed one of his earliest and most central concerns, seem to be missing or
at least not duly stressed in Being and Time. More specifically, in Being and Time the
main concern seems to be the covering over of Dasein’s being without much reference to
the covering over of other possible matters of concern. It is a return to this concern with
the origin of our practices, I submit, which occurs in the movement from Being and Time
to “The Origin of the Work of Art”.
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Section 2: World Enough and Time; Anxiety and the Problem of World Change
“With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’.”133
“Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, Lady, were no crime
We would sit down and think which way
To walk and pass our long love's day…
But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near;
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity.”
Andrew Marvell134
“What is ‘past’? Nothing else than that world within which they belonged to a
context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a
concernful Dasein who was-in-the-world. That world is no longer.”135
I had stated earlier that there are two ways which Heidegger believes we can
come to know worldhood. The first, offering more intimations or formal indications of
what will later be filled out, is the method employed in the passages discussed so far.
This method is that of drawing from descriptions and analyses of our everyday
experiences the pre-ontological understanding of worldhood which we always already
have but which we are rarely, if ever, aware of. The second method, which provides a
dramatic attestation to the earlier indications, is the experience of anxiety in which the
formal structures of worldhood appear emptied of all content. As already suggested, this
later experience of anxiety has already been foreshadowed by the way in which
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equipment only ever really obtrudes upon us when something has gone wrong. Only in
moments of breakdown, or when brought forth by signs, do the background elements and
intentional/care structures of experience rise to our attention. This point, the way in
which the very forms that alone allow for meaningful experience themselves only rarely
appear, will become important later when we discuss two senses of the undisclosed. For
now what is important is for us to briefly present the nature of anxiety and Heidegger’s
response to it.
Anxiety, then, will be the attestation to the indications already provided about
worldhood. It can do this because the experience of anxiety, what is commonly
considered an objectless fear, in fact discloses the structure of our relational existence as
Being-in-the-world. Anxiety is, according to Heidegger, mistakenly considered an
objectless fear because is seems to demonstrate a certain indefiniteness such that: “That
in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world.”136 This apparently
objectless fear demonstrates the inconsequential nature of any determinate object in the
world, leaving all worldly objects irrelevant in the fact of the experience. Ultimately, “…
the totalities of involvements…within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it
collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance.”137
This experience of the utter insignificance of any given entity, commitment or practice
effectively leaves only the structure of worldhood itself in our view such that “…the
world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.”138 What this ultimately reveals,
however, is that it was the world and, more specifically, ourselves as Being-in-the-world
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which anxiety was anxious in the face of to begin with. The sheer thatness of our being,
and the fact that the meaning of everything else depends upon the stand we take
concerning our being, is that in the face of which we flee.
In this way anxiety provides attestation of the structures already discussed, but
furthermore it demonstrates the reality of pre-ontological understanding insofar as we
‘fear’, in anxiety, a situation we only really come to experience in anxiety. We must
always already be aware, through pre-ontological understanding, of the structure of
worldhood in order to flee from it through most of our activities and fear it in the
experience of anxiety. Furthermore, the experience of the worldhood of the world both
makes clear to us the role that taking a stand concerning our lives plays in the structure of
a meaningful world while also depriving us of all such stands we had willingly or
thoughtlessly made in the past. We are left, then, with the demand and necessity of once
more taking upon ourselves roles which can provide unity and meaning to the world.
These roles, however, can only be those provided us by our thrownness into a historical
context. This is where we discover the role of resoluteness, the call to a commitment
which, once made, will provide a for-the-sake-of-which and thus once more disclose the
situation in which we find ourselves.
It is important that we pause here and note one of those points of emphasis which
changes from Being and Time to some of Heidegger’s later work. In the face of anxiety,
resoluteness is left with the roles made possible by Dasein’s context and history. There is
no assertion of a wild leap into a radical creative newness. Authenticity is not the
achievement of some dramatic unique position, but rather a taking up as one’s own roles,
provided by history and tradition, which previously one may thoughtlessly have drifted in
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or out of. It is our throwness and the They which provide us all our possibilities. It is
important, here, to note two strains in the argument I am attempting to make. First, there
is the debate about whether past and current practices are necessarily the origin of all
future ones. Second, there is the related debate about whether these practices come from
ourselves or something else such as the worlding of the world or the self-disclosing of the
undisclosed. These two debates are related in a perhaps confusing way. The very
assertion that authentic Dasein does not leap into some newly created unique role
supports my own position, derived from the material determination of form, concerning
the origin of our practices in the matters with which they are concerned. If I were
asserting the existence of a Promethean artist, and not Promethean art, then the fact that
authenticity does not give rise to the dramatically unique would be troubling for me.
However, insofar as art is the origin of both art work and artist, the fact that we are
always delivered over to something else for our possibilities, be that something else
history or the They, only supports my second position that practices do not arise from
ourselves but rather through the disclosure of matters themselves. The only problem for
me here is why we should always be dependent upon current and past possibilities. Is it
not possible that, even as I assert traditional practices arose, new practices can arise from
authentic experiences of the matters themselves? Although we do not have a strong
reason to assert this from Being and Time, I believe a firm understanding of the second
debate greatly clarifies my position concerning the first.
There is an objection to my project thus far. In the preceding paragraph I spoke of
ontic practices as if they were the forms, and then of the matters they concern as
determining them. One might perfectly well admit this, and then point out that there is a
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higher formal level I have ignored. The determination of ontic practices by ontic matters
might be compared to Heidegger’s second sense of world, namely specific ontological
regions such as the world of mathematics. Given practices determine given worlds and, I
am asserting, rise from given matters. But Heidegger has just spent a good portion of his
book discussing worldhood, which is a formal characteristic of all possible worlds. This
structure precisely does not seem to be dictated or determined by any specific matter.
But is this really so? Do we find Heidegger anywhere prioritizing the formal as
determining its content? The first intimations of worldhood we arrive at through the
analysis of actual lived worlds, the world of a workshop and the like. Here we maintain
the good phenomenological practice of allowing our experiences of the matters
themselves to guide our philosophizing. In the course of this method do we discover that
form is determinative? Only if we wish to assert a simplistic social constructivism
whereby humanity’s practices determine how things show up and these practices are
created by humanity itself in leaps of arbitrary creation. This, however, we have rejected
in asserting the connection between pre-ontological understanding and categorial
intuition as well as in focusing on the way in which we are always delivered over onto
something else, generally our throwness, for our possibilities. Finally, what do we find in
the more dramatic phenomenological attestation which is anxiety? Certainly not that
some form determines the matter of experience but rather that anxiety, which I would
contest is a most potent example of determining matter, does away with all our ontic
ways of interpreting things and itself discloses, or determines, the most extensive formal
element we find in Being and Time i.e. worldhood. Anxiety attests to the fact, more
clearly than anything else, that all our finite formulations, interpretations, practices, goals,
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and roles can be overthrown by something over which we have no control: “Anxiety thus
takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the
‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted… Anxiety individualizes
Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands,
projects itself essentially upon possibilities.”139 This same point is echoed in the work of
Hans-Georg Gadamer on Heidegger when he discusses disposition and ground mood, of
which anxiety is one particularly potent example, as the ultimate determining ground and
limit in Being and Time beyond which one can not go:
“In one of the most brilliant phenomenological analyses of Being and Time,
Heidegger analyzed this limit experience of Dasein, which comes up upon itself
in the midst of beings, as ‘disposition’ (Befindlichkeit), and he attributed to
disposition or mood (Stimmung) the real disclosure of Being-in-the-world. What
is come upon in disposition represents the extreme limit beyond which the
historical self-understanding of human Dasein could not advance.”140
Anxiety’s individualizing power, then, puts an end to any form of absolute social
constructivism while its casting us back upon the possibilities of the public They puts an
end to any sort of solipsism. What we are ultimately left with, though it will only once
more become clear (or at least clearer) following Being and Time, is the determination of
matter.
There is a definite progression concerning these themes in Being and Time we
would do well to notice. In the sections dealing with worldhood it is very possible to be
under the false impression that we are absolutely free to radically create any for-the-sakeof-which we like, and thus determine an individualized world structure for ourselves.
There is a hint of this when we concentrate on just the section discussing the setting up of
139
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signs, we are struck by the vague sense that setting up signs is something we do ourselves
from some sort of individual freedom. The presentation of worldhood, which indeed is
just one element in the progressing explanation of the unitary experience of Being-in-theworld, then moves on to discuss the equally determinative elements of being-with-others
and the They. It is with this addition that we begin to see the way in which we are always
delivered over to something else for our possibilities. But, at this point, it is tempting to
assert some sort of current social constructivism whereby whatever the They currently
says determines what is. Section Five of Division Two of Being and Time then goes on to
orient the possibilities of any current They, or authentic Dasein, within the wider
determinations of historicality. As Guignon notes: “Needless to say, Heidegger does not
believe that any commitment is as good as any other… At the end of Being and Time, he
turns to an examination of how a clear-sighted grasp of the current situation is bound up
with an understanding of our belongingness to a shared ‘heritage’ and our participation in
a communal ‘destiny’.”141 In the course of this final turn to history, however, Heidegger
also finally comes face to face with the problem of world change, a problem which points
to the need that The Origin of the Work of Art will attempt to fill.
The movement of Being and Time, which constantly locates more isolated
phenomena within the larger context which alone makes each meaningful or allows for
their being, eventually arrives at the dependence of any given social role on the
historicality of a community. As I have stressed, there is no originating leap for an
authentic individual, but there is also no such leap for a community. Rather, the very
destiny of a community is wrapped up in that community’s own role within the larger
141
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context of its history and heritage. The fate of Dasein is unified with the destiny of a
community: “But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Beingwith-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny.”142 It
is important for us to note that world, then, is always also historical. In our Being-in-theworld we find that we also encounter the having-been of previous worlds: “Along with
any factical Dasein as Being-in-the-world, there is also, in each case, world-history. If
Dasein is there no longer, then, the world too is something that has-been-there.”143 This,
of course, raises the question of the rise and fall of worlds in general.
It is striking that, in working up to a discussion of this issue in Section Five of
Division two, Heidegger uses an example which he will use in the exact opposite sense in
“The Origin of the Work of Art”. I refer to his discussion of the Greek temple: “Thus ‘the
past’ has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it
belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still be present-at-hand
‘now’ – for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is
still ‘in the present’.”144 This passage is striking for several reasons in light of the role the
temple will play later in Heidegger’s post-Being and Time concern with historical world
change. First we should note that it appears in a section dedicated to laying out the
ordinary, and generally confused or mistaken, view of history. In this sense, then, the
dual being of the temple expresses a paradox the solution to which will be an
understanding of historical world change. Insofar as the temple, even if in ruins, is still
here now, in what sense is it past? Only in the sense in which its world is past:

142

SZ p. 436
Ibid. p. 445
144
Ibid p. 430
143

101

“What is ‘past’? Nothing else than that world within which they belonged to a
context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a
concernful Dasein who was in-the-world. That world is no longer. But what was
formerly within-the-world with respect to that world is still present-at-hand… But
what do we signify by saying of a world that it is no longer? A world is only in
the manner of existing Dasein, which factically is as Being-in-the-World.”145
It is, then, the paradox of the temple which directs our attention to the fact that we have
experiences which point to worlds that, in some sense, no longer are. The second striking
element about the presence of the temple as an example here is that, as I mentioned, it
will play the opposite role in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. In Being and Time the
temple appears as a referent to a world which is no more, it is a harbinger of the past.
Later, however, the temple will be depicted in the role it played in Ancient Greece as the
establishment of a world and, I am claiming, the irruption of the new into history as such.
This point, the changing role played by the temple, nicely brings into view at least one of
the many shifts in focus which occur from Being and Time to “The Origin of the Work of
Art”, namely, the move from a backward looking tendency towards a questioning as to
the rise of the new. It is interesting, as well, to note that the general path we traced in
Heidegger’s pre-Being and Time work moved from the decidedly forward looking
concern with how we might allow matters to give rise to their own conceptualizations
(the problem of the categories and categorial intuition) to the de-structuring of reified
ways of taking things until finally settling on the focus on heritage in Being and Time. It
is important for precisely this reason to stress, then, that the way in which the problem of
historical world change arises in Being and Time is very different from the way it will
later be discussed in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. First we are troubled by the fact
that world can be something which is past while later we find the focus on the question of
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how worlds arise. As I had remarked in passing in the first chapter of this work, we seem
to see in the overall path of Heidegger’s thought a tendency to shift back and forth
between the determinative power of history, a past orientation, and the irruptive power
with which the new rises into history, an orientation towards the future. Ultimately in
Being and Time, the problem of world death is left mostly unaddressed: “…if we were to
follow up the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical historizing, we
would necessarily be transgressing the limits of our theme…”146 This promissory note,
however, was to be fulfilled later through a discussion of art and the setting up of a
world, though in a rather different tone and with a gaze cast in a different direct than we
find in the original raising of the problem.
We can take at least one key message from the general structure of
Heidegger’s attempt to understanding Being through an analytic of Dasein. This message
is that apparently discrete entities or phenomena, when phenomenologically investigated,
are time and again discovered to be part of a larger event from which alone they derive
their being. Whether we are making the mistake of discussing “one equipment” or an
“individual Dasein”, we end up ultimately locating an understanding of the entity in the
larger context, be it equipmental totality or Being-with-others in the They. My use of the
term “event” for these larger contexts rests, of course, of Heidegger’s ultimate
temporalizing of the very phenomenon of the world or Dasein. Each given world context
or community of practices itself depends upon the ongoing temporalizing of the event
from which they arise. This is ultimately what it means for Heidegger to state “… if
fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its
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historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny.”147 Dasein and its
world alike are caught up in the larger happening out of which each arise. This point,
however, should dissuade us once and for all from prioritizing any current collection of
possibilities at the risk of underestimating the role of the ongoing event understood as
either a historical sending or self-disclosing future.
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Section 3: Truth and Untruth; The Reservoir of the Undisclosed
“In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the
truth’ states equipimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’.”148
“The first beginning is not mastered; and the truth of be-ing, in spite of its
essential shining, is not expressly grounded. And this means that a human foregrasping (of asserting, of tekne, of certainty) sets the standard for the
interpretation of the beingness of be-ing. But now the great turning around is
necessary, which is beyond all ‘revaluation of values,’ that turning around in
which beings are not grounded in terms of human being, but rather human being
is grounded in terms of be-ing.”149
We must still discuss Young’s second claim concerning the period leading from
Being and Time to “The Origin of the Work of Art”. This is the claim that following
Being and Time Heidegger flirted with a particular Nazi Prometheanism and then, by the
time of “The Origin of the Work of Art”, returned safely to the insights of Being and
Time. In the course of debating this point we will also clarify what I have previously
referred to as two different possible understandings of the undisclosed which I take to be,
at least partially, the basis of the disagreement between Dreyfus and myself. It will be
useful for us first to note that very different readings of what occurs between Being and
Time and “The Origin of the Work of Art” are possible from the one presented by Young.
Despite Young’s claim to be presenting a view contiguous with it, I take the position
presented by Taminiaux in “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’” to be one
such alternate reading as I will discuss later. Another alternate view is that presented by
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Guignon when he discusses the limitations of Heidegger’s understanding of commitment
in Being and Time:
“To make a commitment is not just to leap one way or the other for the sake of
leaping; rather, becoming committed to something is most often experienced as
answering a call or responding to something outside ourselves, something that
makes a demand on us. It would seem, then, that any picture of resoluteness that
ignores this dimension of being called will fail to capture what is most
fundamental about our actual experience of being committed. For this purpose,
some account needs to be given of what calls us, and this requires a move beyond
the descriptions of Dasein’s own projections and disclosedness to an account of
something that can exert a pull on us from outside ourselves. One way to
understand the shift that occurs in Heidegger’s writings in the mid-thirties is to
see these works as addressing this problem. In the 1935 essay, “The Origin of the
Work of Art,” for example, truth is described not just as a matter of what Dasein
does, but as something that happens to Dasein through Dasein’s being in a
relation to a particular entity – a work of art – which ‘sets truth to work’ and
thereby discloses a world.”150
This particular concern harmonizes nicely with Heidegger’s statement quoted at the
opening of this section from his 1936-38 Contributions to Philosophy; From Enowning to
the effect that previously we have mistakenly attempted to ground beings and Being on
the particular being of human-being. It is hard not to read in Heidegger’s condemnation
of the urge to ground Being upon human-being a criticism of his own attempt to
understand Being through Being and Time’s analytic of Dasein. Indeed, the very project
of arriving at Being through some representative or prioritized particular being, a strategy
which looms so large in the opening of Being and Time, seems fundamentally
problematic to Heidegger following. Here we have precisely the “distressing difficulty,
which has been clear to me since Being and Time and has since been expressed in a
variety of versions”151 which Heidegger mentions in the addendum to “The Origin of the
Work of Art”. It seems that to properly understand Dasein, let alone to understand Being
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itself, we must have recourse to something beyond Dasein itself. The reading we have
presented of Being and Time should already suggest this point, indeed we have attempted
to draw out at least a few of the tensions where we see Heidegger pulling in this
direction. For example, if we are always already caught in a larger unfolding event it is
the event, and not ourselves, which must ground our understanding of both ourselves and
our world. When looking at the passages in Being and Time dealing with the setting up of
a sign which then discloses the equipmental totality that is a world we might be tempted
to think that this setting up is something we ourselves do on our own. In contrast, in “The
Origin of the Work of Art”, the art work and artist alike arise from art. The prioritizes
have shifted, but we have already suggested the way in which the movement of Being
and Time already points towards a constant grounding of particular actions in large
ongoing events and social-historical contexts. In this sense, then, Being and Time is
already on its way towards “The Origin of the Work of Art”. It is important to note that
we were able to read Being and Time in the light we have, stressing where we could the
determinations arise from beyond Dasein himself through reference to the material
determination of form, because of the reading we have already given to Heidegger’s
earlier projects. The shift which Heidegger states must occur is the one he was already
involved with in his earliest work, a shift to the matters themselves and away from
imposed human determinations. The very need to ground our understanding of Dasein
beyond Dasein, to understand Dasein through Being and not vice versa, is in a rather
potent sense a continuation of the debate with Natorp. It seems, then, that this issue had
slid out of focus to some extent in Being and Time but comes back into focus following.
The famous “turn” then is more a “return” than anything else.
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One of the ways in which this shift of focus or strategy occurs following Being
and Time is in the shifting of weight from one understanding of what untruth or the
undisclosed is to another understanding. Both senses were present to some extent in
Being and Time, but which one was given priority alters from 1927 to 1936. We can see
this best by looking at how untruth is understood in Being in Time in contrast with how it
is understood in the 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth”. The distinction will
ultimately be between what is concealed, undisclosed or withdrawing within the clearing
of a given world and what is undisclosed insofar as it lies outside of a given world.
Within Heidegger’s discussion of equipment and the structure of worldhood in
Being and Time he pauses to stress that the very structure he is extracting from everyday
experience, and which anxiety completely discloses, is precisely that which generally is
hidden in the background of all our undertakings. In point of fact, any given piece of
equipment, and remember that everything we experience at all is ultimately going to be
understandable along the lines of equipmentality, is characterized by a tendency to be
unnoticed when fulfilling its role smoothly: “The ready-to-hand is not grasped
theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as
a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its
readiness to hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite
authentically.”152 We, of course, should be struck by the use of the term “withdraw” here
insofar as it will be a central characteristic of the earth when we come to Heidegger’s
later work on art. This withdrawal of the ready-to-hand, and more importantly the entire
structure of references which makes the ready-to-hand possible which we understand as
152

SZ p. 99

108

the world, can provide us one possible understanding of what will later be understood as
the strife between world and earth. The very elements which disclose entities themselves
resist disclosure. This is one of the passages we have in mind when we suggest that we
can draw the entirety of the position Young and Dreyfus alike attribute to Heidegger’s
“The Origin of the Work of Art” from Being and Time alone.
Later in Section Six of Division One of Being and Time Heidegger will again
stress the primordial nature of the undisclosed by identifying Dasein’s being in the truth,
insofar as it is the clearing of disclosure which alone allows anything to show up, with
Dasein’s being in the untruth. This moment, quoted at the opening of this section, appears
following Heidegger’s identification of the ready-to-hand’s tendency to withdraw with
Dasein’s tendency to lose itself in becoming dispersed in its world and the They, a
characteristic called falling: “Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its
‘world’. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has directed itself
thither… Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in
‘untruth’.”153 This untruth, as Dasein’s dispersal and the withdraw of worldhood and its
ready-to-hand entities, is something very much present within the world itself. As
Heidegger discusses the presence of the concealed in terms of semblance and disguise:
“It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has
already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure
itself of its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is
never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its
departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as
if… That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are
still disguised.”154
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An observant reader should find this passage particularly damning towards the overall
argument I am attempting to build. Clearly here we have presented the idea that the rise
of anything new into history must occur from previously present elements within the
world. At this moment in Being and Time, at least, Heidegger does indeed seem willing
to foreclose the irruption of the radically new into history. I take this point, however, not
only to change later on but to already have been different before Being and Time, and
perhaps even in tension with other tendencies of Being and Time itself.
What is the other possible sense of the undisclosed, concealed or untruth? We can
begin to see it if we give thought to certain hermeneutic observations with which
Heidegger was concerned throughout his life which we have already discussed in his
early work. You will recall that, in the previous chapter, we had discussed Heidegger’s
presentation in the Introduction to Phenomenological Research of the point that every
care structure necessarily conceals something even as it discloses as well. Similarly, with
Heidegger’s early insistence, in The History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena, that
the relation between intentional relations are themselves intentional in the back of our
mind we walked through Heidegger’s revealing of the structure of worldhood as made up
of ever larger contexts of care. The world itself, then, is just the care structure of a
community. But this care structure, like any other, will itself conceal and neglect
something even as it discloses. In other words, the clearing of disclosure which is world
rests within the forest of the concealed. It is this precise image which makes little sense in
Being and Time if: “The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having
something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the
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mode of semblance.”155 However, this image is going to become central following Being
and Time. As Julian Young himself nicely describes this point as it occurs as earth in
“The Origin of the Work of Art”: “Earth is the area of ‘unfathomable’ (PLT p. 128,
compare p. 180) darkness which constitutes the other ‘side’ of the ‘clearing’ that is world,
‘the side of… [Being] that is averted from us, unilluminated by us’ (PLT p. 124). Being
is thus ‘world’ and ‘earth’ taken together… it resembles the moon: behind the side
illuminated by and for us lies an immeasureable – ‘ungraspable’ (Ister p. 136) – area of
unperceived darkness (PLT p. 124).”156 The irony of this passage is, of course, that I
agree with Young’s depiction of untruth, or earth, here but it would be rather problematic
to locate it completely in Being and Time for reasons I have already pointed out. But,
isn’t “The Origin of the Work of Art” supposed to be, according to Young, Heidegger’s
returning safely to the insights of Being and Time? This identification of the concealed
with that outside of the clearing of the world, like onto the dark side of the moon, is not
an insight from Being and Time but rather a progression away from Being and Time and,
perhaps, back towards earlier insights.
This new conception of, or at the very least shift of focus in understanding,
untruth appears strongly in Heidegger’s 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth”. In this
work the undisclosed is characterized as older and more primordial than any given
disclosure, and indeed disclosure itself, identified with a letting-be that brings into
accord, is described as dependant upon concealment: “However, what brings into accord
is not nothing, but rather a concealing of beings as a whole. Precisely because letting be
always lets beings be in a particular comportment that relates to them and thus disclosed
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them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a
concealing.”157 Here we have a repetition of the point we had already gleaned from
Heidegger’s early hermeneutics, namely that any disclosure is always also a covering
over. Heidegger goes further, however, and insists that this hermeneutic point about the
partiality of any given perspective or disclosure is insufficient to really appreciate the
primordial nature of untruth: “The concealment of beings as a whole does not first show
up subsequently as a consequence of the fact that knowledge of beings is always
fragmentary. The concealment of beings as a whole, untruth proper, is older than every
openedness of this or that being. It is also older than letting-be itself, which in disclosing
already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealing.”158 In this sense, then,
untruth as that upon which all disclosure depends must, in a sense, be beyond world taken
as the ultimate clearing or disclosure. We can drive home this point by contrasting
Heidegger’s assertion in Being and Time that untruth is always experienced as some sort
of dissembling within our experience with his assertion in “On The Essence of Truth”
that mysteries derived from day to day life itself are never essential in the way that
primordial untruth itself, as the concealment of beings as a whole now characterized as
The Mystery, is:
“However, to reside in what is readily available is intrinsically not to let the
concealing of what is concealed hold sway. Certainly, among readily familiar
things there are also some that are puzzling, unexplained, undecided,
questionable. But these self-certain questions are merely transitional, intermediate
points in our movement within the readily familiar and thus not essential.
Wherever the concealment of beings as a whole is conceded only as a limit that
occasionally announces itself, concealing as a fundamental occurrence has sunk
into forgottenness.”159
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This holding to what is already revealed, even when revealed as dissembling or
mysterious, is characterized by Heidegger as a flight from the real mystery of primordial
concealment, a flight which he calls erring. This precise failing is then identified by
Heidegger with precisely the mistake he took himself to have made to some degree in
Being and Time when he sought to arrive at Being through Dasein:
“He persists in them [the latest needs and aims] and continually supplies himself
with new standards, yet without considering either the ground for taking up
standards or the essence of what gives the standard. In spite of his advance to new
standards and goals, man goes wrong as regards the essential genuineness of his
standards. He is all the more mistaken the more exclusively he takes himself, as
subject, to be the standard for all beings.”160
Here we have an identification of erring, or fleeing from The Mystery which is
primordial untruth, with the desire to take man as the standard for all beings or even
Being itself. The failure to take into account “the essence of what gives the standard”
should particularly remind us of Heidegger’s early renovations of categorial intuition.
Searching for a source for the categories with which we were to conceptualize the matters
of our concern, categorial intuition was transformed into pre-ontological understanding,
or the disclosedness in which we always already find ourselves insofar as our collective
activities have already opened up the world to us. As I have repeatedly asserted, however,
for pre-ontological understanding to maintain the promise Heidegger saw in categorial
intuition the disclosure which arises through our activities must take its origin from the
matter with which these activities are concerned. The source of standards, then, is to be
understood as outside of Dasein and, as this later piece suggests, outside of any given
disclosure, clearing, or world. What arises from this discussion is that, with our new
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sense of untruth clarified, openness to the concealed is an openness to the possibility that
new standards can indeed arise within the context of a given world. We begin to see why
there can indeed be an irruption of the new into history or even the rise of a new world
from out of the mystery which is the undisclosed resting beyond the limits of the finite
clearing that is any given world.
We should be cautious of oversimplifying the period between Being and Time
and “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Changes in any thinker’s positions are rarely
smooth and rarely hold constant during the periods of experimentation and change. There
are moments, for example, in the Introduction to Metaphysics of 1935 which seem to
remind one of both the mistaken focus on Dasein as the standard of Being Heidegger was
moving away from and the focus on the power of something beyond Dasein having a
determining force upon it. There is something right in Young’s claim that Heidegger
flirted with Young’s sense of Prometheanism in this period, but Young is wrong to think
that Heidegger returned to the insights of Being and Time following this period. In fact,
the Youngian Prometheanism161 of moments in the 1930s is closer to Being and Time
than much of what we find in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. This tension of the 1930s
is perhaps seen best in the contrast between the “overwhelming sway” of primordial strife
in the Introduction to Metaphysics and the violence with which man escapes from this
sway:
“The polemos named here is a strife that holds sway before everything divine and
human, not war in the human sense… struggle first projects and develops the unheard, the hitherto un-said and un-thought. This struggle is then sustained by the
creators, by the poets, thinkers, and statesmen. Against the overwhelming sway,
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they throw the counterweight of their work and capture in this work the world that
is thereby opened up.”162
In tracing the changes in Heidegger’s thought during this period Taminiaux summarizes
the Prometheanism of the Introduction to Metaphysics in this way:
“Being itself is ‘an intricate struggle’ (EM, 81) between powers, Being is an overpower requiring a ‘creative self-assertion’, that is, a ‘separation in the
togetherness of being between unconcealment and appearance, Non-Being’ (EM
84). Such a decision is the way man is called to be responsive to the over-power
of Being. And because this over-power is violence, he can rise to its challenge by
being himself the disrupting and the violent one. The issue for him is to operate ‘a
taming and ordering of powers by virtue of which beings open up as such when
man moves into them. This disclosure of beings is the power that man must
master in order to become himself amidst beings, i.e., in order to be historical’
(EM, 120). In the context, ‘himself’ means ‘the wielder of power,’ the one ‘who
breaks out and breaks up, he who captures and subjugates’ (EM, 120).”163
What is interesting about the perspective we find at this moment in Heidegger’s work is
the presence of both what was previously central in Being and Time and what will be
central in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. We have both the overwhelming sway in
which man is caught, and the radical determinative power of the creator or statesman
which, in taking on a counter role to the violent force of the overwhelming sway, gives
rise itself to a world. Here we have both a resistance and power discovered beyond
Dasein and the Promethean power of Dasein to react in the face of this force. However,
as our discussion of “On the Essence of Truth” should suggest, at other moments
Heidegger was also concerned during the same period to insist upon the dependence of
all disclosure upon the mystery of the undisclosed, and Dasein’s equal dependence upon
this. Eventually these tensions settle into the final version of “The Origin of the Work of
Art” where, as Taminiaux puts it:
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“Formerly, aletheia was connected with the There that a people is entrusted to
take upon itself, thus making the Dasein of a people the locus of truth. This
characterization now disappears. Dasein is no longer the locus of truth.
Unconcealment is now taken to be a clearing in the midst of beings, a clearing to
which humans belong and are exposed, rather than one instituted by them…By
the same token, truth itself is no longer a matter of human decision between being
and not-Being, or between unconcealment and mere appearance.”164
By “The Origin of the Work of Art”, then, we are well on our way to discovering in the
rise of a world the activity of something beyond Dasein itself, something we might call
Art, or the worlding of the new world, or the working of Truth. Whatever we may call it,
however, there seems good reason to think it can originate from beyond the already
disclosed, the already circumscribed within a given world, and thus give rise to the
radically new within history.
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Chapter Three: Art
“What seems easier than to let a being be just the being that it is? Or does this
turn out to be the most difficult of tasks, particularly if such an intention – to let a
being be as it is – represents the opposite of the indifference that simply turns its
back upon the being itself in favor of an unexamined concept of being? We ought
to turn toward the being, think about it in regard to its being, but by means of this
thinking at the same time let it rest upon itself in its very own being.”
Heidegger “The Origin of the Work of Art”165
Having come at last to “The Origin of the Work of Art” we should pause to
remind ourselves where we stand and what we are trying to accomplish. Our goal from
the start has been to offer a reading of “The Origin of the Work of Art” which
understands it in light of Heidegger’s earliest concerns and the path that his attempt to
address these concerns took from his lecture courses in 1919 through Being and Time
right up to the publication of the final version of the work on art in 1936, with perhaps
even a glance beyond to the 1956 addendum. In the course of this study we have also
sought to build a critique of other readings of “The Origin of the Work of Art” which we
suspect do violence to the text’s role in Heidegger’s oeuvre. This critical element is,
however, at best a side note or chance outcome of the attempt to apply the rich research
we now have at our disposal on Heidegger’s early work to areas of Heidegger’s thought
which have not been duly viewed in light of this scholarship.
We have found that one of Heidegger’s earliest concerns was how
phenomenology was to be capable of fulfilling the Husserlian dictum to return to the
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matters themselves. How, it was asked, can philosophy disclose a being as it is while also
letting it be as it is? This challenge, which we have referred to as the problem of
Gelassenheit, can be raised in several different forms. One manifestation of it was the
challenge to Husserlian phenomenology offered by the Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp in his
two pronged attack as discussed by Heidegger in the first lecture course contained in
Towards the Definition of Philosophy. First Natorp pointed out that philosophical
reflection distorts the matters upon which one reflects through an atomizing and “stilling
of the stream” of lived experience. Then he claimed that, even were this not so,
phenomenological description must occur in language which is always already removed
from experience insofar as language is based upon a process of abstraction and
universalization which must inevitably distort or destroy the particularity of any given
experience. Heidegger’s answer was seen to rest in his rejection of the false dualisms
hidden at the heart of both Natorp’s claims and the entire modern epistemic tradition of
philosophy in general. In other words, for Natorp’s claims to get off the ground one must
conceive of reflection and speech as external impositions on existence or isolated
activities of a disconnected observer. Heidegger’s counter claim, found articulated
throughout his early lecture courses, was that reflection and language were both elements
of life and existence itself. In other words, philosophy is an activity of “the matters
themselves” and, as such, properly understood, it represents a privileged access to their
nature and not a distorting view. It is clear, however, that the weight of Natorp’s
objection has simply been shifted to the phrase “properly understood”. The challenge
becomes, how can we ground philosophical activity in existence so that it can avoid
being accused of imposing structures on the subjects it investigates.
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The young Heidegger admitted that existence has the tendency to dissemble and
that we have a tendency to deceive ourselves. Philosophical speech can degenerate to
empty talk and traditions can be covering over rather than letting things be. Philosophy
properly understood must, then, dedicate itself to something like the principle of the
material determination of form insofar as the matters themselves which are of concern
must be allowed to dictate how they are to be conceptualized and discussed. To use a
Kantian formulation, our concepts must be derived from the things themselves,
understanding now the “things themselves” as always already engaged in self-reflection
and speech. One way that we might understand this idea of the things dictating their own
conceptualization, a formulation very foreign to a tradition following Kant, was what
Heidegger found so exciting in Husserl’s categorial intuition as presented in his Logical
Investigations. Here we have a dismissal of Kant’s division of the active and passive
elements of the human mind and a location of categorial conceptual elements in intuition
itself. Heidegger’s growing sense, however, that the subjectivist tradition dominating
philosophy since Descartes was itself primarily distortive required him to reformulate
Husserl’s insight into a form not dependant upon consciousness and other mentalistic
assumptions. We might say that categorial intuition becomes, in Heidegger, categorial
engagements insofar as our lived activities in the world, with no reference to
consciousness as their primary medium, are what provide us with the categorial elements
through which matters are known to us.
In this move from Husserl to Heidegger, it is possible for us to mistakenly lose the
very potency of Husserl’s original position. Categorial intuition was exciting because it
placed the dictation of form or concepts in the hands of the things themselves. Categorial
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engagement must maintain this structure or else we have lost the very goal we were
concerned with at the start. Our enworlded engagements, which include the totality of our
cultural practices and traditions, must have their origin in the matters with which they are
concerned. They must arise from existence itself. This, of course, does not foreclose their
drifting from their origins and becoming distortive later. Indeed, it is even possible that
most traditions and activities are deformed precisely in the sense that they have come to
cover over rather than disclose the things with which they are concerned. For this reason
Heidegger’s practice of de-structuring becomes important as a way of freeing up the
matters themselves from distorting traditions, practices, and language in order to allow
them to dictate new ways in which we can be engaged with them. This very story,
however, should raise a question we do not seem to have addressed, and which I believe
Heidegger himself felt he had not fully addressed until “The Origin of the Work of Art”.
How do matters themselves give rise to disclosive practices? If we are to find a moment
of origin for a given way in which things have shown themselves in practices, what
would this origin look like? When we understand world as the interconnected structure of
such disclosive traditions and practices, the question becomes what the origin of a world
looks like. These questions lead to Heidegger’s investigation of art. It is for precisely this
reason that considering the setting up of a world by art to be just a disclosure of the
already present but implicit world structure (Young) or just a new gathering of previously
existing but perhaps scattered practices (Dreyfus) is going to disconnect “The Origin of
the Work of Art” from the way in which it is an extension of Heidegger’s earliest
concerns.
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In the three sections which follow we shall take Heidegger’s own structuring of
“The Origin of the Work of Art” as our guide. The first section, in dialogue with the
section of the same title in Heidegger’s work, shall deal with the concepts of form and
matter as we have been using them and as they enter into “The Origin of the Work of
Art”. The second section will discuss our interpretation of the strife of world and earth in
conjunction with how it is presented by Heidegger. The final section will bring the
previous considerations to bear on the concept of history, and the historicity of world, as
Heidegger discusses the subject in the third section of his work.
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Section One: Thing and Work
“One ought to have a close look at the sophistry being pursued today with
schemata like form-content, rational-irrational, finite-infinite, mediatedunmediated, subject-object. It is what the critical stance of phenomenology
ultimately struggles against. When the attempt is made to unify them, one treats
phenomenology in a superficial manner. Phenomenology can only be
appropriated phenomenologically, i.e., only through demonstration and not in
such a way that one repeats propositions, takes over fundamental principles, or
subscribes to academic dogmas.”
Heidegger, Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity166
It should be clear by now that when we use a phrase such as “the material
determination of form” we are rather far removed from, say, a traditional Aristotelian
understanding of the terms. When we say “form” we intend to bring into view all the
various connected concepts we find associated with this word in Heidegger including, for
example, a Kantian use of the word “concept”, a Husserlian and also medieval scholastic
use of the term “category”, as well as a properly Heideggerian discussion of “disclosive
practices”, “clearings” and finally even “worlds”. Similarly, in talking about “matter” we
intend to bring to mind the Kantian “thing in itself”, the Husserlian “matters themselves”,
and Heidegger’s “existence”, “life” and even “Being”. Speaking of the material
determination of form, then, can mean anything from “things conceptualized should
themselves dictate the concepts used to understanding them” to “the world should (or
perhaps always does and must) arise from Being”. Between these two extremes is a
spectrum of various formulations of connected issues, all of which share a common
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structure to which we refer in terms of the principle of the material determination of
form.
At this point we would do well to revisit the third section of our first chapter.
There it was discussed how Heidegger, perhaps above all else, was concerned to avoid
the hidden assumptions and distortions that any of these previously mentioned concepts,
even those which are Heidegger’s own, bring to any given philosophical encounter when
not derived authentically from the philosophical encounter itself. It was this very concern
which was central in Heidegger’s own critiques of the epistemic model of philosophy
derived from Descartes and carried on through Kant into Neo-Kantianism. By importing
the epistemic model of the human condition we make ontological assumptions not
necessarily justified by the matters of concern themselves. The Husserlian revolution out
of which phenomenology was born was, in good part, the transformation of the
scheme/content dualisms into intentional form from which it could be stated that subject
and object arise, as secondary and derivative, from a more primordial medium of
intentionality. Similarly, categorial intuition dissolved the boundary between the passive
and active, or intuitive and conceptual, which was central to Kant. These are all lessons
Heidegger learned well, and also positions which he himself wished to get beyond or
beneath. Thus, we have his reformulation of the theoretical assertion/knowledge model of
intentionality into the lived engaged-practice model of care, his transformation of
categorial intuition into pre-ontological understanding, and his reformulation of truth as
correspondence into a focus on disclosure. The important point for us right now, then, is
to make clear that when we discuss “form and matter” we certainly do not intend to
suggest some naïve return to Aristotelian dualisms; rather we have used it as a short hand
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for Heidegger’s constant reinvention and re-overcoming of past dualisms long since
grown stale. If, then, we seem to be moving towards an interpretation of the world-earth
dualism as a reformulation of Aristotelian form-matter it must be understood in terms of
an uncovering of the more primordial lived experiences out of which the abstract formmatter dualism alone ever arose as meaningful to begin with and from which it has
wandered.
It is certainly important for us to make this point insofar as Heidegger dedicates
much of the first section of “The Origin of the Work of Art” to pointing out that the form/
matter dualism is a distortive formulation which art works, and things in general, have
falsely been forced to fit. Indeed, he goes as far as to make the point we have just made,
though in a rather more negative tone. Namely, he points out that under the concepts of
form and matter the entire conceptual structure of Western epistemology and ontology
can be contained:
“Form and content are the most hackneyed concepts under which anything and
everything may be subsumed. And if form is correlated with the rational and
matter with the irrational; if the rational is taken to be the logical and the irrational
the alogical; if in addition the subject-object relation is coupled with the
conceptual pair form-matter; then representation has at its command a conceptual
machinery that nothing is capable of withstanding.”167
In enquiring as to the proper origin of the form/matter conceptual apparatus Heidegger
comes to the conclusion that it first arose not from an encounter with art works or mere
things, but rather from the nature of equipment. Form and matter are going to be
grounded in the usefulness which is an inherent characteristic of something experienced
as equipment. Form originally, then, is to be considered as arising from the idea of
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formative activity and matter from some choice of the appropriate material for some
specific thing being formed. Thus, form and matter come into view as ways to distinguish
how and why something is, or fails to be, useful.
In the very preliminary and clearly inadequate formulation available at the very
beginning of the essay, equipment is presented by Heidegger as standing in an
intermediate position between the mere thing and the work of art. The mere thing is
characterized primarily in terms of being self-contained and self-subsistent; it does not
require being made or being useful in order to be what it is. Equipment, on the other
hand, must be produced and can come to fail in its usefulness. Art, in contrast, at this
point at least, is considered to have the self-sufficiency of a mere thing insofar as it seems
to require no use or even usefulness and yet will have come to be through some sort of
relation to production. As intermediate, it is in terms of equipment that the being of
things and works have come to be conceptualized. This, in conjunction with a faith in a
creator God, gives rise to almost the whole of western ontology:
“The idea of creation, grounded in faith, can lose its guiding power of knowledge
of beings as a whole. But the theological interpretation of all beings, the view of
the world in terms of matter and form borrowed from an alien philosophy, having
once been instituted, can still remain a force. This happens in the transition from
the Middle Ages to modern times. The metaphysics of the modern period rests on
the form-matter structure devised in the medieval period, which itself merely
recalls in its words the buried natures of eidos and hule. Thus the interpretation of
‘thing’ by means of matter and form, whether it remains medieval or becomes
Kantian-transcendental, has become current and self-evident.”168
It is worth pausing here to note something odd which should have begun to jump out at
an observant reader. A good portion of our discussion of Being and Time was dedicated
to discussing equipmental being as the being which all things encountered through care,
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therefore all worldly things, have. The very structure of worldhood understood in terms
of a totality of involvements points to the necessary equipmental being something must
show up in terms of in order to show up at all. The discussion, then, of the present-athand as a derivative and privative experience of the ready-to-hand, i.e. the equipmental
versus the mere-thing, seems to be undergoing some sort of extension or change here at
the very beginning of “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Heidegger will still assert that:
“As a rule it is the use-objects around us that are the nearest and authentic things.”169 Yet
there is also the key implication that in the talk of the world almost entirely in terms of
the equipmental something fundamental has been left out: “Nevertheless, in its genuinely
equipmental being, equipment stems from a more distant source. Matter and form and
their distinction have a deeper origin.”170 Heidegger will seek this deeper origin of both
equipment and matter/form in his attempt to come to know the being of the work of art.
The path already sketched out in seeking the appropriate origin of the form/matter
structure, and the further path needed to uncover the connection between the thing,
equipment and art work, both consist in a Heideggerian strategy we are already very
familiar with. Heidegger will seek to reverse the movement of universalizing and
abstraction which has allowed both words and the general ways of engaging with
existence with which they are associated to wander far from their source and become
empty traditions covering over the matters they once served to disclose: “But perhaps this
characterization in terms of matter and form would recover its defining power if only we
reversed the process of expanding and emptying these concepts.”171 This process will,
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then, require a reengagement with equipment, and eventually art, in a way not
predetermined and obscured by traditional abstract determinations.
We have, however, gotten ahead of ourselves. Heidegger does not focus the
entirety of the first section to a discussion of form and matter. Rather, form and matter
themselves only enter the conversation following a previous discussion of two other ways
in which the thinghood of the thing can be conceived. This discussion itself has arisen
from the rather simple insight that in order to understand the being of the work of art we
shall have to get clear on the being of the mere thing such that we might see what
differentiates the two. Reading “The Origin of the Work of Art” in isolation it is possible
to see this first section as detached from what is to follow. The later presentation of the
nature of art and art works does not depend necessarily on any of the discussion which
came before except, perhaps, for a glance in the direction of the form/matter issue. Indeed
dwelling on the thingly nature of the thing seems to serve, at best, a purely negative
purpose in the rest of the work. In other words, it points out misconceptions so that we
can avoid them. For these reasons Heidegger himself, at the end of the section, calls all of
what had come before a detour. When we think about the first section, however, in light
of the path Heidegger’s own thoughts have taken since 1919 we begin to see in it a
recapitulation of previous insights and concerns as well as a desire to clarify them further.
Let us look a bit closer and see in what sense this is so.
The three traditional ways a thing has been conceived, as discussed by Heidegger,
are as a bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, and finally as formed
matter. The conception of the thing as a bearer of traits is explained in terms of substance
ontology wherein a thing is conceived as an underlying substrate in which various
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properties adhere as accidents. The very opening of the “The Origin of the Work of Art”
in which art work and artist alike are grounded in terms of art, which clearly is not
conceived as anything like a substance, already points to the event nature through which
art will later be conceived and through which truth as disclosure has already been
conceived throughout Heidegger’s previous work. The rejection of substance ontology,
then, is the return of an old concern and its discussion raises another old concern which
will, nonetheless, loom largely in the background of what Heidegger is up to in “The
Origin of the Work of Art”. In discussing substance ontology, Heidegger almost
immediately brings up the support substance ontology derives from the structure of
language itself, a point strongly made previously in the work of such thinkers as
Nietzsche:
“Who would have the temerity to assail these simple fundamental relations
between thing and statement, between sentence structure and thing-structure?
Nevertheless we must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the
combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the
thing (of the union of substance and accidents)? Or could it be that even the
structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the
sentence?”172
The seemingly natural next step, then, is to propose that humanity imposes its way of
speaking and thinking onto the things themselves of the world. It is precisely this
possibility which Heidegger entertains next. At this point, however, we should be aware
enough of Heidegger’s concerns to face with great caution the suggestion that linguistic
structure can be understood fundamentally as an imposition alone. Were we to accept this
position we would be identifying Heidegger with a linguistically savvy Kant, someone
who believes our access to reality itself is denied or deeply distorted by the veil and
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limitation of our language. Language for Heidegger, however, is disclosive and it is
primarily through it that anything is disclosed at all. If there are distortions due to
language, as indeed for Heidegger there are, it can not simply be that language is just
imposed upon a nonlinguistic Being. As Heidegger’s reply to Natorp makes clear,
language itself must have a deep primordial connection to what comes to be seen through
language. Here in “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger makes a similar assertion:
“Actually, the sentence structure does not provide the standard for the pattern of thingstructure, nor is the latter simply mirrored in the former. Both sentence and thingstructure derive, in their typical form and their possible mutual relationship, from a
common and more original source.”173 The appropriate reply, then, to the claim that the
substance/accident structure is central to language will be a more complex movement of
pointing out other ways of speaking which have been covered over through time, citing
perhaps elements of old German or Ancient Greek, while also tracing the supposedly
“natural” subject-predicate formation to a rather unnatural origin in mistranslation and
reformulation of concepts in the move from Greek to Latin. In other words, in terms of a
point we have repeatedly made, ways of speaking which once originated from things
themselves have drifted from that origin and become distortive traditions. All of this is a
side note to the most important point for us, which will be that this “more original
source” from which language and thing structure alike derive will be the key background
concern of “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Placing aside the drifting of traditions from
their roots through history, how do these traditions originate to begin with? How, it might
be asked, do we first come to speak of and come to experience anything in the given way
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that we do? Heidegger’s discussion of substance ontology and language in this first
section serves, then, to introduce the issue of the origin of ways of speaking of things as
important for the work which is to follow.
The second conception of the thing plays a central role in empiricism, namely the
idea of the thing as a unity of sensations. This conception need not presuppose substance
ontology but it does represent another major philosophical prejudice in the history of
western philosophy. Often, if we are to reject substance, it is in terms of the deceptive
nature of the sensory access we have to things themselves. In some forms of skepticism,
for example, it is precisely because we only know sensations that we can never know
things themselves. If we accept this position, then an adequate reformulation of our
concept of thinghood would be in terms of sensations alone. We have already
familiarized ourselves with Heidegger’s response to this position, and indeed it is a
response he shares with the Neo-Kantians, namely that we never actually just experience
sensations at all. Experience is actually, in almost all cases, some form of experiencing
as. Thus we don’t hear some sound, we hear a car horn. Even the experience of
something we don’t recognize is an experience which stands out amidst the meaningful
background as the sound of something which we do not recognize. Sensations are, then,
never just experienced simpliciter but rather always experienced as part of the meaningful
structures which make up our world: “Much closer to us than all sensations are the things
themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or
even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things,
divert our ear from them, i.e. listen abstractly.”174 This, of course, simply serves to direct
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our attention to the fact that we always already find ourselves within a meaningful world.
Once more we find ourselves coming back to the question which “The Origin of the
Work of Art” will attempt to address, namely, how a world comes about in the first place.
The first conception, Heidegger says, holds things too far away from us while the
second causes things to press in on us with too great an insistence. The third, then, will
hopefully present the thing in a way such that it will be “allowed to remain in its selfcontainment. It must be accepted in its own constancy.”175 We have already discussed this
third way, the form/matter structure, and its shortcomings. However, it seems worth
noting that despite its incorrectness, it is the starting clue, or formal indication, which will
guide the process of reverse abstraction through the return to the particular experiences
from which the thinghood of the thing, and indeed the workliness of the work, will finally
be conceptualized. Form and matter, then, provide us a way into the essence of art while
the previous two concepts of the thing simply point us to the problem of the origin of
language and the origin of world which alike shall be answered through the discussion of
the being of art.
We find, then, that it is not possible for us to read the first section of the work
without recalling such past concerns as Heidegger’s previous attempts to answer Natorp’s
challenges to phenomenology. For this reason alone we might be wise to read what is to
follow as a continuation and redevelopment of Heidegger’s previous answers. But this
means, as the appearance of the problem of the origin of language and its connection with
the nature of worldhood should suggest, that the real question in this work will be deeper
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than simply enquiring how any given world transforms into another but will rather also
concern the fundamental nature of world origin in general.
Having discussed the three traditional and mistaken ways in which thinghood has
been conceptualized, it remains for us to trace the path Heidegger takes into a discussion
of the origin and nature of art. The key shift which moves the reader into the second
major section of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is one away from the talk of
appropriate conceptualization which dominated the sections we have already discussed
and towards the reliance on a disclosive event as foundational for the investigation. I will
briefly map out this movement.
With the attempt to arrive at an understanding of the thinghood of the thing
having repeatedly run into a dead end, Heidegger suggests that it may be precisely this
tendency of the thing to resist thought which is most proper and characteristic of it:
“The unpretentious thing evades thought most stubbornly. Or can it be that this
self-refusal of the mere thing, this self-contained independence, belongs precisely
to the nature of the thing? Must not this strange and uncommunicative feature of
the nature of the thing become intimately familiar to thought that tries to think the
thing? If so, then we should not force our way to its thingly character.”176
Here, in this rather odd redirection of the investigation, we have a definitive
foreshadowing of the withdrawing and self-refusing nature which will later be thought so
strongly as the nature of earth. In this sense, then, the thingness of the thing will fail to be
richly dealt with until the later sections concerning earth and world. For now, however,
this observation serves to justify Heidegger’s turning to an attempt to think through the
equipmental being of equipment since form and matter, the most promising of the
previous distortive views, originates from a thinking concerning the being of equipment.
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Having failed repeatedly to think the thing, however, how are we to go about
appropriately thinking equipment. This time around Heidegger explicitly states the need
to avoid the imposition of previous interpretive frameworks, in order to do so he attempts
to make the phenomenological turn to simply describing equipment as it is experienced.
In order to “facilitate the visual realization”177 of a piece of equipment in the
service of phenomenological description, Heidegger has chosen to concern himself with
shoes, he turns almost as a side note to consider a painting of shoes done by Van Gogh.
The visual description moves pretty swiftly into a discussion of the usefulness of
equipment, a concept we have already encountered. Thinking about usefulness then
provokes the realization that a piece of equipment is only useful within the setting of its
proper use, which also means it is most fully a piece of equipment when it least draws
attention to itself by working precisely as it should: “The peasant woman wears her shoes
in the field. Only here are they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less
the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or
is even aware of them.”178 This last point, that equipment is most fully equipment when
dependably and unnoticeably doing precisely what it is useful for, is described by
Heidegger as reliability.
It is precisely the nature of reliability, the way in which equipment recedes when
most fully equipment, which seems to suggest that we cannot gain access to the being of
equipment. Indeed, even recognizing reliability as the central nature of equipment would
be denied to us had something not intervened to disrupt the self-concealing nature of
equipment. This is a point with which we are very familiar from Being and Time’s
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178

Ibid. p. 32
Ibid. p. 32

133

discussion of the way in which equipment and the structure of worldhood of which it is a
part naturally withdraw from view if not brought into focus through fairly extraordinary
means. Notice, for example, that we notice the shoes when the heel falls off. But then it is
precisely when the equipment has lost its equipmentality that we notice it. We may from
this come to note the centrality of usefulness for equipment but we will not, it seems,
come to notice self-secluding reliability itself. What, then, has allowed us to notice
reliability? In Heidegger’s text it is the intercession of the work of art which brings it to
our attention, not unlike the way the sign in Being and Time was characterized as a
special piece of equipment useful for bringing other generally concealed parts of the
equipmental totality into view.
Were we to encounter a pair of shoes resting on the floor we would not,
Heidegger claims, come to see the reliability on which their nature depends. We might
see some equipment not currently in use. If the shoes are worn out and broken we might
see equipment which is no longer useful, we might even consider them at that point to be
mere things. The painting, at first, seems to offer us even less than if we experienced the
shoes resting in the corner:
“From Van Gogh’s painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is
nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong –
only an undefined space. There are not even clods of soil from the field or the
field-path sticking to them, which would at least hint at their use. A pair of
peasant shoes and nothing more.”179
We can go even further with this privative description and claim that we don’t even know
that the shoes are shoes of a peasant. We might, taking the lead from critics of Heidegger,
who claim it to actually be the case, suggest the possibility that the shoes are Van Gogh’s
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own.180 We might, perhaps more carefully, simply note that from the painting itself we
have no knowledge of whose shoes they are. “And yet-”181 At this point follows the much
maligned passage in Heidegger’s text where the nature of equipment speaks forth, as it
were, from the painting revealing the nature of the world of the peasant woman. A wiser
commentator than myself might choose to give in at this point to the history of objections
this passage has triggered, objections generally based upon the claim that, even if the
nature of art is to disclose truth, the painting of the shoes can have nothing to say about
the world of a peasant woman insofar as they are actually Van Gogh’s shoes. We might
note that this early description of the disclosive properties of art is not necessary for what
follows after and leave it at that. I suspect, however, that objections such as these have
fundamentally missed the point of the view of art Heidegger is suggesting. I hope to be
able to say briefly how and why this is so.
Let us first ask why, without the key elements that will be developed later in the
text to explain the nature of art, we might be tempted to think for even a moment that
something like Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes might tell us more about equipment
than staring at a pair of shoes in the corner. We have already stressed the way in which
the painting offers us less to go on than even our own experience might. It seems,
however, that it is precisely this point which Heidegger uses as his first real foray into the
nature of art. We first stress the way in which the painting takes the shoes, in some sense,
out of their everyday context in a radical way such that we don’t even know anything
about the room in which they are depicted as resting. We then notice that, deprived of
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their place in the totality of involvements, which is the life and world of he or she who
owned the shoes, the shoes themselves summon forth the totality of involvements from
which they have been taken. We are well prepared to understand why this would be so,
for we have already discussed in the context of Being and Time the fact that there is no,
and cannot be any, singular piece of equipment. The nature of equipment is to always
already be involved in a structure of practices, goals, roles and concerns. As such, it is
impossible for the piece of equipment that is the shoes to stand alone as they at first
appear to do in the painting. Their very lonesomeness there is extraordinary and
summons forth, now noticed as if itself extraordinary, the entire life in which they ought
to fit. In this way the painting calls forth what usually recedes, the totality of
involvements in which equipment is always present and with which it always recedes into
obscurity. Note that everything we have just said, all of which serves precisely to bring to
our attention the equipmental nature of equipment, is entirely unaffected by whether the
shoes belong to a peasant woman, Van Gogh, or anyone else. It is the nature of shoes,
and ultimately equipment, which is of concern.
There is one more thing to note about this subject, and it is precisely the key point
that Heidegger draws from the work’s ability to provide us access to the truth of
equipment: “If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what
and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work. In the work of
art the truth of an entity has set itself to work.”182 The point we wish to focus on, then, is
the event nature of this disclosure of truth which occurs through this preliminary
encounter with Van Gogh’s painting. What has occurred in the painting is an event of
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truth, and not some action of the observer or artist: “This painting spoke. In the vicinity
of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be.”183 The
speaking of the painting, truth setting itself to work, is something in which Van Gogh,
Heidegger, and ourselves are alike caught up and not something determined by any one
of us. Thus, in a sense, it really doesn’t much matter what Van Gogh intended to paint. It
is very possible that, in the course of painting his own shoes, he created a work in which
the truth of equipment was disclosed and that, in the course of this disclosure, the event
caught Heidegger up in the imagery concerning a female peasant. None of these aspects
of the event invalidate any other.
Something else has occurred in this move to discussing the truth event which
occurs through the work of art. We have rather dramatically moved away from the first
inclination which brought Van Gogh’s work to mind to begin with. Heidegger’s first use
for the painting had been to provide some visual example on which to practice
phenomenological description. Now, however, we have found that it is precisely what
was not represented, precisely what was not visually available, in the work which was
central to the event of disclosure that was the work. It is precisely because the painting
lacks context, in this one example, that the equipmental nature of the equipment comes
conspicuously to light. Representation, and all the talk of adequation and correspondence
which representation brings to mind, has been demonstrated at this point to be a deeply
inadequate way of characterizing the nature of the work of art. With it the conception of
truth as correspondence has also been dismissed.
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The one final point to note is the lesson to be drawn from the structure this first
section has taken. We had assumed the thinghood of the thing to be primary, but our
failure to find a way to think our way into this thinghood drove us to shift our attention to
the equipmental being of equipment. This suggests equipment as primordial, a
perspective we are familiar with from Being and Time. Thinking about equipment also,
however, was found to be impossible without the intercession of the work of art. The
event of truth which is art, then, is that upon which our access to thinghood and
equipmentality depends: “The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This
opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art
work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work.”184 It is,
then, the self disclosure which is the event of truth upon which thinghood, equipment and
work depend in the same way as art work and artist.
The structure of this first section is, as we have mentioned, preparatory, in some
sense in a negative way, but also is primarily backward looking to previous concerns and
issues meant to be recalled in order that the reader might appreciate the extent of what
“The Origin of the Work of Art” attempts to achieve. This observation, however, brings
out a specific aspect of the discussion of art which does occur in this first section that we
would be wise to note. The example of Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes stands out, once
one has read the entirety of the work, as a rather different type of art work than much of
what follows after. Starting in section two Heidegger will claim that “great art” is the
only art he intends to consider in his work.185 With a full discussion of earth and world it
will become clear what great art is and it will also become clear that, while Van Gogh
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may have been a great artist and perhaps with great hesitancy a piece of his might be
consider great art in Heidegger’s sense, the painting of shoes certainly will not be so
considered. Noting this point is important for at least two reasons. First, it allows us to
appreciate the spectrum we are dealing with. All true art, we might suggest, will be an
event of truth setting itself to work but not all true art will be great art in the sense of
setting up a new world. Similarly, while am asserting that some art at least must be great
to the extent of setting up a radically new world, not even all great art must be so
understood. Secondly, the very discussions we have offered of Van Gogh’s shoes should
make clear how dependent this section has been on the insights of Being and Time. As I
had noted previously, we could derive the entire discussion of Van Gogh’s shoes from
Being and Time alone. It is our contention, however, that this dependence ends with
section one. An example of this can be found in the nature of the self-secluding we have
found in this first section. Here it is the reliability of equipment and the totality of
involvements of which this reliability is a part that most prominently resists disclosure
and is found to be self-concealing. This corresponds to the way in which the structures of
a specific world in Being and Time also conceal themselves. However, we shall find that
Heidegger’s later discussions of earth go beyond this form of self-concealing and bring
us in touch with the second sense of the concealed, namely the concealed as that which
lies beyond the limits of a given world.
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Section Two: Earth and World
By now we have discussed often enough, tangentially or directly, the
interpretation of “The Origin of the Work of Art” presented by Julian Young and Hubert
Dreyfus to be clear on what they are trying to say. We have, we hope, been able to avoid
giving the impression that their positions are identical, especially since Young himself
characterizes his position as in contrast with Dreyfus. We have, however, attempted to
focus upon a central shared element of their interpretations that we believe the story we
have told so far gives us good reasons to doubt. This shared element is an interpretation
of what opening up a world means which understands it in terms of previously worldly
elements. The reason for the strange phrase “previously worldly elements” is that our
claim is that art can open up a world which was not previously in existence in a world or
as a world. Furthermore this new world, understood as a framework of meaning,
discloses things which previously were not in existence in a world. In contrast to this
position Young understands the opening of a world performed by art as a disclosure of
the always already implicit structures of the existing world. Art, for him, is not
promethean but rather revelatory and thematizing. For Dreyfus, while the world opened
up by a work of art can be a new world in some sense, it is built up out of previously
existing practices which are gathered into a new form. We have already pointed to the
way in which this interpretation is well grounded in division one of Being and Time. A
new world, where world is understood as a structure of practices, purposes and roles
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making up a totality of involvements, can be crafted from previously existing practices
put together to create some new whole which is more than the sum of its parts. Recall, for
example, our previous discussion of the way in which the concept of the artist had to be
crafted out of other already existing social roles with the move into modernity and the
similar way in which the nature of the position of President had to be formed from, and in
contrast to, various other political models of authority in the case of George Washington.
Before we move on to discuss the specific areas of “The Origin of the Work of
Art” which bear most directly on this issue, it might assist us to look briefly at another of
Dreyfus’ writings where he speaks more of his model of opening up a world and more
directly addresses one way in which the type of world creation we are looking for might,
although mistakenly or too limitedly, be conceived. In the book Disclosing New Worlds
co-authored by Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores and Hubert Dreyfus, the very issue of
the opening up of new worlds that is the central problem of the interpretation we are
attempting is addressed in terms of three types of disclosive activities: “Articulation,
reconfiguration, and cross-appropriation are three different ways in which disclosive
skills can work to bring about meaningful historical change of a disclosive space.”186
Each of these three activities involves some sort of change to what is, in this book, called
style. Style is defined as the way in which the various practices that make up a world fit
together, an element which we ourselves have not discussed in our focus on the world as
a structure of practices, roles, ways of speaking and goals. Style would be that which, on
top of all these elements, expresses the nature of their interconnection: “Style is our name
for the way all the practices ultimately fit together. A common misunderstanding is to see
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style as one aspect among many of either a human being or human activity… Our claim
is precisely that a style is not an aspect of things, people, or activity but, rather,
constitutes them as what they are.”187 The shift of focus from just talking about a world,
or frameworks of meaning, to speaking of style effectively clarifies how we can speak of
a new world and yet go on speaking generally of the same practices and norms as before.
If style is the central determination of what a world is and how it discloses entities within
it then changing the arrangement of practices changes the entire structure and we have a
new world.
Articulation, the first of the ways style can be significantly changed, involves a
clarification or reprioritization of the practices which already constitute a disclosive
space. This activity can be a focusing whereby a previous multiplicity of practices
become newly understood through a focusing upon one of the practices as of central
importance. We can understand articulation further in two ways. Either articulation is a
gathering from dispersion or articulation is a retrieval of previously important elements
which have been allowed to sink from focus: “All articulation makes what is implicit
explicit. If what is implicit is vague or confused, then we speak of gathering from
dispersion. If it was once important and has been lost, then we have the special kind of
articulation we call retrieval.”188 The important points for us are first that this very
movement from implicit to explicit fits perfectly into Julian Young’s model, thus we can
understand Young as a sub-case within Dreyfus’ interpretation, and second that the only
element of newness we encounter here is in terms of the style in which practices are
arranged. There are no new practices encountered, let alone an entire totality of
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involvements all of which are new. The same holds true for the next way of changing
style which is called reconfiguration. Reconfiguration is not necessarily a total break with
articulation as a way in which style can change but is, rather, different more by degree
than anything else. In reconfiguration previously marginal practices are shifted to
centrality. This then changes the meaning and distribution of all the other practices within
the framework of disclosure. Where articulation involves making something previously
important but perhaps unclear or fallen from sight once more explicit in its importance,
perhaps even to the extent of making it more central than it was before, reconfiguration
takes something which was perhaps never very important and makes it central for the first
time. These two ways of changing style are the primary ways in which Dreyfus had
conceptualized art’s opening up of a world for Heidegger in his earlier piece “Heidegger
on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics”. As the terms used to
describe these activities suggest, we are here simply dealing with a re-articulation or reconfiguration of practices which have always already been available to us. The final way
to change style goes a little beyond the limitations of the previous two but still, for us,
doesn’t go far enough.
This third formulation is cross-appropriation and it involves the importation of a
practice from another disclosive framework:
“Cross-appropriation takes place when one disclosive space takes over from
another disclosive space a practice that it could not generate on its own but that it
finds useful. These disclosive spaces can be at the level of whole cultures or
societies or nation-states, which we designated worlds, or they can be at the more
restricted levels of professions, industries, companies, and even families, which
we designated subworlds.”189
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It seems worth noting in passing the extensive problems that the possibility of this type of
change of style encounters when we attempt to think about it on the level of actual worlds
and not just subworlds or local worlds where most of the discussion of the book focuses.
It should suffice for our purposes here to note just one point from Being and Time,
namely the lesson we learn from the observation that the term for equipment (Zeug) is a
mass term which can never be either singular or plural, but rather always refers to a
whole. There can literally never be just one equipment. This is why we are forced in
English, for example, to specify that we are discussing “a piece of equipment” rather than
“an equipment”. The lesson drawn from this is that within the framework of a world
anything can only appear as what it is because of the place it occupies in relation to other
practices, pieces of equipment, etc. This was what we had come to realize in chapter two
when we discussed the mode of letting-be or Gelassenheit which is characterized as
letting-be-involved. Now, if we wish to speak of appropriating a practice absolutely
foreign to our world structure, we must face the challenge of how we can even
understand the foreign practice in question to begin with if it has no relational being in
the totality of involvements which is the whole of our linguistic cultural practices. At this
point we might import the entire debates surrounding such related issues as Quine’s work
on radical translation, Kuhn’s incommensurability of scientific paradigms, or Spivak’s
discussion of the impossibility of the speech of the subaltern. We obviously have no time
or space for this discussion here, but it does begin to suggest the many inadequacies that
cross-appropriation would have as an explanation for the rise of a radically new world as
we are conceiving it. Beyond this, it would still base the opening up of the world on a
previously existing practice, if one foreign to the world whose change we are seeking to
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understand. This is not, however, necessarily an inadequacy of the role that crossappropriation plays in Disclosing New Worlds itself. An adequate discussion of such a
topic would take far longer than we have here, but it is worth noting that a primary focus
on changes of subworlds and local worlds and not on the holistic change from one single
world to another would hardly be troubled by those issues which concern us.
Articulation, reconfiguration, and cross-appropriation make up the modes of what
is then called historical world change in contrast with costumary disclosing, which goes
on in a normal way every day, or discontinuous change which is experienced as a rupture
with what came before:
“All of these types of change are historical because people sense them as
continuous with the past. The practices that newly become important are not
unfamiliar. We contrast, then, our notion of historical change with discontinuous
change. When, for instance, a conqueror imposes a whole new set of practices on
a people or a people is dispersed and must adopt wholly new practices to survive,
such change is discontinuous and is beyond our range of interests.”190
In locating, then, Dreyfus’ earlier explanation of what he takes Heidegger to mean by the
opening up of a world in “The Origin of the Work of Art” within the structure of what he
calls in Disclosing New Worlds “historical change” in contrast with forms of
discontinuous change we uncover an implicit claim on the part of Dreyfus that Heidegger
thinks art gives rise to historical but not discontinuous change. Beyond, then, just
pursuing the question whether or not the interpretation of Young and Dreyfus fits into a
wider picture of Heidegger’s work, we might now also ask whether the way in which
Heidegger discusses art seems to suggest he is primarily interested in what Dreyfus calls
historical change or discontinuous change. Is, we might ask, the rise of a new world
through art experienced necessarily as continuous with history? We suspect the answer is
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no. Obviously we do not seek to compare the way a work of art sets up a world to the
imposition of new practices by a authoritarian ruler. If ever there were distoritive
practices in which the things of concerned precisely do not dictate the practices which
concern them it would be in this example. Were it possible to impose a world in this way
- and we think for many reason, some of which we have already mentioned, that such a
full imposition is not possible - then the Heideggerian positions we have studied would
require that such an imposition be rejected as the erection of an empty and horrifically
distorting monstrosity. In other words, there is clearly no respect for the material
determination of form in the imposition of foreign and artificial frameworks.
The example of a people dispersed who have to find new practices may be,
however, particularly illuminating for our purposes. For the sake of space, I shall try to
discuss why as briefly as possible. What does it really mean to suggest that a people
dispersed and, perhaps, forced to wander far from home would have to develop new
practices and thus come to find themselves in a new world? It seems that this is a fairly
unobjectionable observation, and yet looked at from the right angle it can be made
absolutely contiguous with our own interpretation of the way a work of art sets up a
world. To state that a scattered people in a strange land would find themselves caught up
within the evolution of new practices, notice that we have to limit here the language
which seems to suggest that we simply create practices rather than arriving at them
through interaction with matters of concern, implies that practices are based upon and
arise from the matters with which a people interact. Scatter a people in a strange country
and they must deal with different matters, different matters which will give rise to
different practices and ways of speaking, all of which will make up a new world for that
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people. Some practices may no doubt be saved, though in time these too will change in
relation to the varying circumstances. All of this seems commonsensical enough, but it
means very clearly that matters can dictate new practices. Material can dictate new form.
Earth, understood as the undisclosed, can give rise to new worlds. Why, then, the
bewildering insistence of Dreyfus and Young on worlds only arising from previously
existing elements in one sense or another? The answer might be the one stated by
Dreyfus, namely that the example of a scattered people is extreme, rare, and not very
useful for the types of world disclosure Dreyfus is concerned with. This circumstance,
further, seems to have little to do with art.
However, the force of the possibility portrayed in this example remains. What we
claim art sometime does, namely, give rise to new practices and a new world from these
practices, does indeed occur in some contexts. Thus, what we are suggesting can not
simply be impossible or meaningless. Further, if you take seriously Heidegger’s concern
with the way in which practices and ways of speaking become empty and traditions drift,
you can come to see that, were one to come to look under the concealing shroud of an
empty tradition, an entire people may indeed come to find themselves, without ever
having moved an inch, scattered and facing a very strange land. To a culture previously
lost in dissembling or distorting traditions an encounter with the matters themselves
would be just as historically discontinuous as being driven from their homes and forced
away from their previous social cohesion. It seems that it is precisely this which
Heidegger is suggesting some art can do. Furthermore, this need not simply be a return to
what the distortive traditions were before they drifted. It may be that traditions which
once authentically arose from the matters can no longer be vitally connected to them.
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Existence changes, both ours and that of what we concern ourselves with, and so the time
may come when new practices must arise even without a literal cataclysmic scattering of
a people. I am hard pressed to see how either Young of Dreyfus can dismiss this
possibility out of hand. But this question concerning history we shall have to put off until
section three of this chapter. For now we will pursue our interpretation of earth and world
with an eye for the rise of the radically new or suggestions that what art discloses is
experienced as anything but contiguous and familiar.
The central move of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is to think art in terms of
disclosure. This, indeed, is at the heart of the transformation of form and matter into
world and earth. We have already begun building up to this understanding through our
concern in the last chapter to distinguish the undisclosed or concealed understood as
those things implicit or hidden within a world from the more primordial sense of the
undisclosed or concealed as that which lies outside the limits of a specific world and
which that world often does not allow to appear at all. There is a continuity between the
statements that every care as care conceals something, as we discussed in chapter one,
that every clearing or lighting ultimately depends upon the darkness in which it exists as
a disclosure, as we discussed in chapter two in terms of the undisclosed as the mystery in
“On the Essence of Truth”, and finally the claim that world limits what can appear as
much as it allows anything to appear at all. This limitation of any particular world is not
just the self-concealing tendency of the structures of worldhood as seen, for example, in
the concealment of the reliability of equipment which we have already discussed. Rather,
every world as primordial disclosure itself is limited in the sense expressed in the
hermeneutic insight that for something to appear as a specific thing or from a specific
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angle forecloses its simultaneous experience as something else or from another angle.
Further, some of the ways in which a thing can be disclosed may be in contradiction to
other ways in which it might be disclosed such that a thing’s involvement in a given
totality of involvements might keep it, while still located within those relations, from
appearing in any number of other ways. These other ways of its appearing would not,
then, be implicit possibilities of the given world or totality of involvements. Quite to the
contrary, these other possibilities are literally impossibilities within the given world.
Part of what makes the position of Young and Dreyfus appealing may be the
implicit assumption that something is not able to appear, without some form of
dissembling, in two radically conflicting ways. If this were so, then each possible
authentic disclosure of an entity might be assumed to have some sort of structural
connection to any other possible disclosure. In this case we are positing an underlying
structure ordering all disclosure such that the very plural use of the term “world” begins
to look like little more than a literary idiosyncrasy. Of course, there is some basis for this
view. What has all our talk about the material determination of form been meant to
suggest if not that things can determine the way they show up to us, if properly allowed
to, and that ultimately they can determine the entire structure of the world itself. This
does not, however, allow us to help ourselves to the assumption that the things
themselves can not reveal themselves in several apparently contradictory ways in the
contexts of different worlds. Insofar as any given standard of consistency or rationality is
part of the structure of a given world, assumptions about what can or cannot happen from
the fall of one world to the rise of another is an attempt to impose the specific elements of
a given world onto the entirety of Being. There are only standards of consistency within a
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world framework, and the assumption that some standard or continuity unites worlds can
only ground itself in the, I would claim unjustified, supposition that these standards are to
be found outside the structures of particular worlds. In other words, it is to assume that
certain facts are true of the undisclosed mystery, or earth, which is precisely to miss the
extent of the finitude of any given disclosure. There are no facts about earth. At this point
it may be useful to note some precise problematic elements of the terms we have been
using throughout the course of this work. Repeatedly we have spoken of ‘things’ and
‘matters’ which determine conceptualizations, language, or forms. Having moved from
discussing specific disclosures to the entire disclosive structure of world itself, it should
be clear that presuming that outside of a given world, or all worlds, there are discrete
entities, things, or matters is to objectify the mystery or earth. ‘Things’ arise because of
the structure of a world, and what lies outside a world is best understood as the
determining mystery or unknowable ground from which worlds arise. This means, of
course, that we can not be assured of any consistency between worlds without assuming
we know more about the mystery than we do. A claim to the effect that there are
meaningful commonalities between all worlds, or that two worlds apparently occurring
one after another must be continuous in some sense, can ultimately only amount to little
more than a statement of faith. This point is, of course, in conflict with Heidegger’s
ambition in Being and Time to disclose the universal structure of worldhood itself but
this, more than anything, may have been one of the main reasons why the book had to
remain an unfinished project. This is surely suggested by Heidegger’s own closing of
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Being and Time with the statement that his way of laying out the constitution of Dasein
has been nonetheless just one possible way among others.191
If we understand world as the most basic clearing of disclosure amidst primordial
concealment then the understanding of earth towards which we have been driving is of
this primordial concealment on which any finite disclosure is dependent and yet which all
disclosure must thrust from sight. This, then, would be the understanding of world and
earth as they are encountered in the phenomenon of truth in general. However, we must
heed Heidegger’s concern to ground our understanding of earth and world in the
phenomenon of art itself and not in our broader considerations of the nature of disclosure.
These considerations have provided us a good foundation for our look at earth and world
but they hardly touch upon the more difficult details of these elements as they appear in
art.
We must turn now to think earth as it appears in the particularity of the art work.
Heidegger’s engagement with earth takes its real start from a reflection on the different
way in which the material substrate appears in the case of equipment versus the art work:
“In fabricating equipment –e.g., an ax – stone is used, and used up. It disappears
into usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable the less it resists
perishing in the equipmental being of the equipment. By contrast the templework, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather
causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the Open of the
work’s world. The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals
come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak. All
this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of
stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster of
metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and into the
naming power of the word.”192
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What we notice, then, is that rather than disappearing into usefulness as occurs with
equipment, and indeed even to equipment itself as a whole, that out of which the art work
is made first comes to really be experienced as what it is in its being part of the art work.
This, however, calls for a renovation of the sentence we have just written, for art
understood more primordially as an event of truth comes to disclose for the first time as
what it is what our previous sentence seemed to assume was already laying about presentat-hand. The temple is not, then, made of rock but rather makes rock accessible to us as
rock. We are skirting what I consider the greatest difficulty in interpreting “The Origin of
the Work of Art”, namely the question of how to unite the understanding of earth and
world we have modeled on disclosure to the understanding in terms of art which is
generally modeled on work material and completed form. In other words, how do we
think something like “the massiveness of stone” in terms of the concealed such that we
are not just dealing with an inventive analogy? It will help us to say a bit more about the
nature of earth in the art work.
Heidegger provides an example of the nature of earth through discussing the
pressing downward which manifests the heaviness of stone. This pressing downward, we
are told, “denies us any penetration into it”193. If we break open the stone the heaviness
retreats into the pieces; we do not find it hidden within. If we weigh the stone we have
translated the pressing downward into a mathematical form, but we have not captured the
heaviness. In fact, at that moment, we have lost the heaviness entirely. In reading, say in
a scientific report, the weight of something there is precisely no experience of that
weight. We could go even further and attempt to capture the stone’s pressing downward
193
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in terms of gravity and the warping of space-time created by mass as conceived by
Einstein, and then we would have truly lost any experience of weight in the very heights
of a theoretical abstraction the phenomenological attestation of which, almost by
definition, we can have no experience.
Similarly, Heidegger states: “Color shines and wants only to shine. When we
analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only
when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to
penetrate into it.”194 The nature of this remaining undisclosed is very obviously here not
strictly a remaining entirely concealed. The color shines, it just cannot be disclosed
further than that. In this way, then, the work of art which allows the color to shine lets the
earth be an earth insofar as it discloses, not necessarily the essence of being of color, but
the way in which it alone allows anything to appear to us and yet remains ultimately a
mystery. As noted, we can come to understand the phenomenon of color and light in
various frameworks, such as that of the physical sciences, but these never really tell us
anything more about the shine of color but rather translate the sheer thatness of it into a
different language. This shining forth of the mystery that there is color is a restatement in
a new form of the fundamental question of the Introduction to Metaphysics, namely why
are there beings at all rather than nothing? We might ask why there is color at all rather
than nothing, but the sheer fact of color is that upon which all visual phenomenon, at
least, rests and behind which we ultimately cannot get. However, the art work may place
us before this particular experience of color as color, this startling experience of the
mystery that it is at all in a way behind which we can not get. In this way the art work lets
194
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an earth be an earth. How are we to connect this understanding of earth to the one which
we have been modeling on a hermeneutic understanding of the event of disclosure in
general?
I believe the answer lies in the way in which remaining true to the event nature of
art forces us to rethink something as simple as the experience of the weight of a rock or
the shine of color. If we really do attend to the experience of the weight and hardness of
stone in the Greek temple we come to see not that these characteristics are that upon
which the temple depends in a sense analogical or parallel to the way in which any
specific disclosure depends upon the undisclosed amidst which it arises. Rather, in the
event which is the temple, the weight and hardness of stone is both that out of which the
temple emerges and that which only appears as what is depended upon. We are, then,
dealing with different manifestations of the same type of event, namely the event of
disclosure. In coming to experience something as something, it is only from amidst
everything which is not experienced and can not be experienced in that given event of
disclosure that the first experience is possible. The finitude of disclosure means that it is
dependent upon and delivered over onto all that it can not disclose even as the finitude of
the painting or temple rests in their inability to present anything more of that upon which
they depend than the sheer shine or weight, and the very characteristic that the shine and
weight can not be gotten behind. What we see here, however, is that the self-concealing
of earth goes quite a bit beyond the way in which the reliability of equipment is never
normally itself noticed. The withdrawal of reliability, and indeed that of the entirety of
involvements, will indeed be part of the self-concealing of earth. For this reason the art
work will, as in the case of Van Gogh’s shoes, bring reliability and the totality of
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involvements into sight as those elements which are self concealing as is asserted in
Young’s interpretation of Heidegger. However, it is also the sheer “that it is” and the
broad darkness in which rests all the other ways in which it could be which shelter under
the rubric of earth: “Beings refuse themselves to us down to that one and seemingly least
feature which we touch upon most readily when we can say no more of beings than that
they are. Concealment as refusal is not simply and only the limit of knowledge in any
given circumstance, but the beginning of the clearing of what is lighted.”195 The very
dependence of world upon earth, however, would therefore suggest that the rise, tarrying,
errancy and/or fall of a world is dependent upon all those many ways of experience and
addressing things which it precisely does not have access to. The very fact that we can
not get back behind the shine of color, that we can not master its origin or understand its
being, points out that we are always delivered over to the way in which it currently shines
which, quite beyond our power to add or detract, could always have been, or come to be,
different:
“Things are, and human beings, gifts, and sacrifices are, animals and plants are,
equipment and works are. That which is, the particular being, stands in Being.
Through Being there passes a veiled destiny that is ordained between the godly
and the counter-godly. There is much in being that man cannot master. There is
but little that comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, which is
mastered insecure. What is, is never of our making or even merely the product of
our minds, as it might all too easily seem.”196
At any moment the color could fade, the hardness of the stone dissolve, the “es gibt”
stop giving197 and the world of the work, or the world in which we work, could end.
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It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the specific form of the earth in
poetic art and to ask how this form of the earth connects up to everything we have been
saying so far. We have already read a formulation for the earth in poetry as “the naming
power of the word”, elsewhere we are also given reason to think of the earth in a poetic
or theatrical work of art as the common folk sayings and, perhaps, myths of a people:
“In the tragedy nothing is staged or displayed theatrically, but the battle of the
new gods against the old is being fought. The linguistic work, originating in the
speech of the people, does not refer to this battle; it transforms the people’s saying
so that now every living word fights the battle and puts up for decision what is
holy and what unholy, what great and what small, what brave and what cowardly,
what lofty and what flighty, what master and what slave (cf. Heraclitus, Fragment
53).”198
Later, in section three of the work, Heidegger will go on to say that all real art work is
poetic in nature. What he will mean by this is not that art should be thought of in terms of
communication or linguistic or discursive elements but rather that the being of language
and art alike are both most originally thought of in terms of disclosure and that, insofar as
a people’s world is most fundamentally tied to its language, all true art can be valuably
thought through in terms of the way in which language opens up a world poetically. Now
much of what we have said throughout the course of this work has involved the relation
of language to the things of which it speaks. How might we attach Heidegger’s reference
to the earth in language as the naming power of the word of the sayings of a people to our
previous considerations of language? In thinking about that in language beyond which we
can not go, that upon which linguistic art or any use of language at all depends, we might
notice first that, much as Heidegger suggests that any traditional understanding of truth as
correspondence depends upon an already existing space of meaning or clearing, language
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itself depends upon that sheer fact of meaning and that things can come to be disclosed
through language. Before we can speak of anything it must first be the case that language
has meaning, in other words that language brings things into disclosure. Thus we might
contrast working language with the danger of idle talk and empty intending with which
Heidegger is so concerned. It is indeed possible for the word to loose its naming power,
for language to spin like a wheel disconnected from the machine to borrow an image
from Wittgenstein. In that case language becomes something else, and less, than
authentic language. It becomes a diversion, a distracting haze. We might, then, consider
the naming power of words to refer to the power of language to derive from, and bring
into disclosure, the matters itself with which it is concerned. In this sense, then, language
depends at its heart upon what we have been calling the material determination of form.
What we have said suggests that the earth in language or poetic art might be
correctly taken in two senses. First, there is the earth found in the common and traditional
sayings of a people. This is indeed the basis upon which a current language depends and
from which poetry will arise while, all the same, the richness of the language will resist
being entirely appropriated or brought into clarity by the work of art. The old legends will
always have more to say, and will never submit to complete reformulation. This is so
because the common sayings of a people harkens back to an original encounter with the
matters of concern from which meaningful speech arises. The dependence of poetry on
the sayings of a people is, then, the dependency of it upon an original experience of
Being. This nicely joins up with Heidegger’s interest in the process of destructuring to
return to the authentic origins of language. This, however, is only one possibility. The
other understanding of earth in language is the deeper one of the naming power of the
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word itself which might arise as easily from a new experience of Being as an old one.
Language, once born from an experience of Being, can just as easily be born anew not
through a return but rather through a new encounter. We can see, then, that poetry may
both harken back or leap forward and in each case, if it is truly great art, arrive at the
experience of Being from which the word derives its naming power. In the one case we
would fit very nicely into the understanding of Heidegger found in Dreyfus and Young
while the second is a possibility they fail to account for. It is this leaping forward to a
new experience of Being which we have in mind when we talk of the rise of a radically
new world.
There is one last point concerning the way in which the art work lets an earth be
an earth which we should stress before moving on. Clearly we find here a rather unique
formulation and deeper understanding of Gelassenheit. Previously Gelassenheit was
mainly understood as the necessity to keep artificial or distortive ways of relating to
matters from being imposed upon them; rather matters themselves had to be left to give
rise to their own practices, etc. With the withdrawing characteristic of the earth, however,
we come to see that those things we might understand as the earth in any given
circumstance are not just prone to distortion but rather actively resist being forced into
frameworks in which they do not belong. The earth must be allowed to be an earth
because, as was pointed out with the downward thrust of the stone or shine of color, the
more we attempt to grasp it the more we lose it until we are left with a series of numbers
or a lofty abstraction alone. Color only is color when it is allowed to shine. The very
concept of earth, then, might be considered a particular reformulation of the problem of
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Gelassenheit which brings into sharp focus a further understanding of the principle of the
material determination of form and all the many issues we have found connected with it.
The world and earth are presented by Heidegger as existing in a constant state of
strife. This strife is the tension between the disclosure that is world and its own finitude
in the sense both that it is dependant upon that which it can not surmount and also that in
each disclosure it conceals as much as it reveals. The world is a closing as much as an
opening and each disclosure is a denial as well:
“The nature of truth, that is, of unconcealedness, is dominated throughout by a
denial. Yet this denial is not a defect or a fault, as though truth were an unalloyed
unconcealedness that has rid itself of everything concealed. If truth could
accomplish this, it would no longer be itself. This denial, in the form of a double
concealment, belongs to the nature of truth as unconcealedness. Truth, in its
nature, is un-truth. We put the matter this way in order to serve notice, with a
possibly surprising trenchancy, that denial in the manner of concealment belongs
to unconcealedness as clearing.”199
One of the characteristics of Dasein’s falling, however, is the tendency for disclosure to
cover over not just those things it does not disclose or forecloses from being disclosed but
rather also the concealing of this very fact about itself. Disclosure as it occurs in our
everyday lives presents itself precisely as neither an achievement nor as tentative; this is
partially the meaning of so much of the talk in Being and Time about Dasein losing itself
in the objects of its concern. We forget, or cover over, the very finitude of our position
and the partiality of all disclosure. The uniqueness of art, and part of what makes it
potentially the primordial event of truth in which a clearing as a whole is opened up, is
the fact that in not just setting up a world but also in disclosing an earth as an earth the
artwork presents its own finitude. The world set up by a work of art, because of the
presence of its earth, reveals the finitude of the world whereas we usually loose ourselves
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in taking our world to be final and absolute. It is questionableness which the art work
insists upon even as it occurs as the setting up of a world.
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Section Three: Beginning History
“Whenever art happens – that is, whenever there is a beginning – a thrust enters history,
history either begins or starts over again.”200
We have, then, come to the end of this work in the topic of the beginning of
history. This has been, in a sense, what we have been driving at to begin with. When
categorial intuition became pre-ontological understanding in Heidegger it was made
possible to ask how we come to seemingly always already have an understanding of
Being. The answer is, in a sense, the beginning of history, that certain original disclosures
of existence give rise to the practices in which our pre-ontological understanding is
contained. The matters, at some time in some way, give rise to the practices through
which we then understand and discuss what is. As we had suggested at the beginning of
the previous section, through looking at Disclosing New Worlds we come to see that our
disagreement with Dreyfus, which already includes Young’s position as a special case,
can be reformulated by asking whether the world set up by art is always historically
continuous. In contrast to Dreyfus’ insistence that the practices set up by a work of art are
rearrangements of previously existing practices set into a different style such that these
practices are always experienced as in some sense familiar, we assert that the work of art
as conceived by Heidegger often serves to disclose things which are experienced as
uncanny, radically new, and even strange or bizarre.
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Before we press on, however, it is worth admitting, or recalling that we have
already admitted in the introduction to this work, that depending on which statements
from “The Origin of the Work of Art” one chooses to focus on each argument, Dreyfus’,
Young’s and my own, can be supported or seemingly defeated. For this reason we have
not just presented an argument with Dreyfus and Young based on the text of “The Origin
of the Work of Art” but rather we have also sought to suggest that, while there are ways
to support their positions, it leaves out something vital that is developing through the
course of Heidegger’s life work. If world change and world formation is always a case of
rearranging already existing elements in what sense have we maintained the interest
which originally drew Heidegger to categorial intuition, in what way have we continued
to assert that cultural practices and philosophy itself can, when properly understood, arise
faithfully from existence itself? The position which Dreyfus and Young would suggest
overlooks the very real concern for Heidegger that our practices can either be true to the
matters they concern or falsify them insofar as they can arise from them and later become
distortions. This position makes it necessary to admit the possibility that matters may
give rise to new practices through which they are disclosed or, to avoid the deceptive
image of static “matters” residing behind or underneath the world, that Being can disclose
itself in radically new ways. Hopefully, then, we have successfully shown that we have
historical and biographical reasons beyond textual ones to support our view. We should
look closer, however, at the textual ambiguities and see if we can explain away some of
them.
Let us first look at passages that seem to clearly support our view and then,
glancing at some passages which may contradict us, hope to find some kind of
162

reconciliation. In presenting Dreyfus’ interpretation of the work of art as gathering and
reorganizing previously familiar practices such that the new world is always experienced
as historically continuous with what came before we might offer the following
resounding contradiction form “The Origin of the Work of Art”:
“The setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the unfamiliar and extraordinary and at
the same time thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe to be such. The truth
that discloses itself in the work can never be proved or derived from what went
before. What went before is refuted in its exclusive reality by the work. What art
founds can therefore never be compensated and made up for by what is already
present and available. Founding is an overflow, an endowing, a bestowal.”201
It seems clear from this that the work precisely does not gather the already familiar.
Further, we are clearly told that the new world that arises from the work can never be
derived from what went before. We might also draw on another section from several
pages earlier:
“Art then is the becoming and happening of truth. Does truth, then, arise out of
nothing? It does indeed if by nothing is meant the mere not of that which is, and if
we here think of that which is as an object present in the ordinary way, which
thereafter comes to light and is challenged by the existence of the work as only
presumptively a true being. Truth is never gathered from objects that are present
and ordinary.”202
This talk of the truth arising from nothing, but a nothing understood as the not of that
which is rather than a void or emptiness, can be interpreted as pointing to the precise
understanding of the undisclosed as earth towards which we have repeatedly looked.
Truth arises out of that which a given world conceals or makes impossible, but which a
new and different world might reveal. This, of course, would mean that the new world set
up by a work of art would necessarily challenge the current one, and would precisely
have to thrust down into concealment what was previously ordinary. In the face of
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Dreyfus’ assertions, then, we might simply state with Heidegger that the most extreme
cases of the disclosure of truth in art are never gathered from what is present and
ordinary.
We must, however, be cautious of the seemingly dual voice of “The Origin of the
Work of Art”. Following both of the quotations we have just drawn upon Heidegger
makes statements which Young and Dreyfus both might use to their advantage, for
example: “Genuinely poetic projection is the opening up or disclosure of that into which
human being as historical is already cast.”203 Here we have the implication, certainly
amenable to Young’s interpretation, that poetic projection discloses a world we have
already been in but which we did not previously notice. Repeatedly Heidegger seems to
state both my position, and those of Dreyfus’ and Young, side by side:
“Poetic projection comes from Nothing in this respect, that it never takes its gift
from the ordinary and traditional. But it never comes from Nothing in that what is
projected by it is only the withheld vocation of the historical being of man itself.
Bestowing and grounding have in themselves the unmediated character of what
we call a beginning. Yet this unmediated character of a beginning, the peculiarity
of a leap out of the unmediable, does not exclude but rather includes the fact that
the beginning prepares itself for the longest time and wholly inconspicuously.”204
One way in which to make sense of these statements from the position we are presenting
is to note that, insofar as the earth contains what any given world both conceals and fails
to reveal and insofar as it is from this that a new world arises and on which it will depend,
it is in the finite and perhaps distorting nature of the previous world that the new one had
been preparing itself for the longest time inconspicuously. We are aided in this by an
earlier statement of Heidegger’s: “At bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extra-

203
204

Ibid. p. 73
Ibid. p. 73

164

ordinary, uncanny.”205 This statement comes in the course of Heidegger’s discussion of
the way in which truth is untruth. Guided by this we might point out that, insofar as what
is disclosed in the everyday world in a determinate manner also has other ways of being
disclosed which are absent or actively concealed by the one manner of disclosure, what
we take to be ordinary is always potentially historically discontinuous and radically
uncanny. The ordinary is, then, precisely that in which we haven’t recognized the finitude
and partiality of all disclosure. But, if as we have discussed the nature of art is to let an
earth be an earth and in doing so reveal the finitude of all disclosure, all true art must give
rise precisely to a disclosure of the uncanny.
We seem, then, on good ground in stating that, contra Dreyfus, some art must give
rise to a discontinuous and radically new world precisely not born out of previously
familiar practices. In fact this new world might be precisely in the most extreme conflict
with the previous world. This position is stressed by Heidegger through his focus on the
ambiguity of the genitive construction that we find in a statement like “the origin of the
work of art”. The genitive is always in some sense ambiguous and often richly so. Notice,
for example, that in this case we may be speaking of that from which the work of art has
its origin, which will be from art in one sense and from truth more primordially insofar as
art is a form of truth, or we may be speaking of the origin which is the work of art.
Heidegger plays on this rich ambiguity while also considering the original sense of the
German word for origin, or Ursprung, which can literally mean a primal or original leap:
“Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the
truth of what is, in the work. To originate something by a leap, to bring something
into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap – this is what the
word origin (German Ursprung, literally, primal leap) means. The origin of the
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work of art – that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to
say of a people’s historical existence, is art. This is so because art is by nature an
origin, a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes
historical.”206
Surely the source of a thing’s nature out of which its origin leaps is not simply going to
be a juggling of previous practices. Rather, it seems precisely the origin of practices them
selves with which we concern ourselves when we discuss art as the origin of history
itself. If, in the founding that is the overflowing of truth through a great work of art, a
new thrust enters history to the extent of either starting, or starting anew, history we can’t
possibly be in the realm of historical continuity where continuity is understood in terms
of the retention of common elements from one stage to the next. This could never be
experienced as anything but an irruption of the new into history, a new which is
destructive of that which was previously presumed to be given and universal. As we have
said before, however, this need not be the case in all art. There are many, and it may be
true even of most, cases in which the understanding of Dreyfus and Young will work
perfectly. But it seems very clear that Heidegger needs for there to be some cases in
which their understanding will not work, otherwise he has lost the entire value which
categorial intuition first had for him, namely the chance for things to disclose themselves
from themselves rather than being limited simply to what is imposed either previously or
currently.
It may, however, be appropriately asked if we can think of any possible example
in which art could possibly have worked in this way. Further, isn’t there something about
the earth-world relation which precisely suggests that, in relation to the earth, there is
always some given on which art depends? As has potently been pointed out to me, a
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musician must use the same notes as those who came before him to craft his music even
as the colors an artist uses are already in existence. Does this provide support to Dreyfus’
focus on art as a re-organizing of the previously existent? The answer is yes, in some
cases, but not in all. In many cases art is historically continuous and the musician’s work
uses the same notes as previous musicians and can also be understood as a development
of, or return to, traditional themes. At the very least the act of playing and writing music
is performed within the context of most of the same practices, otherwise we couldn’t
recognize it as music at all. However, different scales of notes have come to be
throughout history, and new instruments have given rise to new sounds although not
perhaps, strictly speaking, to new notes. Of course, in this sense, speaking of notes has
itself become something of a theoretical abstraction disconnected from the real “clang of
tone” which is surely different in the move from one instrument to another. In a sense the
invention of the piano gave rise to clangs of tone which were never previously possible.
Clearly, however, the work of the first musician to use a piano was still couched within
many traditions and practices. However this at least suggests the possibility of change in
even the seemingly fundamental and unchanging, it is only in an abstract sense that
musical notes have stayed the same through time.
We might be in more trouble when it comes to discussing color, but even there we
have some ground to stand on. At least part of what Heidegger implies, if we take
seriously his claim that only in the work of art does color first come to shine, is that the
red experienced in a dramatically new work of art, although in some sense strictly the
same color, may have come to shine in a very different way from anything that had
existed before. It would be a mistake to see here a new arrangement of previously
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existing elements insofar as Heidegger repeatedly asserts that it is in the event of the
work of art that the elements come to be what they are. If we take this seriously we have
nothing even resembling a “new arrangement” but rather the leap of a new shine for red
into being. This is, in fact, one response open to Dreyfus in the face of my description of
his position, specifically that providing a new style to the arrangement of practices is
providing new practices in a deeper sense than I seem to have taken into account.
However it does, I feel, endanger his position on historical continuity insofar as here we
are claiming the supposedly continuous elements to be misconceived abstractions, i.e. red
has precisely not remained the same at all and neither have the practices which have been
re-arranged. As I have attempted to suggest it is part of the nature of earth itself that we
can not know that it is stable or complete. We are delivered over onto it in the same way
we are delivered over onto Being, and as we have attempted to suggest we have no
position from which to assert that it is impossible that entirely without warning the earth
might come itself to radically change through some new leap.
We might push our examples a bit further while suggesting at each step that we
draw nearer to the most radical type of opening a world Heidegger is concerned with. Our
position would be stronger were we to consider the rise of a new art form entirely. The
creation of the novel, perhaps, or the essay might work as such an example. Looking for
an even more radical shift we might turn to the birth of writing itself, a truly radical
creation of a new form of art. Looking at the transition in Ancient Greece, for example,
from an oral culture to a written one we might observe the rise of abstract language in the
Pre-Socratics and finally in Plato. Here we literally have the ability to write things which
could never have been written before not just because there was no writing before but
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also because abstract language gives rise to entirely new ways of thought. Here we have
the birth of that strange art form called philosophy. Truly this is a primal leap and the
origin of a certain history and a certain world. Looking for an example, then, of the type
of art Heidegger has in mind we might point to the dialogues of Plato where a brand new
world of abstract entities has been born. These, of course, are all just suggestive
examples, each with its strengths and weaknesses and each needing more extensive
development. However, we feel confident that even if we could not pinpoint a single case
in which the originating power of art we are claim Heidegger wants to insist upon,
namely the power to open up a radically new world from elements not previously in
existence, was present it would still remain as something of a transcendental possibility,
that which must be possible given the way in which Heidegger understands disclosure
and art. There is, of course, a distinction to be made between drawing out the
implications of Heidegger’s thought and attempting to demonstrate its truth. Throughout
the course of this work we have at times attempted the first but never extensively
concerned ourselves with the second. It may be that, much as in the case of Heidegger’s
claim to uncover the universal structure of worldhood in Being and Time, the furthest
implications of what Heidegger says in “The Origin of the Work of Art” represent the
limits of that work and the questions it leaves to be addressed.
In conclusion allow me to restate the basic elements of my claim as schematically
as possible and then discuss some connected issues, implications and problematic
elements which may serve to clarify the issue further. I am claiming that Heidegger’s
engagement with world disclosure in “The Origin of the Work of Art” follows from his
earliest concerns with how we can allow the matters of concern, and/or the undisclosed,
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dictate the ways in which we are to relate to them. Categorial intuition was exciting for
Heidegger because it provided a way for things to dictate their own categorial elements.
When this insight is purged of its theoretical elements we arrive at the pre-ontological
understanding found in our everyday and traditional practices. For this view to maintain
the promise offered by categorial intuition practices must be derived from the matters or
things they concern, and not just imposed. However, as Heidegger’s concern with
destructuring makes clear, practices can become detached from their origins in the
matters of concern and can thus end up being distortive and concealing. The question left
open by this path is how practices arise from the things they concern or, from a wider
perspective, how the ultimate disclosive framework which is world arises from the
undisclosed.
In Being and Time Heidegger speaks of his project as a return to primordial
origins: “We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our
clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those
primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of
Being – the ways which have guided us ever since.”207 The question we claim he
attempted to answer afterwards was what the primordial experience, or wellspring of a
tradition, is like. What does the beginning of history look like? What this language makes
clear, however, is that if we are going to maintain Heidegger’s commitment to his own
form of realism and the concept of primordial beginnings and new beginnings for history
it has to be possible for old worlds to fall and radically new worlds to arise. Talk of
historical continuity would seem to contradict the very idea of a primordial experience of
207
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Being starting history. This doesn’t, however, mean that we are claiming there is ever just
earth or a pure experience of something like Kant’s thing-in-itself. The primordial
experience is the rise of a world, and all worlds are partial and finite interpretive
frameworks. There may be an infinite number of possible originating experiences of
Being giving rise to an infinite number of worlds with no one experience being absolute
or total. The question is not whether we experience the undisclosed without interpretation
but rather whether all world frameworks bear some continuous relation to what came
before. As I have suggested, to presume that all world frameworks do bear some
continuous relation to what came before is to presume to know something certain about
the nature of the undisclosed itself upon which the necessity of continuous relation would
rest. This, I feel, we can not do.
I had mentioned earlier that it is difficult to provide an example of a radically new
world. I should now say something about why this is so. In discussing historically
discontinuous worlds we are clearly dealing with the issue of incommensurability. If two
worlds are not continuous, i.e. if they do not share elements and practices, then there is no
way that they can be compared. To recognize any element of the one world in the other
that element would have to find a place in the totality of involvements of the interpreting
world. At that point either the worlds do, in fact, prove to be continuous or we have not
really grasped the element of the foreign world. In other words, it is almost a logical
truism to state that an example of a world radically discontinuous from the one we
currently occupy can not be presented because the discontinuous world can only be
experienced at all within our world insofar as it has been made continuous with it in some
sense. If we recognize this then we could suggest both that, because of the nature of
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worldhood itself, we have no access to an example of a radically new historically
discontinuous world and also that any number of historical changes which we recognize
as apparently continuous may not actually be continuous from a hypothetical, and
impossible, standpoint outside of either the old or new world. What we retrospective
interpret as continuous may never have been so. Ultimately, however, I think that what
we find is that taking both a realist commitment to the principle of material determination
and Heidegger’s conception of worldhood seriously we end up facing a boundary of what
is conceivable.
This last point I have suggesting is nicely presented by Hans-Georg Gadamer in
his discussion of the connected concepts of abyss and ground:
“What is an abyss? Plainly it is something whose depths one can never
completely plumb, or better something that one can only plumb and never get to
the bottom of. This, however, implies something else: at the bottom of the abyss
there is ground, but of such nature that as we penetrate to it, this ground always
recedes again, away from us and into the depths, depths at the bottom of which
there is nevertheless ground… Again and again he [Heidegger] leaved over the
abyss and sought to get to the ground at the bottom of it. In his search for the
other beginning, or better, in preparing for a thinking that could make another
beginning, he tried to get back behind Aristotle’s metaphysic and back behind
Plato.”208
I believe this image of the plumbing of the receding ground of an abyss fits nicely the
circumstance we find ourselves in right now. Notice that, if we take my discussion of
incommensurability seriously, we can’t really be talking about art anymore. The
discussion in “The Origin of the Work of Art” has gone far beyond it. For us to recognize
something as art, as great art which sets up a radically new world, we must have
continuities at our disposal which I am unwilling to grant. This draws out, then, the
implications of the spectrum I have been insisting on throughout these three chapters. Art
208
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can be an event of disclosure, and great art can be an event of world disclosure in all the
various senses Young, Dreyfus and myself have discussed. However, when we come to
the furthest end of the spectrum of the opening up of a brand new history in the
disclosure of a radically new world, when we attempt to plumb the question to the
greatest depth possible, we are no longer speaking of anything we could call art or even
great art. Just as Heidegger’s historical destructurings were to push his location of the
primordial experiences ever further back behind the earliest thinkers in the tradition of
philosophy, so too his attempt to think great art as primordial world disclosure leads,
finally, to a further abyss beyond the topic of art. It is leaning over the edge of this further
abyss that we must leave this work.
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Epilogue: The Question Remains
“But the question remains: is art still an essential and necessary way in which
that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no
longer of this character?”209
I had begun this work with the simple goal of coming to understand “The Origin
of the Work of Art” in the light of Heidegger’s work which had come before it, and most
specifically in the light of the rich access we now have to so much of his early work
executed before Being and Time. In the course of this attempt I came to formulate the
way in which two influential readings of “The Origin of the Work of Art” might be seen
to be inadequate in the face of the light cast upon Heidegger’s later work by his earliest
concerns. Much as Heidegger’s simple question as to the origin of the work of art led him
to a deep questioning of the relation of truth to history and the relation of art to
contemporary humanity, my seemingly simple question of how to read “The Origin of the
Work of Art” has brought to my mind wider questions concerning the place of
Heidegger’s work on art in the path of philosophy following Heidegger’s time and the
place of art itself within that movement. The question which Heidegger kept alive in the
epilogue to his own work is still alive in the epilogue to mine. Is art still an essential way
in which truth which is historically decisive happens? What role has art, so conceived,
played in the philosophy which has drawn much of its descent from Heidegger, whether
for or against him? What role has the connection of truth and art, descending from the
209
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German romantics through Hegel into Nietzsche and thence from Heidegger to Gadamer
and eventually into French thought and destined, through Georges Bataille and Jacques
Lacan for example, to influence such thinkers as Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, and
Jacques Derrida, played in the history of recent continental philosophy? These are the
questions to which our attempt to think through Heidegger point as we suspected they
might when we stated in our introduction that the role that Heidegger attributes to art,
following many years of wrestling with questions concerning the nature of philosophy
itself, suggests that philosophy of art and art itself are far from periphery when it comes
to the nature of philosophy in general. Indeed, with Heidegger taking up the theme from
Nietzsche, we begin to see the centrality of art for philosophy and of art in philosophy, as
well as the conception of philosophy as art, all due to the connecting of truth to poeticartistic disclosure. The linguistic turn which occurred in twentieth century philosophy has
been well traced, but the artistic turn remains to be adequately mapped out. When it has
been we may see that it was the destiny of the question Heidegger fatefully asked at the
end of “The Origin of the Work of Art” to arrive, through the rich and turbulent history of
twentieth century continental philosophy, at a dramatic and exciting answer in the work
of such thinkers as Nelly Richard in Chile. In attempting to assert the fundamental
relevance of “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Heidegger’s thought we arrive, then, at
the question of the fundamental relevance of thinking concerning the connection of truth
and art to the history of philosophy since Heidegger’s work, or further the role of art as
truth in history itself. This is the path which remains to be followed, a path for which
what you have already read is only preparatory.
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